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Political communication and advertising are not performed only by politicians and parties. 
Governments around the world also invest in advertising at the national, subnational, and local 
levels. However, the study of government advertising has deserved little-to-no attention in political 
science. In this dissertation, I aim at filling this gap and try to answer four interrelated questions. 
First, what is the content of government advertising? Second, how does government advertising 
affect citizens’ political attitudes and behavior? Third, what factors explain governments’ 
expenditures with advertising? Fourth, does government advertising have political impacts on 
outcomes that matter for incumbent governments, more particularly electoral outcomes? This 
dissertation shows how government advertising matters by using Brazil as a case to be studied. 
Here, I argue that incumbent governments invest in advertising with the goal of building a 
reputation for accomplishments and also to signal effort to the electorate. Concerning the impact on 
attitudes and behaviors, I contend that government advertising and partisan advertising interact with 
the information environment to realize effects on voters.  
The dissertation is organized around a literature review on government advertising, a 
theoretical chapter, and four empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter carries out a content 
analysis of more than 400 ads from the state of Minas Gerais and its municipal governments and 
proposes a classification scheme for government ads. The second conducts an online survey 
experiment on 1,800 Brazilians to verify how government advertising affects the attitudes and 
behaviors of voters. The third chapter studies the determinants of and the impact of government 
 v 
advertising spending at the subnational level, in the state of Minas Gerais. Finally, the fourth 
empirical chapter analyzes the impact of government advertising in Brazilian municipalities and 
takes into account the effect of government advertising in conjunction with campaign spending.  
The results show that government advertising matters politically, with relevant impacts on 
incumbent’s vote share, turnout, and other measures of campaign effects in the experimental 
inquiry. The study has implications for the study of political communications, campaign effects, 
campaign spending, and incumbency (dis)advantage. It also helps understand better the Brazilian 
competitive political system. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In political science, political communication plays an important role in attempts to explain 
and understand individuals’ acquisition of attitudes and display of certain political behaviors. 
Communication research has long been concerned with the question of why and how people use 
mass media (Cho 2008). The effect of the media on citizens and the media's capacity to influence 
or shape citizens' thoughts have been the object of concern in the most important research work in 
the field (e.g., Lazarsfeld el at 1944; Berelson et al. 1954; Converse, 1962). Of particular interest 
to this literature, studies on political advertising, campaign advertising, and campaign effects have 
produced a voluminous amount of research with important implication about the impact political 
messages can have on citizens. In general, many studies since the beginning have found "minimal 
effects" of campaign efforts and concluded that vote choice decisions have been determined by 
some set of stable predictors, such as party identification, the state of the economy, or 
assessments of the incumbent government or party (Hillygus, 2005a). In spite of that, there has long 
been a disconnect between the conventional wisdom of political scientists and the campaign 
behavior of political operatives. Later, experiments on agenda setting and media priming had a 
profound effect on the fields of political science and political communications (Iyengar and Kinder 
2010; Iyengar et al., 1984). A more recent and growing body of political science research has 
argued, though, that these campaign efforts do in fact influence an individual’s likelihood of voting 
and other political and electoral phenomena. Among such efforts, political advertising has been of 
particular importance. 
Despite some scholarly skepticism, political advertising has been found to exert indirect 
effects (e.g., on learning) and direct effects. Specifically, political advertising has been found to 
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increase voters’ campaign knowledge and shape political decision making and vote choice. A 
sizable body of research has investigated political ad effects on voter turnout, generating mixed 
findings (see Lau et al., 1999). While some have found that political advertising, particularly 
negative tactics, fosters cynicism and further demobilizes the electorate (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, 
and Simon, 1994), others have suggested that political advertising promotes participation. The main 
focus of the studies on media effects and political advertising has been on the impact of political 
messages through parties, politicians, or advocacy coalition and interest groups, especially during 
campaign periods. Further, most studies on the effects of political advertising have been applied 
to the US context, with some exceptions (e.g., Desposato 2006 and 2008). 
However, political communication in general and advertising, in particular, are not 
carried out only by the media or by politicians and parties. Governments also invest in 
communication.  Chief executives such  as presidents "go  public" (Kernell,  1997)  and try to 
influence the course of events by shaping how citizens view certain issues (framing), which 
considerations they hold when evaluating the government (priming), or which issues should 
occupy the public agenda (agenda setting) (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Chong and Druckman, 
2011). One particular form of government communication, though, has deserved little-to-no 
attention in political science: government advertising. Far from being an obscure or irrelevant tool, 
government advertising is broadly used by several governments worldwide, at the national, 
subnational, and local levels. 
Research on government advertising remains a lacuna in political science in general and 
political communication research in particular. So far, scholars have only mentioned government 
advertising in discussions about democracy and political communications without discussing it 
more thoroughly (e.g., Levitsky and Way, 2010; Canel and Sanders, 2016). Most works that mention 
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or study government advertising in social sciences are case studies of specific countries and their 
media markets. Empirical work on the topic is limited to just a handful of studies (more in the 
review of government advertising scholarship in the following chapter). No study to date tries to 
develop a comprehensive theory to explain why governments spend on advertising, how 
government advertising can affect individuals’ behavior, and whether government advertising 
results in any electoral result to incumbent politicians. Also, there have not been studies discussing 
what types of government ads are run (i.e., the content of government ads). 
Thus, this dissertation project aims at providing answers to both gaps above and wants to 
answer four questions. First, what is the content of government advertising? Second, how does 
government advertising affect citizens’ political attitudes and behavior? Third, what factors 
explain governments’ expenditures with advertising? Fourth, does government advertising 
have political impacts on outcomes that matter for incumbent governments, more 
particularly electoral outcomes? This dissertation is the first attempt to explain the determinants 
of and the impact of government advertising at the individual and the aggregate levels. It uses 
Brazil to verify the determinants of government advertising in the state of Minas Gerais from 2003 
to 2014 and its impact in the state for three elections (2006-2010-2014). Moreover, it studies the 
effects of government advertising in Brazilian municipalities for three elections (2008-2012-2016). 
Finally, the dissertation also examines the content of more than 400 ads from the state of Minas 
Gerais and carries out an experiment with more than 1,800 participants. 
The dissertation on government advertising provides several scholarly contributions. The 
study of government advertising allows us to verify the impact of government’s communication 
(other than presidential rhetoric) conveyed by the government outside the campaign periods 
and their information environments. More importantly, in many cases, government advertising is 
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devoid of many cues that help voters process political information, such as party symbols, open 
ideological statements, a political personality (e.g., candidate, elected official) and negativity. 
Thus, it is unknown to us how citizens process government communication in the absence of 
such cues and how other messages in the media can (or do not) help voters process the information 
they find in government ads, and the effects. Moreover, the findings from this project would 
allow us to put credence or not in the importance that some observers attribute to government 
advertising. Despite the large sums of resources spent on advertising in several countries, 
including Brazil, there is limited academic empirical evidence that advertising does change 
citizens' attitudes and does benefit incumbents electorally. Last but not least, the study of 
government advertising can expand our understanding of presidential politics, economic voting, 
and accountability in Latin America. If government advertising benefits incumbents, does it 
benefit citizens as well by making them more informed and better capable of holding incumbents 
accountable? Or does government advertising hinder horizontal accountability (O’Donnell, 
1994) and further buttressing the worse features of presidentialism in Latin American (Linz, 
1990)? This project will be a first step to answer these questions. 
In normative terms, the study of government advertising leads to important implications. 
On the one hand, it is possible to argue that government communication about policies is part of 
the democratic process. Citizens may demand to know what their elected governments are doing 
in their favor. Government entities must communicate about changes in laws, public safety issues, 
and a broad range of issues that may affect people (Liu et al., 2012). Hence, by informing the 
public about its policies and actions, the government may be fulfilling its obligation to be held 
accountable by its citizens. 
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As a rule, though, the distinction between government advertising used for public policy 
purposes and party-political advertising for partisan advantage can become blurred (Kerr et al., 
2008, p.161). Governments can use advertising for propaganda purposes rather than as a non-
partisan public relations tool (Gelders and Ihlen, 2010, p.61). In countries with weak bureaucracies 
or authoritarian rules, it is reasonable to expect that the citizenry may perceive most or all 
government public relations as forms of propaganda and fundamentally distrust all the 
communication efforts (op. cit., p.60), while in more democratic countries citizens may perceive 
governmental communication efforts less as propaganda. Nonetheless, public distrust is severe in 
many countries and can be difficult to be overcome with advertising (Liu et al. 2012). 
When governments advertise, they can use taxpayers' money to achieve purposes that may 
be contrary to the interests of at least some of those taxpayers (Mullen and Bowers, 1979). 
For example, governments can sponsor cash transfer programs that may be detrimental to citizens who 
oppose redistributive measures. Additionally, governments are not necessarily compelled to ensure 
truth in their advertising. Several claims stated in government ads may be impossible or difficult 
to prove (e.g., when an ad states that a country's economy improved once the government promoted 
monetary policy changes). Thus, government advertising can potentially promote political aims 
and not be simply factual in its statements.  
Furthermore, governments can use advertising to build incumbency advantage (Levitsky 
and Way, 2010). Many incumbent governments increasingly use advertising as an office perk to 
advantage them over political competitors who cannot afford similar media access to get their 
message across (Young, 2003 and 2005b). Access to advertising may help incumbents limit 
competition. It also means that many incumbents can propagate their message outside the 
campaign period, allowing them to conduct "de facto", unofficial, permanent campaigning. 
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Therefore, government advertising can be a powerful tool at the hands of incumbent 
governments. By using advertising, governments can potentially distort citizens' evaluations and 
hinder accountability indirectly (by influencing the media to provide a better image of the 
government), or directly (by shaping citizens' attitudes and opinions about the government). 
Theoretically, a government could use both in tandem, making itself difficult to be held 
accountable, especially in countries with small or restricted media markets. Moreover, 
governments can use advertising to influence citizens' evaluations and therefore affect the 
evaluation citizens make about government performance. For instance, advertising can be used by 
governments to deflect blame, to remove the public opinion's attention away from issues and 
policies unfavorable to the government while redirecting their focus towards issues and policies 
the government is better evaluated. 
1.1 Dissertation Outline 
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a conceptualization of 
government advertising and a literature review of the scholarship on government advertising 
worldwide. It also reviews relevant empirical work on government communication and 
government advertising and points to research gaps in the literature that the dissertation will tackle. 
In Chapter 3, I present the theoretical arguments for the empirical chapters. It is divided in 
six sections. In the first section, it is stated that government advertising is used by incumbents to 
signal competence about their administrations and build a personal reputation. In the second 
section, addressing the content analysis of government advertising, I lay out categories under 
which government advertising can be classified. The organization criterium of ads is goal-oriented, 
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that is, it takes into account the goal of the message in the advertising. There are three categories: 
information provision, credit claiming, and behavioral change. In the third section, I theorize about 
the impact of government advertising at the individual level. I develop a theory informed by 
attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) and ad sponsorship to explain how individuals process 
information from government ads and state how government advertising can impact citizens’ 
attitudes. Next, the chapter presents theoretical considerations about the determinants of spending 
with government advertising. The fifth section presents the theory about the effects of government 
advertising at the municipal level in Brazil, while the sixth section of the chapter addresses the role 
played by government advertising on electoral participation. 
Chapters 4 to 7 are the empirical chapters. Chapter 4 analyzes the content of government 
advertising from the state government of Minas Gerais and its City Halls. I present the 
methodology adopted in the coding of government ads and descriptive results. 
In Chapter 5, I propose and implement a between-subjects online factorial experiment to 
study the impact of government advertising vis-à-vis party advertising on four dependent 
variables: responsibility attribution, intention to vote for reelection, ad’s effectiveness, and 
performance in office. The chapter is organized as follows. I describe the experimental method 
used, the data, the experimental design and procedures, measures, manipulation checks and 
dependent variables. Next, I present the results, which consist of difference in means’ tests, ordered 
logistic model, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
models. Lastly, I present a conclusion for the chapter. 
In Chapter 6, I evaluate how government advertising is allocated and its electoral effects. 
It uses the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais (MG) to test the proposed hypotheses on the 
determinants of government advertising spending. I present a brief overview of the recent political 
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history of the state. Next, the chapter presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. 
Further, the empirical strategy and results from the multivariate analyses are presented. In the 
section that deals with the effects of government advertising, I also present descriptive statistics of 
the main independent variable of interest, present the independent and dependent variables, and 
lay out the empirical strategy. Estimations rely on panel random effects models and two-stage 
generalized least squares random effects models. After that, I present the results, followed by a 
conclusion. 
Chapter 7 analyzes the impact of the spending with government advertising by the 
Brazilian municipalities. I provide descriptive statistics for the main independent variable of 
interest, the spending with government advertising. I also describe the independent and dependent 
variables to be used in the empirical analysis. In the sections that follow, I describe the empirical 
models to be used. I make use of panel random effects models. Additionally, I use two-stage 
generalized least squares random effects models and Heckman probit to account for the 
endogeneity between campaign spending and government advertising spending with the error 
term. The Heckman model is used to address the fact that the mayors who run for reelection may 
not constitute a random draw of all Brazilian mayors. The decision to run for reelection needs to 
be appropriately taken into consideration in the models for proper parameter estimation. The next 
section presents the results and a conclusion. 
In Chapter 8, I conclude with a review of the main findings and a discussion of the 
implications of the study’s results. 
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2.0 Literature on Government Advertising 
2.1 Conceptualizing Government Advertising 
Broadly speaking, government advertising is a communication instrument employed by 
governments whose purpose is to promote, persuade, inform, or communicate government 
policies, actions, or goals to citizens. It can include "...the promotion of government services, 
changes in legislation, as well as social marketing campaigns" (Kerr et al. 2008, p.157). It may 
also be used to persuade a receiver to adopt some behavior change (e.g., to quit smoking) or to 
take some action, now or in the near future (e.g., gun buyback program). Government advertising 
can be used alone or in conjunction with other government communication efforts, such as 
presidential speeches (Canel & Sanders, 2016). It allows governments to communicate with citizens 
directly, without intermediaries. 
Government advertising is different from other types of advertising in several regards, most 
notably from commercial and political advertising, including campaign advertising. First, 
differently from commercial advertising, government ads' "products" or policies do not convey 
price information for they cannot be acquired on the market as commercial products can. Second, 
while the sponsors of commercial ads usually face competition on the market, the sponsor of 
government ads (i.e., national, subnational or local governments) do not face competition from 
challengers’ ads. Third, commercial ads tend to be aired continuously over time in a given 
year. Political ads, on the other hand, may be aired by political parties during non-election 
years. Campaign ads may or may not be aired in non-election years depending on each country's 
electoral regulations. Regarding government ads, they are usually aired in off-year elections and 
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sometimes even in election years, but not necessary during a country's electoral campaign period, 
depending on a country's electoral regulations. In Brazil, for instance, governments at all levels are 
prohibited from airing ads during the three months preceding the election day. Fourth, unlike 
commercial and political (including campaign) ads, government ads do not ask or allow citizens 
to purchase a product or cast a vote for a candidate or party. Governments can use advertising, 
however, to inform citizens about policy benefits they may be entitled to or try to persuade them 
to adopt a socially desirable behavior, such as using seatbelts while driving. Last but not least, 
while political ads may convey political and ideological messages and symbols, government 
ads face more restrictions regarding message content. In many countries, including Brazil, 
government ads cannot openly endorse a political party or candidate or propagate messages 
with clear electoral purposes. Such restrictions do not mean, though, that governments do not try 
to promote themselves and extract electoral gains from advertising their deeds, as the content 
analysis of government advertising indicates. 
2.2 Government Advertising Worldwide 
To this date, there is little scholarly work focused on government advertising. Scholarly 
work examining government communication, in general, is also limited (Canel & Sanders, 2016, 
p.3). Most research consists of individual or regional case studies that are descriptive. The studies 
that cover less developed and newer democracies tend to focus more on the ways governments use 
advertising spending and the state power to force or induce the media to cover the government 
more favorably. Studies in other countries focus on media ownership and the governments' 
attempts to influence the media's coverage. 
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In many countries, especially in Latin America, even where the private media exist, they 
are highly dependent on the state. For instance, the government is the biggest advertiser in many 
Central American countries (Rockwell and Janus, 2002, p.332; Kodrich, 2008, p.65). States in this 
region control many enterprises that spend considerable sums on advertising that are important for 
media outlets to stay afloat. Governments also exert considerable regulatory powers that affect 
media’s interests. Other instruments that the state can use to put pressure on the media include 
“official state subsidies, control of paper supplies, government-led advertising boycotts and the 
development of monopolistic television industries with close ties to state power” (op cit 2002, 
p.348). Hence, governments can use regulatory tools and the threat of advertising boycotts to 
influence the media's coverage. In closed media systems, such as those in Central America, the 
states' control over advertising can be harmful to the development and evolution of a free media. 
Advertising spending can be used as a tool to induce indirect censorship on media vehicles. 
The influence of government advertising on the media is also visible in other parts of the 
continent. In Mexico, the federal and the state governments spend large sums of funds on 
advertising. Hughes and Lawson (2004) investigated the sources of partisan bias in television 
coverage in Mexico and found that the relationship between private media and politicians is 
marked by collusive arrangements and by the propagandistic use of state-run stations. 
In Argentina, the federal government has arbitrarily awarded advertising funds to 
economically vulnerable print media (Macrory, 2013, p.187). Governments such as the Menem’s 
administration have retaliated against media sources that broke major scandals by attempting to 
cut state advertising. (Waisbord, 1994, p.27). More recently, Cristina Kirchner’s administration 
retaliated against media sources critical of her government, such as the Clarin Group, by using 
different means such as stricter control of paper supplies, approval of controversial media law, and 
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the redistribution of advertising funds from media sources critical to the government to sources 
supportive of the government1 (Di Tella & Franceschelli, 2011). 
The employment of advertising by the government has also been detected in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. In Australia, government advertising has been extensively used by the central 
government. The Australian government has been known for using sizeable amounts in advertising 
campaigns2. Some scholars such as Young (2003) believe government advertising has given the 
Australian government an important advantage over the competition and became “one of the 
greatest benefits of incumbency” (Young, 2003, p.13-14). In the United Kingdom, debates about 
the government’s use of ‘spin’ – i.e., presentation of policy – dominated the media during Alastair 
Campbell’s years as Tony Blair’s communication chief (Franklin, 2004; Canel and Sanders, 2016). 
More recently, the British government has used advertising as an instrument to induce citizens to 
“do the right thing” by encouraging (or “nudging”) subtle behavioral changes and, therefore, 
achieve objectives such as to “reduce the carbon footprint” or get people “to pay their road tax”3.  
Government advertising has also been widely used by the Canadian government and 
subnational governments (such as Alberta – Kiss, 2009) for different purposes. For instance, on 
anti-smoking campaigns and the dissemination of information about budgetary changes (Rose 
2001). 
Lastly, in the United States executive agencies have also employed advertising to promote 
the Executive’s policies (Kosar, 2005) and would have the potential to exacerbate “the natural 
communication advantage that the president has over Congress and the courts, which may threaten 
 
1 Nejamkis, G., & Esposito, A. (2013). Argentina’s Supreme Court Upholds Controversial Media Law. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-clarin-court-idUSBRE99S0U820131029 
2 For instance; it spends $ 174.7 million on advertising campaigns. See Hickman, A. (2016). Australian Government Spends near-record $175m on 
Advertising. Retrieved from http://www.adnews.com.au/news/australian-governmentspends-near-record-175m-on-advertising 
3 Krebs, Lord. (2012). Sometimes a nudge from the government is just not enough. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/sep/06/nudge-government 
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the balance of power between the branches” (op. cit 2005, p.786). Curiously, there is little-to-no 
work recently done on the subject in political science or related fields. 
In conclusion, government advertising is a worldwide phenomenon, not restricted to one 
specific group of countries or regions. In Latin America, incumbent governments have widely used 
government advertising for political purposes. Latin American governments have demonstrated 
considerable ability at directing advertising money towards supportive media outlets and 
withholding money from outlets seen as more hostile or less pliant to the government. By giving 
or withdrawing advertising funds, governments can powerfully influence the media's behavior 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.64-65). Also, governments can use advertising to influence citizens 
directly, by establishing communication with them without intermediaries. 
These scholarly works illustrate the importance of government advertising and give us 
indications of its potential uses and effects. Nevertheless, they do not inform, theoretically, how 
government advertising works. The empirical evidence is also limited. 
2.3 Empirical Work on Government Communication and Advertising 
Despite the paucity of empirical studies on government communications (and government 
advertising more specifically), there are exceptions that are relevant to the project. They illustrate 
governments' capacities and limitations to affect the media's coverage of the government and to 
influence citizens' attitudes. 
Two studies (on in Kosovo, another in Argentina) assess the impact of government 
advertising on corruption coverage by the media using aggregate data. In Kosovo, Miftari (2014) 
conducted a content analysis in two newspapers at two stages of the post-conflict period in Kosovo 
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and found that as reporting on corruption increased, government advertising declined. Similarly, 
In Argentina, Di Tella & Franceschelli (2011) studied the extent that daily newspaper coverage of 
corruption scandals in four main newspapers is affected by the amount of spending on ads in each 
newspaper by the government from 1998 to 2007. Overall, they found that adverse coverage was 
negatively correlated with government advertising in the newspapers. 
Three other studies evaluate the capacity governments have to influence citizens' attitudes. 
Concerning the privatization of water services in Argentina, Di Tella et al. (2012) studied people's 
beliefs about the benefits of privatization of water services. The assessed the capacity of political 
entrepreneurs to persuade individuals about the privatization and the degree to which individuals' 
views were affected by reality (i.e., the first-hand experience observing the investments made by 
the privatized company). Subjects were primed with two treatments, that is, statements by the 
president and statements by a company regarding firm investments, plus a control group. They 
found that individuals who observed investments made by the privatized company in their 
neighborhoods had a better opinion of water privatization (relative to other privatizations) than 
those who did not gain access to water. The authors also found evidence that the presence of firm 
investments makes people’s beliefs about the benefits of privatization more resistant to the effects 
of propaganda. 
Government messages can be used to promote government policies and convince citizens 
about their effectiveness. In another study, Romero, Magaloni, and Díaz-Cayeros (2015) studied 
the circumstances under which pro-government messages influence citizens' thoughts about the 
effectiveness of government efforts to capture criminal organizations' bosses in Mexico. By 
submitting subjects to experimental frames, they found that crime victimization "immunizes" 
individuals from the influence of pro-government messages on crime. 
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As the last two studies indicate, governments can face obstacles when trying to 
communicate and influence individuals. One of those, studied by Marvel (2016), is the implicit 
bias that many individuals have regarding the governments’ performance. Specifically, many 
citizens tend to automatically and unconsciously associate the government with inefficiency. In a 
study using three survey experiments, Marvel assessed the individuals’ evaluations of United 
States Postal Service (USPS) performance and confirmed that many citizens hold unconscious 
unfavorable views about public sector organizations. Citizens’ skepticism about government 
communications may affect how they evaluate government advertising as well. 
Finally, two M.A. dissertations assess the role of government advertising in Brazil. Kopp 
(2017) studied the political effects of local-level expenditures with advertising and discussed the 
implications of such types of spending for government advertising regulation. Using a nearest 
neighbor matching approach, he found that, on average, mayors who win reelection spend 33% 
more on government advertising than losers. Higher expenditures on government advertising 
improve the electoral prospects of local Brazilian incumbents. It was also found that the effect of 
government advertising is more pronounced in municipalities with poorer human development 
indicators and in larger cities (Kopp 2017, p.23). In another dissertation, Barboza Ribeiro (2017) 
studied the determinants of and the impact of central government expenditures on advertising in 
Brazil. In this study, the author investigates the political motivations behind the allocation of the 
advertisement budget by the Brazilian federal government and its political impact. By borrowing 
insights from the literature on distributive politics and using panel data methods, he found that 
even though past presidential election outcomes predict where in the territory the government 
spends with ads, voters would not seem to be electorally persuaded or influenced by the ads to 
favor the incumbent party. 
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Even though the two aforementioned studies are statistically well-executed, both present 
some gaps that the current study fills. Kopp (2017) analyzes 1,446 municipalities through 
matching, which means that the impact of more than 4,000 municipalities is disregarded. The 
criteria to decide which municipalities are included in the matching is not well explained. Further, 
Kopp’s study lacks an encompassing theory. Most importantly, both Kopp and Barboza Ribeiro 
(2017) do not study the impact of government advertising on turnout. They also do not evaluate 
the impact of government at the individual (i.e., voter) level. Finally, they do not study the content 
of advertising. In this dissertation, all the last three aspects are studied. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Overall, those studies provide significant information about government communication 
(and advertising) regarding its possible impacts, as well as gaps. First, government advertising can 
be successful at influencing media coverage. The two studies surveyed here (Di Tella and 
Franceschelli, 2011; Miftari, 2014) had a focus on the issue of coverage of corruption, though. 
To date, there are no studies analyzing the impact of government advertising on other dependent 
variables at the macro level. Most importantly, we do not know whether government advertising 
can affect political variables of interest to incumbent chief executives such as executive 
approval, turnout and vote share. Second, at the individual-level, government communication 
does not necessarily change people’s attitudes. Individuals hold priors determined by information, 
ideology, or direct experiences that condition that sensitivity to frames and persuasion attempts 
(Druckman, 2001). Third, three individual-level studies previously reviewed (Di Tella et al., 
2012; Romero, Magaloni, and Díaz-Cayeros, 2015; Marvel, 2016) conduct experimental 
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situations in which subjects do not receive additional or competing information. In the real 
world, individuals receive government communications and advertising alongside messages from 
other sources, especially the media, and use these messages to process the messages. 
As a result, to understand why governments spend on advertising and how government 
advertising affects individuals and electoral results, it is necessary to devise a theory that explains 
a) how political and local circumstances shape the allocation of budgetary resources to advertising 
by incumbent politicians, b) how  government advertising  can  be used  to  influence voters’ 
assessments of incumbents, and the resulting effects of those efforts, and c) the reasons and 
motivations individuals have (or not have) to pay attention to advertising. That is, the studies 
fail to explain the circumstances under which they may process government advertising and be 
affected by it, and how government and non-government (i.e., media) messages jointly affect 
how individuals use and process the messages they receive. That is the goal of the next chapter. 
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3.0 Theorizing about the Determinants of and the Effects of Government Advertising at the 
Aggregate and the Individual Levels 
3.1 Introduction 
How is government advertising used by incumbent politicians? With what purpose? Under 
what circumstances can the investment in advertising foster the incumbent’s political goals, at the 
aggregate and the individual levels? In this theoretical chapter, I propose and develop the idea that 
government advertising aims at fostering the incumbent’s4 personal reputation of competence, 
which favors his or her personal vote and chances of reelection. 
In this dissertation, I argue that government advertising is a tool used by incumbent 
officeholders to influence citizens’ perceptions about the incumbent’s performance or competence 
in office. Incumbents use government advertising to promote governmental policies and public 
works and, therefore, to claim credit for governmental deeds. Regardless of its content, 
government advertising conveys governmental action and performance information, which can be 
used by citizens to form retrospective evaluations about the incumbent. More specifically, 
observed government advertising can be used by voters to infer the competence of incumbent 
politicians. 
The chapter is organized in six sections. In the first section, I affirm that government 
advertising aims at nurturing the incumbent’s personal reputation as an effective officeholder. 
Government advertising can be used by incumbents to convey competence about their 
 
4 In this dissertation, the term incumbent refers to executive incumbents, or non-legislative incumbents, that is, the occupants of subnational 
executive offices (i.e., mayor and governor). The terms incumbent and executive incumbent are used interchangeably. 
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administrations and to pave the way for reelection. Further, it is used to signal effort to the 
electorate. In the second section, I focus on the content of government advertising itself and 
describe the categories under which government advertising can be organized according to three 
different goals, that is, information provision, credit claiming, or behavioral change. In the next 
section, I concentrate on the individual level and develop a theory informed by attribution theory 
(Kelley, 1967) and ad sponsorship that aims at explaining how individuals process information 
from government advertising and how government advertising can affect citizens’ attitudes. In the 
fourth section, I theorize about the determinants of the spending with political ads and lay out the 
conditions under which incumbent governments will invest more in advertising. In the fifth 
section, I address the effects of government advertising and campaign spending in the Brazilian 
municipal elections. Finally, in the last section, I theorize about the effects of government 
advertising on electoral participation. 
3.2 Government Advertising and Personal Reputation 
Government advertising constitutes an important means by which the incumbent can earn 
personalized electoral support and help cultivate a personal vote. Here I use the same concept of 
personal vote than Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987). The personal vote refers to “that portion of 
a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, 
activities, and record” (Cain et al 1987, p.9). Adding to that, Kitschelt (2000) stated that “The 
personal vote is the effect of a candidate’s personal initiatives on his or her electoral success, net 
of aggregate partisan trends that affect partisans as members of their parties” (Kitschelt 2000, 
p.852). As a result, the personal vote is a product of the candidate’s personal initiatives that 
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originate in his or her personal qualities. The premise that incumbents have the incentive to 
cultivate a personal reputation rests on an important assumption: that incumbent politicians are 
motivated by the desire to seek reelection (Mayhew, 1974; Cain et al, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 
1995, p.418). By cultivating a personal reputation of competence (which can be either 
administrative competence or competence at delivering particularized benefits, among other 
types), executive incumbents can cultivate a personal vote. 
In the Brazilian electoral context, executive incumbents have incentives to cultivate a 
personal reputation (and, by extension, a personal vote). Brazil’s national and state-level political 
system are characterized by a weakly institutionalized party system, high fractionalization, low 
capacity of parties to exercise discipline over their members, and a lack of strong ideological 
platforms (e.g., Ames, 2001a; 2001b; Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring, 1999; Samuels, 2003). 
Additionally, they are elected under plurality rule (or 50% or more of the valid vote in 
constituencies with more than two hundred thousand inhabitants, otherwise elections are disputed 
in a runoff between the top two contenders). Mayors are elected in single-member districts, the 
municipality, and governors are elected in states. The executive incumbents have geographical 
areas to call their own, which helps create the motivation for relationships between incumbents 
and voters that is more personal and particularistic.  
That said, how can government advertising foster an incumbent’s personal reputation and 
personal vote? I argue that government advertising is a tool used by incumbent officeholders to 
influence citizens’ perceptions about the incumbent’s performance or competence in office. 
Incumbents use government advertising to promote governmental policies and public works and, 
therefore, to claim credit for governmental deeds. Regardless of the content type of government 
advertising (e.g., the announcement of new public works, a smoking ban campaign, or about local 
  21 
tax payment information, to name a few), all types of government advertising convey 
governmental action, that is, the idea that the government is doing something in favor of the 
citizenry. All these types of advertising can be used by incumbents to demonstrate to voters that 
he or she is doing something in society’s favor at large, or in favor of specific groups of citizens 
(e.g., the handicapped, the elderly, women, etc.). In all cases, more or less explicitly, government 
ads convey positive information about governmental action and performance information, which 
can be used by citizens to form retrospective evaluations about the incumbent. Also, government 
advertising is used to signal effort to the electorate before the election. By informing voters about 
goods and services provided to them, the incumbent can show that he or she is a “doer”, an active 
elected official. 
More specifically, observed government advertising can be used by voters to infer the 
competence of incumbent politicians. By promoting government advertising, incumbents expect 
to shape voters’ views and expectations about their competence in office. The effect of government 
advertising is not supposed to be instantaneous, though (i.e., to be effective based on just a few ad 
campaigns), but cumulative. That is, continuous inflows of government advertising over the course 
of a mandate aim at building the views among citizens that the government is doing something on 
their behalf. Even advertising that is merely informative can be beneficial to incumbent officials, 
for it conveys the idea that the government is being accountable and transparent to citizens. 
3.3 The Content of Government Advertising 
Scholarly work on political advertising usually focuses on the indirect (e.g., learning) and 
direct (e.g., voting decision) impacts of advertising on outcomes of interest. Much progress has 
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been achieved at understanding the effects of advertising in recent decades, especially in the U.S. 
context. The key independent variable in these studies has been advertising exposure. Despite the 
importance of exposure in studies of political advertising, studies focused on exposure as primary 
independent variable find some empirical limitations. Advertising is a multifaceted phenomenon, 
conveying information in complex ways. To understand advertising more thoroughly, researchers 
must dedicate efforts at understanding the content of advertising. Concerning political advertising, 
some studies have made use of content analysis, particularly in the United States. For instance, 
Spiliotes and Vavreck (2002) analyzed the content of ads to explain whether political parties act 
as a constraint on candidates’ commitments, and the role a constituency’s partisanship has in 
determining the kinds of commitments candidates make in their advertising. They found that 
parties are a constraining factor on the kinds of commitments candidates make. Also, Sides and 
Karch (2008) examined whether the issue content of campaign appeals mobilize particular subset 
of voters. By matching survey respondents to media markets and then to relevant campaign 
advertising data for three elections, they found that campaign effects vary in their magnitude and 
importance for the mobilization of issue publics. These studies have allowed the examination of 
the impact of factors such as tone and issues on variables of interest such as party vote, turnout, 
issue emphasis, economic voting (Hart 2016), among others. However, concerning government 
advertising, no work (to the author’s knowledge) has analyzed the content of government ads, 
much less developed a theoretical framework to analyze their content.  
The ordinary typologies of political ads are unable to express the content of government 
ads correctly. For instance, Geer (2006) divides the ads into appeals that raise “doubts about the 
opposition” (i.e., negative) or [state] why a candidate is worthy of your vote (i.e., positive)”, 
without any “middle category”. Jamieson, Waldman, and Sherr (2000) divide political ads into 
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attack, contrast, and advocacy, whereas Freedman, Wood, and Lawton (1999) segment attack into 
“personal” and “issue” appeals. William Benoit presents an alternative typology according to 
which ads are categorized as acclaiming (emphasizing good reasons voters should lend their 
support), attacking (focusing on the opponent’s faults as reasons why he or she should be 
disregarded by voters), or defending (countering the accusations raised by the opponent) (Benoit 
et al, 1998). None of the aforementioned typologies can be adequately used to categorize 
government ads.  
First, most of the scholarship focuses on political advertising, which is different from 
government advertising. The tone of political advertising can be positive or negative (i.e., attack), 
whereas government advertising cannot be used for attacking political opponents or policy 
positions for legal reasons. Concerning the topic, political advertising is expected to “take sides” 
on political, policy, or ideological matters. Government advertising, on the other hand, has to be 
more “policy-focused”. Therefore, government advertising tends to be devoid of many cues that 
help voters process political information, such as party symbols, open ideological statements, a 
visible political personality5 (i.e., a candidate or an elected official) and negativity, that is, open 
attacks to opponents. Moreover, government advertising does not face competition in an open 
“political market” as political advertising does. Last but not least, government advertising cannot 
be aired during the electoral campaign period, which differs from political advertising, which can 
be aired during electoral and non-electoral periods. As a result, classifications that take into 
account the tone of advertising as well as their functions as the main criterion for categorization 
miss many important elements of government advertising. It is necessary to devise a new 
categorization scheme to properly classify the content of government advertising. On which basis 
 
5 At least in the Brazilian case. Rules may differ from country-to-country. 
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must such categorization be based upon? Here, I affirm that the classification of the content of 
government advertising must focus on the intended and explicit goal or purpose of the ad. 
 
 
Table 1 Classification of Government Ads by Type 
  
Government ad's types 
Information 
provision 
Credit claiming Behavior change 
Goal 
To publicize or 
promote a policy, 
event, or 
government action. 
To claim credit for 
past, present or future 
policy measures and 
accomplishments. 
To inform, educate, 
guide, or alert the 
viewer to adopt or 
change a behavior. 
Degree of 
explicitness in 
credit claiming 
Less explicit Explicit Least explicit 
Example 
An ad publicizing a 
cultural event in the 
city. 
An ad showing the 
construction of a new 
bridge. 
A non-smoking ad 
campaign urging 
smokers to stop 
smoking.  
 
Therefore, the most secure basis to classify government ads is to focus on the intended goal 
of the ad. I organize government advertising into three distinct categories: information provision, 
credit claiming, and behavior change advertising. They differ from each other in two main respects: 
the goal of the ad and the degree of explicitness with respect to credit claiming. The implication is 
straightforward: credit claiming ads are not the only type of ads that can aim at claiming credit for 
accomplishments and activities. Information and behavior change ads can be used for credit 
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claiming purposes as well. However, non-credit claiming ads can claim credit only implicitly, 
indirectly. The current classification scheme considers explicit goals or purposes only. 
Government ads can be used with the goal of informing the public about a policy, event, 
or government action. Ads in this category include information about the realization of events, 
promotion of tourism in the polity, or the promotion of a new phone line to denounce human rights 
violations. In these types of ads, the main goal is basically to inform the citizenry about a policy 
that has been (or will be) in place. Informative ads do not claim credit for accomplishments, nor 
do they aim at inducing behavioral change in the population. Another type of government ad is the 
credit claiming ad, which has the goal of claiming credit for past, present or future policy measures 
and accomplishments. This is the most typical type of ad associated with government advertising 
and most prone to be used by incumbents with credit claiming and personal reputation building 
purposes. What makes credit claiming ads distinct from the other types of government ads is that 
credit claiming ads directly and explicitly make a connection between the government’s efforts 
and a desirable social outcome. This type of ad explicitly conveys the message that “thanks to the 
government actions in A policy area, X desirable outcome was (or will be) achieved”. Lastly, a 
final type of government ad is the behavior change ad, or a type of ad which has the goal of 
inducing people to adopt or change a behavior. Such type of advertising is common in mature 
democracies as well as democracies in development. Examples of this type of ad include public 
service announcements (PSAs) advising parents to vaccinate their children or urging drivers to not 
drive under the influence of alcohol. It is the least explicit in credit claiming appeal. It is important 
to observe that it is possible that ads may contain more than one implicit or explicit goal, for 
instance, a government ad that publicizes a jobs’ conference that may bring job opportunity for 
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locals. Nonetheless, as it will be shown in the dissertation, even such ads usually present one main 
goal.    
It is important to emphasize and clarify the role of credit claiming appeals in non-credit 
claiming ads. Can information and behavior change ads be used for credit claiming appeals? Yes, 
they can. However, in both ads credit claiming can only be stated indirectly and implicitly, whereas 
credit claiming ads can claim credit for accomplishments directly and explicitly. For instance, an 
information ad that only notifies citizens about a job fair event happening in town can make it 
implicit, by the mere fruition of the event, that the government “is doing something” to address 
unemployment or to bring more jobs. The classification scheme suggested here takes into account 
explicit goals or purposes, though. It cannot infer a credit claiming goal if such goal is not explicitly 
stated. Thus, this project recognizes that credit claiming appeals can be done indirectly and 
implicitly. However, when credit claiming is not directly and explicitly stated, individuals have to 
connect the content of the ad with a credit claiming purpose themselves. In sum, it becomes a 
matter of personal interpretation. 
3.4 The Impact of Government Advertising at the Individual Level 
All that is known from the limited literature on government advertising is limited to 
national or subnational-level accounts. Little-to-nothing is known about how individuals process 
government advertising and how government advertising affects individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviors. This dissertation is the first effort (to the author’s knowledge) to devise a theory of 
government advertising’s impact on individuals. Drawing on the Attribution Theory and the ad 
sponsorship’s literatures, I posit that individuals survey the motivations, interests and intentions 
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attached to the ad’s sponsor. Government advertising constitutes a particular form of 
communication whose sponsor’s motivations are less clear than the motivations behind the 
political advertising, similarly to interest group advertising.  The government’s sponsorship 
constitutes the cue that citizens have at their disposal to evaluate the claims made in government 
advertising, which can be complemented by information found in the information environment in 
which they find themselves located.  
3.4.1 Attribution Theory, Ad Sponsorship, and Government Advertising 
Individuals tend to make attributions about other people’s characteristics and motivations. 
Such attributions help people decide how to behave. The causal attribution in question applies to 
advertising as well. Attribution theory states that individuals infer each other’s characteristics, 
including motivations and intentions, from the behaviors they observe. Kelley’s (1967) attribution 
theory aims at explaining how message recipients make causal inferences about message sources. 
According to Kelley, people behave like naïve psychologists as they attempt to develop 
explanations for people’s behavior. Hence, the theory is concerned with understanding how people 
identify the causes of other people’s behavior (Stiff and Mongeau, 2016, p.148); it describes the 
processes an individual goes through in assigning causes to effects (Eisend 2007, p.616-617). 
According to Eagly and Chaiken’s view of attribution theory, people are likely to be 
persuaded by a message to the extent that they see it as conveying the “truth” and tend to discount 
the message if they attribute it to factors that compromise truth value (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 
p.351; Carroll et al 2016, p.142). The authors also point out that when evaluating messages, people 
may consider not only the identity of the speaker but also salient contextual cues, such as the 
“communicator’s personal circumstances”. Therefore, attribution theory is used to explain how 
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message-related behaviors performed by an audience affect persuasion and how message 
recipients select those cues that they will process (Sternthal, Phillips and Dholakia, 1978, p.300). 
In the realm of consumer research, attribution theory suggests that consumers, when 
presented to a message, will make an effort to assess whether the message provides an accurate 
representation or whether the source of the message lacks credibility (Kelly, 1967). Attribution 
theory states that consumers cognitively infer a motive for the sponsorship behavior (Johnson, 
Dunaway and Weber 2011, p.101).  It suggests that consumers are motivated to acquire an accurate 
perception of external reality (Gotlieb and Sarel, 1991, p.40). Individuals make predictions, or 
develop expectations, about what a particular communicator will say, based on what they know 
about the communication and the situation. 
A key concept to the theory is source credibility. During the 1950s, Hovland and colleagues 
(1953) conducted the first modern social science research on the components of and the effects of 
credibility. They found that source credibility (i.e., how believable the source is) is likely to be a 
significant predictor of persuasion. They define source credibility as a combination of two factors: 
source expertise and source trustworthiness. The former is “the extent to which a communicator is 
perceived to be a source of valid assertions” while the latter is an audience member’s “degree of 
confidence in the communicator’s intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid” 
(Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953, p.21). Nowadays, most persuasion scholars describe credibility 
as a combination of a source’s perceived expertise and trustworthiness. 
Assessments of a source’s credibility are directly related to the motivation attributed to the 
source by the audience. The attribution individuals make concerning the motivations of the source 
can exert an important influence on credibility judgments concerning the source of a message. 
Thus, the identity of the sponsor may impart information to citizens about the interests and 
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intentions of the sponsor, which can be used by them to make judgments about the claims made in 
ads. In other words, the identity of the sponsor can act similarly to heuristics that citizens can use 
to lower cost substitutes for more detailed knowledge (Dowling and Wichowsky, 2013, p.967). In 
the context of political advertising in general, the electoral motivation of candidates or parties is 
salient. Political advertising is motivated by the search for votes or political support. Such salient 
electoral motivation can lead candidates (and parties) to make disingenuous claims (Ridout, Franz 
and Fowler, 2013, p.4). For that reason, several authors have stated that interest group advertising 
is more effective than usual political advertising. Sources that usually argue in favor of their own 
self-interest are seen as less trustworthy, and therefore as less persuasive, than those sources which 
argue less (or against) their self-interest (Walster, Aronson and Abrahams, 1966; Groendenyk and 
Valentino, 2002).  
In the case of government advertising, the political motivation is more difficult to detect 
with clarity than what is usually found in political advertising6. Whereas the electoral motivation 
of a politician, candidate, or party is more obvious and directly self-serving, with the goal of 
winning office, government advertising is capable of creating a sense of detachment from 
candidates and parties. Their political self-interested motivations are less clear to citizens. 
Important cues to voters, such as the name of the incumbent officeholder and party identification, 
are not usually present in government advertising. As a result, the source’s name, that is, a 
government entity, works as the information shortcut citizens have at their disposal to derive the 
source’s persuasive intent.  
 
6 Especially in Brazil, where legislation prohibits incumbent officeholders from appearing in government ads, thus limiting effectiveness for the 
incumbent. 
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3.4.2 Government Advertising and the Information Environment 
Of particular concern to this dissertation is the role of sponsor (or source) of the message 
and its effects, as well as the interaction between the sponsor’s cues and the information 
environment (i.e., external reality).  
Here, I argue that the information environment in which citizens are located interacts with 
the message contained in government advertising. This interaction provides valuable cues that help 
citizens process information found in government advertising. Expectations about the interaction 
between government advertising and the information environment relate to cognitive consistency 
theories in social psychology, more specifically the “principle of congruity” (Osgood and 
Tannenbaum, 1955, p.43), which states that “changes in evaluation are always in the direction of 
increased congruity with the existing frame of reference”. Following the same theoretical 
framework, Chen (2018) studied propaganda effects in China and affirmed that state propaganda 
would exert influence on opinions when reality validates the message in it. More specifically, the 
persuasive power of government advertising would be contingent on the informational context, 
that is, whether reality lends support to the claims contained in the advertising. 
In this dissertation, I state a similar argument: the persuasive power of government 
advertising is contingent upon the informational context. The information context in which 
advertising is delivered shapes whether and how it will affect opinions, which accentuates the 
importance of gaps that might exist between the government advertising’s rhetoric and reality. If 
the message in the advertising is supported by the information environment, the persuasive power 
of the advertising is expected to be enhanced. Conversely, if the messages contained in advertising 
disagrees with the reality portrayed in the ad, the persuasive power of the advertising is expected 
to decrease. An example of the interaction between government advertising and the information 
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environment can be found on the issue of the economy. If a government promotes advertising 
stating that the economy is doing well (e.g., that unemployment and inflation are decreasing) and 
such advertising is corroborated by positive economic indicators on the news, the expected power 
of the government advertising should increase. However, if the advertising’s claims are 
contradicted by the information environment (e.g., advertising showing job creation whereas 
economic indicators show an increase in unemployment), its persuasive power should decrease. 
Other factors such as egotropic and sociotropic evaluations could be important in explaining the 
persuasive power of government advertising. However, the experimental scenario (to be laid out 
in Chapter 5) is fictitious. The application of egotropic and sociotropic evaluations based on one 
reality (the “real” world) would not credibly be applicable to describe how individuals would 
evaluate the economic situation of the experimental setting. Attribution is another relevant 
mechanism, which is explored in the corresponding empirical chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Influence of Government Advertising and the Information Environment on Individuals’ Attitudes 
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3.5 The Determinants of Spending with Government Advertising 
To properly understand the motivations involved in investing in government advertising, 
it is useful to understand advertising as a resource that can be used to achieve specific political 
goals. One key goal that politicians have is reelection. Even when politicians are not driven 
solely by reelection, winning it allows politicians to advance other goals, such as advancing their 
preferred policies or advancing their political ambitions of running for higher offices (Mayhew 
1974; Fenno, 1978). Thus, we can assume that incumbent politicians will consider government 
advertising as a tool that can be used with the goal of increasing their reelection prospects. 
By investing more in advertising, incumbents can increase the likelihood that voters will better 
assign credit for accomplishments and positive circumstances to the incumbent, which will lead 
to a favorable electoral outcome for the incumbent in the next election. 
There is no guarantee, though, that government advertising will work as intended. Some 
conditions, such as the availability of funds, can affect how much incumbents can invest in 
advertising or even if incumbents can invest in advertising at all. Also, some characteristics of the 
constituencies can affect the allocation of advertising resources by increasing or decreasing the 
effectiveness of advertising at reaching citizens. These factors must all be considered when 
formulating an explanation of why and how governments invest in advertising. 
Government spending with advertisements is surrounded by controversy and also some 
degree of secrecy. Little is known about how governments spend resources with advertising and 
with what purpose. In this section, I devise a rationale to understand the logic of the spending with 
advertising by governments. Individual candidates must distinguish themselves from their 
competitors. As stated in the initial section, one possibility to achieve such goal is through the 
cultivation of a “personal vote” (Cain et al 1987; Carey & Shugart 1995), according to which 
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candidates can distribute resources to specific constituencies in order to increase their visibility 
among voters and, in turn, enhance their chances of reelection. Thus, governments can use 
government advertising as a political tool aimed at increasing the visibility of the incumbent’s 
actions in office. 
In this section, I draw from the literature on distributive politics and argue that government 
advertising can be used to increase the visibility of incumbent’s actions in core constituencies. 
Further, I state that advertising aims at magnifying the visibility of overall spending (i.e., 
expenditures on healthcare, education, infrastructure, etc.). In this case, government advertising is 
not a distributive tool for it cannot be appropriated by voters, contrary to particularized benefits 
such as pork. That is, government advertising cannot be classified as a typical distributive politics’ 
tool understood as “as those that involve taxes and transfers, and in particular the decisions about 
allocations of government goods and services to identifiable localities or groups” (Golden and 
Min 2013, p.74). However, the spending with advertising can be distributed in different 
constituencies to achieve different goals, such as running for a higher office (which will not be 
analyzed in this dissertation).  
This project argues that governments allocate budgetary resources to advertising based on 
political considerations (term limits and particularistic incentives), and the characteristics of the 
local context (notably socio-demographic ones). To advance a theory of advertising 
expenditures, it is useful to understand how incumbent politicians allocate budgetary resources. 
Next, I analyze the pertinent literature to budgetary resources and derive theoretical insights to be 
used in the dissertation. 
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3.5.1 Who Receives Allocations: The Core and the Swing Voter 
A group of studies that inform my theory to explain government advertising expenditures 
concerns the literature on the allocation of budgetary resources by executive offices, especially 
the U.S. president. Most studies of this sort aim at assessing how federal budget allocation is affected 
by presidential politics, how the resulting allocation may deviate from a purely social welfare 
maximizing objective (McCarty, 2000; Kriner & Reeves, 2015), and which group is favored, 
swing states (and voters) or “core” states (and voters). That is, the president may use budget 
allocation to enhance his reelection chances either by targeting swing states or by rewarding his 
supporters (Larcinese et al., 2006). One of the first scholars to differentiate between swing and core 
supporters and theorize it were Cox and McCubbins (1986), who argued that the optimal 
strategy for risk-averse candidates would be to distribute to their re-election constituency and 
overinvest in their closest supporters to maintain existing political coalitions. According to them, 
politicians would adopt strategies leading to little investment in (if at all) opposition groups, some 
investment in swing groups, and more investment in their support groups (1986, p.379). 
The basic formal model for studying which types of voters receive allocations was 
developed by Dixit & Londregan (1996), based on Lindbeck & Weilbull (1987) – who outlined 
the logic for targeting swing voters and advocated the explanatory power of the swing voter – and 
Cox & McCubbins (1986). According to this model, politicians (modeled as two spatially arrayed 
two parties, one located to the left and to the right of the ideological spectrum) make allocations 
across groups of voters within a single electoral district. It is assumed that voters have fixed and 
exogenously given ideological preferences and receive some degree of utility from the allocations 
they receive. The model states that a voter will prefer the party further from the partisan ideal point 
if the party offers the voter a transfer that is large enough to compensate for her ideological 
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alignment to the other party. Thus, voters can be “bought” with distributive allocations. Dixit and 
Londregan’s model derive a series of implications. First, that voters with strong partisan 
attachments need larger transfers to be moved from their positions than voters with weak partisan 
attachments. As a result, parties would compete for politically moderate voters (i.e., swing voters), 
for they would be more easily purchased with transfers than voters who are more ideologically 
aligned with a party. Also, poorer voters would require smaller per capita transfers to shift their 
votes than richer voters (Golden & Min 2013, p.78) for the former would derive a higher utility 
from the additional income transferred than the latter. 
Dixit and Londregan’s model results in parties engaging in symmetrical strategies leading 
both to target swing voters. Nonetheless, the authors argue that in some situations it is better for 
parties to allocate resources to core voters, or voters with stronger partisan preferences. According 
to the authors, in this case, parties would engage in “Machine Politics”, occurring when a party 
has a considerable informational advantage about its constituents and is capable of allocating 
targeted goods to specific individuals with accuracy. Hence, the rationale for the allocation of 
goods to core voters is that the transfers would be targeted with precision and without waste 
(Golden & Min 2013, p.79). Over time, this model provided the main theoretical micro-
foundations for studies of distributive politics. 
Cox and McCubbins’ models (1986) arrived at different results and conclusions than Dixit 
and Londregan’s. Cox and McCubbins view campaign platforms as promised redistributions of 
welfare and focused their analysis on the intra-constituency consequences of distributive and 
redistributive politics. They conceive electoral politics as a two-person redistributive game 
according to which a candidate’s attitude toward risk affects the stability of his or her coalitional 
relationships (Cox and McCubbins’ models 1986, p.385). Also, they take into account how 
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differential rates of support by diverse groups in a constituency would influence campaign 
promises and the likelihood that stable coalitions would be forged. Their conclusion is that risk-
averse candidates will tend to over-invest in their closest supporters. In other words, the optimal 
strategy for risk-averse candidates would be to promise redistribution to their reelection 
constituency. 
In the US context, Kriner and Reeves (2015) found that the political reasons rather than 
welfare maximizing ones determine the allocation of federal dollars by presidents. By conducting 
a county-level analysis of federal spending from 1984 to 2008, they found that presidents are not 
universalistic, but particularistic, that is, presidents reliably direct dollars to specific constituents 
to further their political goals. As observed by Cox and McCubbins as well as other scholars, 
presidents systematically prioritize the needs of politically important constituents (Kriner and 
Reeves 2015, p.155). Presidents “target federal grants to pursue reelection, reward their partisan 
base, and bolster their legislative coalition in Congress” (Kriner and Reeves, 2015, p.167). Thus, 
Kriner and Reeves show support for the idea that presidents favor core voters over swing voters. 
Another important factor affecting the distribution of budgetary resources is the political 
support presidents have in states. Overall, the president would be an important player as he can 
direct more funding toward those states that are run by “friendly” governors and that have large 
groups of “core supporters” and allied districts (Larcinese et al., 2006). On the one hand, it is 
possible that states closer ideologically to the president (i.e., states with a high share of presidential 
votes or with a governor belonging to the party of the president) would receive more funds. On the 
other hand, states with a close presidential electoral race and states that either changed political 
affiliation in the most recent election would not receive more funds. Larcisene et all found that 
states with a large share of presidential supporters got more funds but did not find that more federal 
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funds are allocated to marginal or swing states. Overall, these studies strongly suggest that the 
allocation of federal resources by U.S. presidents is shaped by particularistic concerns, that is, to 
achieve reelection and provide support for co-partisans. 
Empirical studies testing the core versus the swing voter hypotheses have found mixed 
results (Albertus, 2012; Stokes, 2005). In Brazil, the findings have also been mixed. Scholars have 
not defined arguments in terms of core versus swing voters (Burrier, 2019). For instance, regarding 
the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família, Hunter and Power (2007) and Zucco (2013) 
found increased support for the Workers’ Party (PT). However, benefits would be universally 
distributed by objective criteria of poverty, without regard for political considerations. These 
results suggest the prevalence of universalistic considerations over particularistic ones in the 
allocation of resources. However, other studies have found signs of parochialism in the allocation 
of resources in the country. For instance, when analyzing the discretionary federal transfers to 
municipalities, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) found that the executive power targets allies facing 
competitive elections, which would provide support for the swing voter hypothesis. 
In this work, I theorize that incumbents have incentives to engage in particularistic 
allocation of advertising spending across districts, to advertise more about deeds and 
accomplishments to some citizens more than to others. Further, spending with advertising can be 
used to further partisan goals, such as buttressing the local party legislative delegation or the party 
presence in the state delegation at the Brazilian Congress. Therefore, different allocation strategies 
are available to the incumbent and none of them are necessarily exclusive. In other words, an 
incumbent chief executive can allocate resources in more than one way. For instance, a governor 
can invest in government advertising in swing and core constituencies at the same time. 
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Here I argue that the incumbent has more incentives to allocate government advertising in 
core constituencies rather than in swing ones. I agree more with the core constituency logic than 
with the swing logic of allocation. Because budgetary resources available to advertising are limited, 
incumbents have more to gain by allocating resources to constituencies that have already benefitted 
the incumbent electorally. In such case, government advertising serves as a reminder of the work 
that the incumbent has done in favor of citizens. Nonetheless, in swing constituencies government 
advertising works more as a persuasion tool. Persuasion tends to be more costly, reason why it is 
more cost-efficient for incumbents to allocate more advertising funds in constituencies where the 
support for the incumbent is higher. Moreover, the sheer number of voters in a municipality matter. 
Because in the Brazilian political system all votes for majoritarian positions (e.g., mayors, 
governors, president, and senator) have equal weight, the best strategy for an incumbent politician 
can be simply to advertise to the greatest number of people. Finally, incumbents have incentives to 
advertise in areas where support for the incumbent’s party for the state and federal legislature is 
greatest, for this allows the incumbent to build important electoral support that can help the 
incumbent further her electoral goals (in office or outside, and in pursuit of progressive or regressive 
career ambitions). 
3.5.2 The Role of Term Limitation 
Another factor with capacity to influence the amount spent by incumbents with government 
advertising is the institution of term limits. The institution of term limits has important implications 
for representation, career opportunity structures, and motivations of individuals interested and 
active in politics (Herrick and Thomas, 2005). Of particular interest here are the career opportunity 
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structures of incumbent politicians and the impact term limits may have on the incumbents’ 
motivations to engage in reputation-building behavior. 
Models of political accountability show that incumbents behave differently when subject 
to electoral accountability. Elections guarantee political accountability and exert a disciplining role 
on incumbents’ behavior (Dalle Nogare and Kauder, 2017). The chance of reelection constrains 
politicians to act according to the interests of their constituents (Johnson and Crain, 2004). 
Reelection wields a disciplining effect on incumbents. Once this accountability is removed, 
incumbents are more likely to follow policies of their own interest and tend to deviate from those 
of voters (Besley and Case, 1995; Leguizamon and Crowley, 2016).  
As a result, term limits affect the incentives incumbents have to engage in reputation-
building activities. A politician tries to signal his or her abilities and thereby build a good 
reputation with voters. The possibility of reelection incentivizes politicians to engage in reputation-
building activities. However, in the presence of term limits, voters are incapable of retaining good 
politicians who face binding term limits (Smart and Sturm 2013, p.93). Based on this literature, 
we should expect, then, that if term limitation exists, the politician will lack – or have fewer – 
incentives to engage in reputation-enhancing activities. However, I present an alternative view. 
Reputation building changes the incumbent’s calculations. In countries such as Brazil, many 
politicians pursue different offices during their political careers. Different career paths can be 
chosen. For instance, a former mayor may run for city councilor and after one or more tenures in 
the local legislature, he or she may decide to run again for mayoral office. Either progressive 
ambition (i.e., to run for higher office) and regressive ambition (i.e., to run for a lower office in 
status than one currently occupies) are frequently followed career paths. In all cases, having a 
reputation as a doer in public office helps a politician follow any career path he or she chooses, 
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especially if a politician decides to run for executive office. Legacy building, which reinforces 
reputation building, also plays a role. The implication is that in such scenario term limits may not 
have the limiting impact on politicians’ conduct in office concerning the use of government 
advertising. That is, a lame duck politician still has incentives to spend in government advertising 
during his or her final binding term in executive office. The reason is reputation building.  
The literature suggests that term limits can lead to important policy implications. For 
instance, Besley and Case (1995, 2003) found evidence of a disciplining effect of elections on 
spending. They detected that, on average, US governors—particularly Democrats—who are no 
longer eligible to run for reelection tax and spend more than governors who can seek an additional 
term. Moreover, Aidt and Shvets (2012) analyzed how term limits influence per-capita transfers 
from U.S. state budgets to legislative districts and concluded that pork is smaller in the last term.  
The implications for government advertising spending are straightforward. According to 
the extant literature, non-term limited incumbents who are able to seek reelection in the future 
have clear incentives to invest more in government advertising, a reputation-building tool. Still 
according to the extant literature, in the presence of a term limit, incumbents should have fewer 
incentives to engage in reputation building overall, which would make the spending with 
advertising less important to the incumbent’s immediate career concerns7. However, I depart from 
the extant views and argue that reputation building concerns provide incentives for incumbents to 
keep spending with government advertising as much, or more, than they spend during their first 
terms. In Brazil, there are term limits for majoritarian offices (president, governor, and mayor). 
Majoritarian office holders can run for consecutive reelection only once and are term-limited after 
 
7 It should be verified in future studies whether incumbents who follow a progressive ambition (i.e., decide to run for higher office) spend more 
with government advertising and whether such effort is successful. 
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one reelection for the same office. Thus, I expect that incumbents keep spending as much or more 
with government advertising when they are term limited. 
3.6 The Effects of Government Advertising at the Municipal Level in Brazil 
This dissertation also considers the effects that government advertising may have on 
political outcomes of interest (i.e., vote share for mayor, reelection for mayor, and turnout) in more 
than 5,500 Brazilian municipalities over three election cycles (2008-2012-2016). The effects of 
government advertising are analyzed in conjunction with the effects of total campaign spending in 
a municipality, the incumbent’s campaign spending, and the challenger’s campaign spending. This 
section of the dissertation contributes to the literatures on incumbency (dis)advantage and the role 
of campaign spending in elections. Therefore, here I present a brief review of the literatures on 
incumbency (dis)advantage and campaign spending and political careers in Brazil. I also present 
a review of the Brazilian political system and the role of mayor, followed by the theoretical account 
of the impact of government advertising and campaign spending. 
3.6.1 Incumbency (Dis)Advantage: Review and Explanations 
The literature on incumbency advantage is important because it sheds light on the 
incentives politicians face. Studies of incumbency effects are motivated by immediate concerns 
over democratic competitiveness, political accountability, and the general fairness of elections 
(Macdonald, 2014, p.1). It is based on two assumption (De Magalhães, 2015). First, that 
incumbents strive to maximize their probability of reelection. Second, that an incumbent has an 
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advantage when seeking reelection. The advantage can be financial (i.e., access to government 
funds and to campaign donors), strategic (incumbent may have a first-mover advantage), or 
informational.  
Empirical studies for the U.S. find a clear incumbency advantage (e.g., Gelman and King, 
1990; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000). These studies on incumbency advantage in the 
U.S. have focused on vote share as the outcome of interest. Most studies of incumbency advantage 
for U.S. congressional and state-level elections have concluded that there is an incumbency 
advantage over nonincumbents. Estimates of the size of the incumbency advantage vary. Using 
term limits for state elective offices as an instrumental variable to address endogeneity concerns, 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) estimated incumbency advantage for state elective offices at 
about 7-9 percentage points.  
Electoral advantage for incumbents has also been registered in other democracies. A 
similar incumbency advantage has been found in Canada (Kendall and Rekkas, 2012). For the 
United Kingdom, Gaines (1998) estimated incumbency advantage at about 1-2 percentage points. 
In Germany, Hainmueller and Kern (2008) estimated incumbency advantage at about 1.5-2.4 
percentage points. Overall, studies have found incumbency advantage in single-member district 
systems in developed democracies (Ariga, 2015). 
In other regions of the globe, the incumbency advantage is smaller or may even be negative. 
Several scholars have argued that there is an incumbency disadvantage, conditional on random 
election, in India (Uppal, 2009), Brazil (Brambor and Ceneviva, 2011; Klasnja and Titiunik, 2015) 
and Zambia (Macdonald, 2014), and other low- and middle-income countries. Linden (2004) and 
Uppal (2009) found strong evidence of incumbency disadvantages in Indian state and national 
elections. 
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In Brazil, Brambor and Ceneviva (2011) found that incumbents are significantly 
disadvantaged in municipal mayoral elections. According to the authors, there is evidence of a 
strong negative effect of incumbency in Brazilian municipal elections (2001, p.25). Also studying 
incumbency advantage in Brazil, Titiunik (2011) was one of the first to study the consequences of 
incumbency in Brazilian mayoral elections. She applied a regression discontinuity design to 
analyze the incumbency advantage of parties from 2000 to 2004 and found evidence of strong 
incumbency disadvantage on both the vote share and the probability of being reelected for the 
three largest parties. Klasnja and Titiunik (2017) concluded that when a party (barely) wins a 
mayoral election in Brazil, its chances of winning the following election are severely diminished 
relative to its chances in similar municipalities where the party does not hold the mayor’s office. 
Their conclusion is that in Brazil, where parties are comparatively weak, parties cannot be relied 
upon to ensure representation. 
 Different explanations for incumbency advantage have been given. As laid out by 
Macdonald (2004, p.3-5), these explanations offer important clues as to why incumbency effects 
vary across countries. A prominent explanation states that the perks of public office may allow 
incumbents to strategically manipulate voter information and individual effort in order to signal 
their desirability to voters (e.g., Besley, 2006). This perspective of incumbent control over voter 
information also relates to Downsian persuasive advertising models, where the perks of public 
office give incumbents more effective persuasive advertising “technologies” (Mueller, 2003, 
Chapter 20). Another related explanation suggests that incumbents attract voter support by 
distributive spending to their constituencies in exchange for political loyalty (e.g., Baldwin, 2013).  
In contexts where opposition parties are weak and fragmented, voters may vote for the incumbent 
party in order to guarantee access to patronage (Wantchekon, 2003). A third class of explanations 
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states that incumbents may have advantage in the mobilization of campaign funds and political 
endorsements through stronger political networks. The desire of fund suppliers to align themselves 
with the expected winner would guarantee valuable campaign resources that challengers would 
have difficulty matching. A fourth class of explanation pays attention to the role that poor 
economic conditions may exert over incumbency (dis)advantage. Simply put, poor economic 
conditions and weak management of the economy would lead to the defeat of incumbents in many 
low- and middle-income countries (see Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2008). A fifth explanation refers 
to a deterrence effect in which high-quality challengers strategically choose to run in districts 
where an incumbent candidate is not running for reelection. Last but not least, a sixth explanation 
addresses the role of weak party systems and opposition coordination. In this case, weak party 
systems can drive incumbency disadvantages where parties are unable to deter legislators from 
rent-seeking behavior (Titiunik, 2011).  
Overall, empirical investigation on incumbency (dis)advantage is full of complexities and 
nuances, it is growing rapidly, and it will continue to expand across the globe. The interaction of 
the aforementioned mechanisms to formal and informal institutions is complex and still 
understudied. 
3.6.2 Campaign Spending and Political Careers in Brazil 
The literature on campaign spending concerns with studying whether and how campaign 
spending affects electoral results. The initial research focused on the U.S. congressional elections. 
There has been no doubt that campaign spending matters. The main controversy has been the extent 
to which the effects of spending differ for incumbents and challengers. Jacobson's (1978) early 
work into U.S. House elections in the 1970s found that incumbent spending was ineffective in 
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generating additional votes, despite observing a strong positive return from challenger spending, 
even when controlling for endogenously determined "reactive" spending, where incumbent 
spending was driven by the size of the challenger threat. Jacobson (1978, 1980) provided evidence 
that they did differ: the more House and Senate challengers spent, the better they did at the polls; 
the more incumbents spent on their campaigns, the worse they did. Once the challenger’s spending 
was taking into account, the incumbent’s spending made no apparent difference. In sum, heavy 
spending by incumbents can be seen as a sign of electoral weakness, whereas heavy spending by 
challengers can be seen as a sign of electoral strength. Campaign spending seems more productive 
for challengers than for incumbents. Subsequent studies have generally also found that incumbent 
spending is less effective than challenger spending (e.g., Abramowitz 1988). 
The most enduring controversy in the literature on campaign money concerns the relative 
impact of spending by incumbent and challengers. There is evidence indicating that incumbents 
receive less return on their campaign expenditures (Jacobson, 1978, 1990; Ansolobehere and 
Gerber, 1994). The relationship between spending and votes is not straightforward. Researchers 
for the most part have trouble establishing a causal and quantitatively important connection 
between spending and vote shares (Stratmann, 2005, p.137). The relationship between spending 
and votes looks very different depending on the candidate’s incumbency status. The more 
candidates who challenge incumbent officeholders spend, the better they do on election day; the 
more incumbents spend, the worse they do. Such relationship has reappeared in every election 
since 1972 (Jacobson 2006, p.201). The consensus explanation is that campaign spending by 
incumbents rises with the magnitude of the electoral threat they face; the more trouble they are in, 
the more they spend (Jacobson, 2006). Spending by incumbents do not appear to cost votes, but 
also appear to have little or no effect on the results. However, spending by challengers is strongly 
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related to the election outcome. That is, the more challengers spend, the better they do in the 
election. As a result, the estimated payoff for a given level of spending seems much greater for 
challengers. 
However, the differing impact of campaign spending by incumbents and challengers is not 
universally accepted (e.g., (Green and Krasno, 1988, 1990; Goldstein and Freedman, 2000). Green 
and Krasno (1988), for instance, argue that much of the research on the topic has been plagued by 
methodological problems, including failures to control for the reciprocal nature of the relationship. 
That is, strong challengers are able to mount serious threats to the incumbent that, in turn, cause 
the incumbent to spend more. This increased spending, however, if offset because strong 
challengers are able to raise more funds. Green and Krasno concluded that incumbent spending 
decreased the number of votes the challenger received. 
There are several methodological challenges involved in the estimation of the effect of 
campaign spending on electoral outcomes. The key problem is endogeneity. Campaign spending 
is endogenous: challengers expected to do well raise more money, as well as incumbents who face 
more serious electoral threats. Campaign spending is endogenously determined by expectations 
about the electoral results. The better a challenger’s prospects, the more contributors are willing 
to invest in their campaigns, which improves the challengers’ prospects. Also, from the beginning, 
scholars have found that incumbents’ vote shares and spending are simultaneously determined: 
while the spending influences the vote share, the expected vote share may influence the spending 
(Stratmann, 2005, p.138). As stated by Jacobson, “money may help win votes, but the expectation 
that a candidate can win votes also brings in money” (Jacobson 2006, p.203). 
The endogeneity problem, characterized by simultaneity bias (i.e., mutual causation of 
money and expected votes) or omitted variable bias (i.e., unobserved determinants of both 
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spending and outcomes), has been addressed in a variety of ways and the results have been 
disparate (Jacobson, 2015). Some scholars simply replicated the initial findings that challenger 
spending matters and incumbent spending does not (e.g., Abramowitz, 1988; Ansolabehere and 
Gerber, 1994). Other studies reported that the marginal returns on spending are greater for 
challengers than for incumbents but to a lesser extent than OLS estimations would suggest (e.g., 
Bartels, 1991). Others argued that spending by both incumbents and challengers has approximately 
the same effect or that incumbent spending is more effective (e.g., Green and Krasno, 1988, 1990; 
Erikson and Palfrey, 1998). Finally, one study, based on analysis pairs of House candidates 
competing for a second time, concluded that no one’s candidate makes any difference (Levitt, 
1994). 
In Brazil, the first findings related to the role of campaign finance on elections are from 
Samuels (2001a, 2001b, 2001c). He explored the impact of campaign spending on incumbent and 
challenger vote shares in elections to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and concluded that 
campaign spending influences the results of Brazilian campaigns. More specifically, Samuels 
found confirmation that campaign spending influences outcomes in Brazilian congressional races. 
That is, money helps win elections in Brazil equally for incumbents and challengers.  
According to Samuels, the main arguments that explain the logic of the relation between 
money and votes in the United States does not explain the Brazilian case well. In the United States, 
incumbents and challengers benefit themselves differently from campaign spending. Incumbents 
would benefit less because they bring an electoral advantage from their mandates, which attenuates 
the impact of campaign financing during the campaign period. On the other hand, challengers, for 
being less known, obtain more benefit in their campaigns from campaign finance. 
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In Brazil, there would not be incentives to the construction of political careers on the 
legislature because of particular features of the Brazilian political system (i.e., centrality of the 
executive power, open list proportional representation, large district magnitudes, large number of 
candidates and weak party system). To Samuels, there is a relatively low payoff to holding a seat 
of federal deputy. That is, incumbents gain little advantage in terms of name recognition from 
holding office. Sometimes challengers have greater name recognition than incumbents (Samuels 
2001b, p.570). Another factor that contributes to the relative lack of an incumbency advantage in 
Brazil is that incumbents who run for reelection are relatively weak candidates. As a result, Brazil’s 
electoral system offers incumbents little protection. The electoral system aggravates individualistic 
and personalistic tendencies and provides incentives for individualistic campaign tactics. It 
promotes high individual campaign spending (Samuels, 2001a, p.33). Following this 
interpretation, it is possible to infer that the Brazilian political “market” would be of high risk: all 
candidates would be able to translate resources into votes. Money would matter equally for all 
candidates. The absence of incumbency advantage in legislative elections implies that, at every 
new election, all candidates would depart from the same level. 
Further studies continued studying the role of campaign spending for the Brazilian lower 
chamber and expanded the scope of the investigation, studying the determinants and the effects of 
campaign funds for the Brazilian Senate and Brazilian majoritarian elections. 
Analyzing the campaign financing of the elections to the National Congress (i.e., lower 
and higher chambers) for the elections of 2002 and 2006, Lemos, Marcelino, and Pederiva (2010) 
found that money matters for campaigns: elected candidates spend on average five times more 
than non-elected candidates. Moreover, candidates running for reelection receive more resources 
than challengers. Concerning the incumbency effect, they found that in Brazil challengers spend 
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less because they have less access. When analyzing the average of spending between elected 
candidates (i.e., incumbents and challengers), the authors found that the spending follows 
Jacobson’s explanations for the American Congress. That is, incumbents spend more and have 
more resources than challengers, but challenges win elections investing less money 
proportionately. For the Brazilian Senate, they found that challengers obtained more campaign 
funds than incumbents (Lemos, Marcelino, and Pederiva, 2010, p.384). Also studying the lower 
chamber, Mancuso and Speck (2012) found a positive and statistically significant relation between 
campaign financing and electoral result, which were also corroborated by Silva and Cervi for the 
period of 2010 and 2014 (Silva and Cervi, 2017, p.79). They also found that the political impact 
of campaign financing is smaller for incumbents than it is for challengers. Addressing the role of 
corruption scandals on the political fate of career members of the Brazilian Congress, Jucá, Melo 
and Rennó (2016) found that although incumbents tainted by corruption scandals tend to be 
penalized electorally, campaign spending attenuates this effect. Their econometric analysis 
showed that above a certain threshold of funding, Brazilian members of Congress become 
impervious to negative exposure.  
Finally, a couple of studies also addressed the role campaign spending exerts in 
majoritarian elections. Speck and Cervi (2016) analyzed the mayoral election of 2012 and 
theorized that parties’ access to campaign advertisement depends on two factors: the 
communication’s infrastructure available in a municipality and the electoral legislation regulating 
the access to campaign advertising and the distribution of time on radio and TV. Their key variable, 
candidate’s spending, was measured as the percentage of spending of each candidate divided by 
the total campaigns’ funds amassed in each municipality by the candidates. They also assessed the 
impact that free campaign advertising had on electoral results. They concluded that campaign 
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resources exert an important role in elections and have a direct effect on electoral performance for 
mayor. Moreover, the importance of money on the campaigns would grow according to the size 
of the municipality. The larger the municipality, the lower the money’s efficiency to obtain votes. 
(Speck and Cervi, 2016, p.71). Borba and Cervi (2017) studied the electoral performance of 1,281 
candidates who ran for president, governor, and mayor of capitals between 2002 and 2014 in Brazil 
and concentrated their analyses on four explanatory variables to explain electoral results in 
majoritarian elections: free TV and radio campaign air time (Horário Gratuito de Propaganda 
Eleitoral – HGPE), campaign financing, incumbent government’s job approval, and reelection. 
Campaign spending exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on the vote shares of 
incumbents running for reelection. 
Overall, the Brazilian literature has found that campaign financing matters. Candidates 
with more access to campaign funds obtain more votes in proportional and majoritarian elections 
(Samuels, 2001a; Samuels, 2001c; Speck and Mancuso, 2012). The relative impact of campaign 
spending for incumbents and challengers has not been systematically studied by scholars. There 
are no studies verifying the relative impact of campaign spending for incumbents and challengers 
for Brazilian mayoral elections. 
3.6.3 The Brazilian Political System and the Role of Mayors 
The Brazilian electoral system is an open list proportional representation system. Part of 
the Brazilian legislature is elected according to a proportional system (the lower chamber and the 
subnational chambers), and another part to a majority voting system (Senate). The executive 
(president, governors, and mayors) is elected according to a simple majority voting system. Chief 
executives are elected according to two different rules: the president, governors, and mayors from 
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municipalities with more than 200,000 voters are elected in two rounds. A candidate must obtain 
at least 50% plus one of the valid votes in the first round. If no candidate reaches the qualified 
majority of the votes in the first round, then a second round takes place, in which the two candidates 
with the most votes in the first round face each other. In municipalities with less than 200,000 
voters (98.3% of all municipalities), the results are determined by a simple majority: the candidate 
with the most votes wins the election. The Senate is made up of 81 members (three members for 
each electoral district, the state) and have a mandate of 8 years. Elections to the Senate are decided 
by simple majority vote. 
Elections take place simultaneously every 4 years. State and national elections occur on 
the same day; local elections are staggered by 2 years. The electoral districts are the same as the 
different administrative units (i.e., more than 5570 municipal authorities and 26 states plus a 
federal district). Voting is compulsory for all Brazilians between the ages for 18 and 70 and 
voluntary for individuals with 16 and 17 years old as well as for citizens over 70. Illiterate citizens 
are not required to vote. Listing is compulsory but not automatic. All citizens who are required to 
vote must register at a regional electoral court. Concerning the electoral campaign period, 
campaigns were financing through private donations. In September of 2016, the Brazilian Supreme 
Court prohibited donations from private enterprises and established the exclusive public funding 
of campaigns. It allowed candidates to self-finance their campaigns if they wish or can, though. In 
addition, there is an electoral campaign period on radio and TV (Horário Eleitoral Gratuito), 
which provides parties with free public advertising on radio and television (Nicolau and Stadler, 
2016). 
The Brazilian political system has been characterized for low levels of party identification 
among citizens, which results in high electoral volatility. Such low party identification can be 
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attributed, at least in part, to the country’s fragmented party system, which leads to party switching 
(Desposato, 2006), weak party discipline (Ames 2001, Mainwaring, 1991, 1993), and the personal 
vote (Samuels, 2001a). Part of the cause for both the candidate-centered competition and the weak 
party system would be the country’s electoral system based on Open-List Proportional 
Representation. Nonetheless, more recently some scholars have pointed out that parties play a 
larger role in the Brazilian Congress than was initially acknowledged (Albarracín, 2016). 
In Brazil, the smallest unit of government is the municipality. Brazil has more than 5,570 
municipalities, varying considerably in population size. Brazilian mayors are elected for a four-
year term, can run for reelection, and can serve only two consecutive terms. In larger and wealthier 
municipalities, mayors control many appointee positions and a sizeable budget. Mayors can obtain 
considerable media attention and are able to claim credit for implementing public works within 
the municipality (Samuels, 2003, p.22). However, the majority of municipalities in Brazil have 
small populations and tight budgets. The benefits of office include pay, control over the municipal 
budget, the ability to influence policy, and the capacity to distribute patronage opportunities 
(Samuels, 2003, p.17). It also includes, for some municipalities, the capacity to spend with 
government advertising. 
3.6.4 Theory on Government Advertising, Campaign Spending, and Electoral 
Results 
In this section, I lay out a theory for the impact of government advertising and campaign 
spending on electoral results. Based on these theoretical considerations, I derive testable 
hypotheses to be latter tested in the empirical analyses. Here, it is assumed that government 
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advertising and campaign spending generate information that is useful to voters, albeit in different 
ways. 
Mayors may advertise their activities in different ways (e.g., newsletters, social media, 
public speeches, media appearances). However, government advertising gives incumbents more 
control over what constituents see or listen to. Whereas media access is infrequent and mediated, 
government advertising can be frequent and is unmediated. Government advertising affects voters 
before the election and constitutes a resource of incumbency advantage. The incentives to spend 
on advertising are two: build a positive reputation before the election and signal effort to the 
electorate. The goal of government advertising is to form views of the incumbent administration 
(and to signal effort) during the long run. 
Because monitoring costs are high, citizens are generally unable to keep track of how well 
the mayor is performing her job. As a result, mayors must work hard to draw attention to what 
they do during their terms. It is important not only to be active on behalf of constituents; it is also 
necessary to advertise the activities. As Hall (1996) pointed out concerning member of the U.S. 
Congress, “efforts on behalf of constituents are not very valuable if they are not visible” (1996, 
p.62). Government advertising conveys messages that signal competence and effort (e.g., problems 
solved by the City Hall, how the City Hall brought federal programs and projects to the 
municipality, public works finished, etc.).  
Also, the type of publicity that government advertising provides is important for 
incumbents looking to gain support from citizens beyond their base. By claiming credit for 
accomplishments that benefit the municipality without drawing partisan opposition, government 
advertising can be used to appeal to constituents who may not otherwise support the incumbent. 
There is a problem with government advertising, though: constituents may not be likely to trust 
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government advertising for considering it biased, even though this type of advertising is less 
politically biased and charged than ordinary political advertising. Most importantly, government 
advertising in Brazil is not aired during the campaign period by law. 
Campaign spending (from incumbents and challengers) also aim at signaling effort. 
However, this effort is exerted in the short term in a very specific period, the official campaign 
period. Voters consume information derived from campaign spending during the electoral period. 
Based on this information, and also information from government advertising, citizens form their 
vote choices. Differently from government advertising, the information that originates from 
campaign spending is self-interested by definition. Such self-interest may be detrimental to 
candidates’ efforts aimed at persuasion. Nonetheless, the information originated from campaign 
spending conveys information necessary to voters that government advertising does not provide 
(i.e., candidate’s name, candidate’s number, party ID, political endorsements, political supporters, 
etc.).  
Hence, government advertising and campaign spending generate different types of 
information to voters. Both aim at signaling effort to voters and reputation building in the case of 
government advertising. However, the information provided to voters by these two sources occur 
at different points in time and are qualitatively different as well. Whereas government advertising 
is aired during the pre-electoral period (i.e., beginning of incumbent’s term until the eve of the 
official campaign period), the information conveyed by campaign spending takes place during the 
official campaign period only. Regarding the qualitative differences between both sources of 
information, the information provided by government advertising is devoid of important electoral 
information that is present in campaign ads, such as candidate’s name and candidate’s number. 
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Voters process information in different socioeconomic and political contexts, and such 
differences in contexts affect the pattern of electoral competition and the degree of impact of each 
information source. As previously discussed, factors such as poor socioeconomic conditions and 
the number of candidates (as well as other often unmeasurable characteristics such as challengers’ 
quality) differ from constituency to constituency and affect the degree to which information can 
be received by voters and can affect their vote choices. 
Last but not least, the political science literature recognizes limitations that citizens face to 
be competent evaluators of past performance of candidates, particularly incumbents, that must be 
taken into account in the current study. Three biases are especially important: a) voters’ focus on 
recent rather than cumulative performance, b) that voters are influenced by events unrelated to the 
incumbent’s performance, such as natural disasters, and c) that voters can be manipulated by 
rhetoric and advertising (Huber, Hill, and Lenz, 2012). The most important to the current purposes 
is the first type of bias.  
3.7 Government Advertising and Electoral Participation 
Turnout is considered to be one indicator of democracies’ health. Low turnout is often 
taken as bad for democracy, for it calls legitimacy into question. It also suggests a lack of 
representation of certain groups (Franklin, 2004, p.2). High turnout, on the other hand, suggests 
higher legitimacy of an election and a better representation of diverse groups in society. As a result, 
scholars have investigated which factors lead individuals to participate at the individual level and 
the aggregate level as well. 
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Studies that investigate who votes and why can be organized in three different approaches 
(Norris, 2002). Cultural explanations emphasize the role that attitudes that individuals bring to the 
electoral process, which include a sense of civic norms, political interest, and party identification. 
Since Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture (1963), studies have surveyed the importance of political 
attitudes and values related to the early socialization process. Second, structural explanations state 
that social and demographic inequalities (e.g., based on educational qualifications and 
socioeconomic status) lead to inequalities in other civic assets, such as knowledge and time 
(Norris, 2002, p.83). Third, there is an agency approach to the study of political participation. This 
group of studies have long stressed the role of mobilizing agencies. For instance, Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) emphasized the electoral functions of party and candidate organizations, group 
networks, social networks, and the role of the media. 
In the United States context, explanations of national and state turnout have focused on 
socioeconomic characteristics, institutional arrangements (e.g., registration requirements) and 
political mobilization efforts, especially from political campaigns (Holbrook and Weinschenk, 
2014, p.43). Thus, studies that explain variation in voter turnout usually fall into three broad 
categories and include explanations related to voters, contextual factors, and mobilization efforts 
from candidates and political parties (Hogan, 1999, p.404-405). 
Studies that have looked at characteristics of voters to explain variation in turnout have 
found that voters’ socioeconomic status, their levels of political resources, and their attitudes are 
found to play a central role in why some people choose to participate whereas others choose not 
to (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). A second group of studies 
focuses more on the contextual determinants of participation, for instance, the role of legal barriers 
or incentives for voting. Studies focused on registration requirements have found that the closing 
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date of registration is one of the most important determinants of voter participation (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980). A third approach to the study of turnout has paid attention to the mobilizing 
effects of political parties and candidate campaigns (Hogan, 1999, p.405). Earlier studies modeled 
mobilization effects through the action of canvassing efforts of parties (e.g., Kramer, 1970-1971). 
Most recently, though, research has put greater emphasis on the mobilization effects of individual 
candidate campaigns. Most studies of this sort have operationalized campaign effort as total 
spending and have found that it is a relevant factor in explaining turnout (e.g., Caldeira and 
Patterson, 1982). Previous studies demonstrate that candidate activity (measured bas campaign 
spending), has a strong influence on participation in statewide, congressional, and state legislative 
elections. These studies focus on the direct effects of campaign spending and have found that 
spending exerts a positive influence on voter participation (Cox and Munger, 1989; Hogan, 2013, 
p.840-841). 
Recent scholarly evidence indicates that spending may actually promote greater 
participation in the political process. Numerous empirical studies have documented a positive 
relationship between campaign expenditures and voter participation for several offices, including 
the presidency (Holbrook and McClurg, 2005) and the Congress (Jackson, 1993), among other 
offices. Experimental studies have shown that citizens are more likely to vote when they are 
stimulated by exposure to campaign information (Green and Gerber 2008). Observational studies 
have shown that campaign mobilization effort is a very powerful predictor of turnout not just in 
the US (Hillygus 2005), but across various electoral institutions (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp 
et al. 2008). 
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3.7.1 Government Advertising, Campaign Spending and Participation 
This dissertation continues the third line of inquiry (i.e., the mobilization approach, or the 
agency perspective in Norris, 2002) by examining the relative effects of non-campaign effort 
(government advertising) in the state of Minas Gerais and the effects of non-campaign and 
campaign effort (i.e., government advertising and campaign spending from incumbents and 
challengers) in Brazilian municipal elections. In this case, the mobilizing agent is the incumbent. 
It is important to emphasize that this study does not deny that individual differences in attitudes 
and resources are important causes of who participates and who does not. Rather, it recognizes 
that government advertising and campaign spending by incumbents and challengers are elite 
efforts to influence electoral outcomes, and such perspective is better studied through the 
mobilization lens. 
Usually, campaign efforts put in place by political parties and candidates, together with 
media coverage, are the key sources of information available to voters. Government advertising 
offers an additional, non-campaign tool, source of information with mobilizing effects. Hence, 
government advertising is a non-campaign tool at the disposal of incumbents that impacts electoral 
participation. It can be understood as an investment in the mobilization of voters, to which voters 
might rationally respond by turning out to vote. From a Downsian (1957) perspective, government 
advertising and campaign spending lessen the cost of voting by providing voters with valuable 
information. 
Government advertising informs and mobilizes voters. More specifically, government 
advertising reduces the electoral cost of voting by reducing the informational demand on voters 
about the job performance of the incumbent politician or candidate. Second, government 
advertising also mobilizes by persuading voters about the benefits that might flow from the 
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incumbent’s reelection. Mobilization via government advertising and campaign spending gives 
voters a reason to care about the outcome. The more incumbents invest in government advertising, 
the greater their capacity to expose voters to information about the incumbent’s performance, 
which can be electorally relevant. 
The theory assumes the premise that more visible campaigns encourage electoral 
participation. The higher the spending with government advertising (and campaign spending), the 
more visible a campaign becomes to voters. However, we should not expect government 
advertising to have a uniform effect on turnout among all group of voters (i.e., the incumbent’s 
supporters, the incumbent’s opponents, and the undecided). As McGhee and Sides (2011) 
observed, the mobilization of partisans may prove more efficient than other ways of winning votes. 
Incumbents, facing budgetary constraints, have greater incentives to target their supporters. Thus, 
government advertising is believed to increase more the instrumental benefits of voting for 
supporters of the incumbent. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this theoretical section, I developed a series of arguments to explain a) the content of 
political advertising, b) the impact of government advertising at the individual-level, c) the 
determinants of the allocation of government advertising, and d) the effects of government 
advertising and campaign spending. A key element underlying all the theoretical accounts in this 
chapter is the understanding that government advertising act as a tool that helps incumbents 
cultivate a personal vote. It is based on the assumption that incumbents aim at maximizing their 
chances of reelection. Government advertising can be used by incumbents to shape citizens’ 
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perceptions about the incumbent’s performance. This is achieved by government advertising by 
allowing the incumbent to claim credit for governmental deeds. Government advertising conveys 
positive information about governmental action and, indirectly, performance information, which 
allows incumbents to form retrospective evaluations about the incumbent’s tenure.   
With regard to content, I devised an inductively-oriented grouping of government 
advertising into three distinct categories based on the intended goal of the ad: information 
provision, credit claiming, and behavior change. The first aims at publicizing policies or events 
and is moderately explicit regarding credit claiming appeals. The second claims credit for past, 
present, or future policies and accomplishments and it is the most explicit respecting the credit 
claiming appeal. The last one, behavior change, aims at informing, educating, or alerting the public 
to adopt or change a behavior and it is the least explicit concerning credit claiming appeal.  
Also, the dissertation devises theoretical expectations regarding the way government 
advertising affects individuals. Based on attribution theory and ad sponsorship theories, it is 
understood that individuals cognitively try to infer a motive for the sponsorship behavior (Johnson, 
Dunaway and Weber 2011, p.101) and that they make predictions, or develop expectations, about 
a communicator based on what they know about the communication and the situation. A key 
element to the theory is source credibility and the motivation attributed to the source by the 
audience. Individuals attribute motivations to the source of communication and such attribution 
exerts influence on credibility judgments concerning the source. The identity of the sponsor 
conveys information respecting the motivations of a communicator, which can be used as 
heuristics by citizens when forming judgments about a message receive by them. Whereas political 
advertising presents salient self-interested electoral motivations, which tend to be seen as less 
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trustworthy and therefore as less effective, government advertising’s motivations are less salient 
than political advertising.  
Sponsorship does not act alone, though, on citizens’ judgment process. Instead, it also 
interacts with the information environment, or external reality. The information reality provides 
clues that help individuals process information found in government advertising. When the 
message contained in a government ad is congruent with the external reality, the persuasive power 
of the advertising is expected to increase. On the contrary, when the message contained in a 
government ad is incongruent with external reality, the persuasive power of the advertising is 
expected to decrease. The implication of the impact of such interaction is clear: government ads 
that portray rosy views of reality that do not agree with the reality in which citizens find themselves 
will not deserve citizens’ attention or will be viewed unfavorably. Hence, there is a limit to how 
much government advertising can be used as mere propaganda. 
At the aggregate level, it is argued that government advertising is employed to gather 
support for the incumbent in core constituencies rather than in swing constituencies. Because 
budgetary resources available for advertising are limited, targeting core constituencies constitutes 
a more cost-efficient strategy than targeting swing constituencies, which demands more costly 
efforts of persuasion of a subset of voters. Another factor that must play a role in advertising 
allocations concerns term limits. They affect the incentives incumbents have to engage in 
reputation-building activities. Contrary to what the extant literature suggests, I argue that 
reputation building and legacy building concerns make lame duck politicians more likely to keep 
spending as much as (or more) with government advertising in their second terms in office. 
Finally, also at the aggregate level, I argue that government advertising affects voters 
before the election. The incentives to spend on advertising are two: to build a positive reputation 
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before the election and to signal effort to the electorate. As a result, the goal of government 
advertising is to form views of the incumbent government’s administration (and to signal effort) 
over the long run. Campaign spending, on the other hand, signals effort in the short term in a very 
specific period and is qualitatively different from government advertising, which means that 
government advertising and campaign spending result in different types of information to voters. 
Given the closeness of the generation of information to the election engendered by campaign 
spending, we can expect this spending to be more potent than the information generated through 
government advertising. 
As already discussed, one important limitation is that we do not know what type of 
information voters “consume” when they face government advertising. Is the information mostly 
electorally-oriented, claiming credit for accomplishments? Or does government advertising 
provide other types of information? If yes, which types of information are provided? The analyses 
that follow on Chapter 4 aim at answering these questions. 
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4.0 Government Ads and Content Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The academic work on political advertising has usually focused on the impacts of 
advertising on different outcomes of interest, such as vote choice, voting decision, turnout, 
learning, and political knowledge. Most recently, more emphasis has been dedicated to the analysis 
of the effects of political advertising. Even though the advertising’s effects are usually mediated 
by factors such as party affiliation, political knowledge, and political involvement, the literature 
has found that political advertising can affect voting. It can persuade viewers to vote for a specific 
candidate or issue, it can have agenda-setting and third-person effects, and it can indirectly affect 
vote intention. The key independent variable in most studies has been advertising exposure, either 
by using survey measures or through experimental assignment (e.g., Valentino, Hutchings, and 
Williams, 2004) and the use of natural experiments (e.g., Ashworth and Clinton, 2006; Krasno and 
Green, 2008). There has also been the use of content analysis, albeit not extensive in number. For 
instance, Spiliotes and Vavreck (2002) analyzed the content of ads to explain whether political 
parties act as a constraint on candidates’ commitments. Also, Sides and Karch (2008) examined 
whether the issue content of campaign appeals are capable of mobilizing particular subset of 
voters. Nonetheless, government advertising has received limited attention from the political 
communication literature. Concerning the methodology used, there is no work (to the author’s 
knowledge) that uses content analysis to analyze the content of government ads. There is also a 
paucity of research that develops a theoretical framework to analyze their content. 
  64 
In this chapter, I present an alternative classification scheme of government advertising 
that is different from the classification schemes available in the political communication and the 
political science literatures. This classification scheme takes into consideration the goal or purpose 
of the government ads, which can be classified into information provision, credit claiming, and 
behavior change ads. I also propose additional classification of the government ads based on 
features such as the display of specific examples or improvements in the ads, the ads’ time horizon, 
the presentation (and the number of) corroborating sources of evidence, ads with specific names 
or titles, the presence or absence of specific audio-visual techniques, groups targeted by the ads 
and the issues covered in the ads, among others. Next, I present the content analysis’ methodology 
and main descriptive results, followed by a conclusion. 
4.2 Additional Features of Government Advertising 
Besides the classification into information provision, credit claiming, and behavior change, 
government advertising can be classified according to different and additional categories. Based 
on the literature on political advertising and content analysis, I propose other criteria to classify 
ads in addition to the ad’s goal or purpose.  
Government advertising is based on information about accomplishments or improvements. 
Hence, I classify government ads with respect to whether they show specific examples of 
improvements and also how many improvements are displayed in the ads, in words or images. Ads 
can also vary concerning their time horizon, that is, conveying information about policies in the 
past, present, or future (or a combination of those). Government ads also vary with respect to 
whether they show corroborating sources of evidence (e.g., an anecdotal account from an 
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individual, statistical evidence, etc.). Some ads also display specific names or titles defining it, and 
such denomination can have important political consequences. If an elected official wants to 
associate his personal reputation to a policy, it can be beneficial to design a policy with a specific 
title that citizens can relate to that office holder latter on. Examples of prominent policies with 
specific titles are the conditional cash transfer programs “Bolsa Família” program (i.e., Family 
Allowance program), created in 2004, and the Mexican program “Oportunidades”, created in 
2002. Government ads also vary with respect to whether information about the money spent in a 
policy is presented or not, as well as audio-visual techniques (e.g., who speaks to the audience in 
TV ads, whether the ad portrays a celebrity). Last but not least, government ads can also differ 
with respect to the social groups that are targeted in the ads (e.g., women, children, public servants, 
workers, etc.) and the issues covered in the ad (i.e., economy, social issues, law and order, etc.). 
All these different aspects of government advertising are categorized and subject to the content 
analysis that will follow next. 
4.3 Content Analysis: Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
I rely on advertising data from the Brazilian firm Arquivo da Propaganda (Propaganda’s 
Archive), which contains a very large dataset of ads aired in Brazil. The data consist of a set of 
storyboards, audio and video files (for radio ads and tv ads, respectively). I obtained and organized 
advertising data for a sample of ads from the Minas Gerais’ state government from January of 
2003 to December of 2014 and a sample of Minas Gerais’ city halls’ ads from January of 2005 to 
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December of 2016. The unit of analysis in these data is each piece of political advertising. The 
data record the date and time of each airing, the media market in which it aired and the ad’s 
sponsor(s). 
Ads were selected through a simple random sample selection process (without 
replacement) from a list of all the ads for the state government of Minas Gerais and the state’s city 
halls. From these initial lists, I eliminated advertising belonging to state-owned companies and 
also ads co-sponsored with other government entities (e.g., an ad sponsored by the state 
government of Minas Gerais and the Brazilian federal government, or the state government of 
Minas Gerais and a city hall). After these eliminations, I obtained a total of 939 ads from an initial 
list of 1928 ads from the state government. Likewise, for the state’s city halls’ ads, I obtained a 
total of 712 ads from an initial list of 917 ads. After the first round of eliminations, I also eliminated 
from sample consideration all ads which were aired in media markets other than Minas Gerais. As 
a result, I obtained 866 ads from the list of 939 ads for the state government of Minas Gerais and 
695 ads from the list of 712 ads. From the lists of 866 ads and 712 ads, I proceeded to a simple 
random sample selection (without replacement) of 25% of the 866 ads, resulting in the final data 
sample of 217 for the Minas Gerais’ state government. I also proceeded to a simple random 
selection (without replacement) of 31% of the 695 ads, resulting in the final data sample of ads of 
215 ads for Minas Gerais’ city halls. 
4.3.2 Ad’s Coding 
One graduate student was hired to co-code the ads with the author. The co-coder was 
trained during two months on ads from unrelated government ads to ensure that variables and item 
definitions were clear. Eventual differences in coding were dealt with through discussion and 
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additional exercises to ensure a common understanding of the coding procedures. After training, 
each coder received half of the ads from Minas Gerais’s state government and half the ads from 
Minas Gerais’ city halls to code. Each coder coded the ads individually and separated from each 
other. Later, the two codes were combined to establish intercoder reliability measures (i.e., Percent 
agreement and Cohen’s Kappa), which can be found on Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix.  
4.3.3 Coding Measures 
The two datasets of ads contain the same measures. Each dataset contains information 
about the year in which each ad was aired, the ad’s sponsor, the type of media where the ad was 
aired (i.e., newspaper, magazine, radio, TV, outdoors), and media market where the ad was aired. 
In addition, the datasets contain the information coded by the coders. The most important measure 
is each ad’s goal or purpose, which can assume one of three categories (i.e., information ad, credit 
claiming ad, or behavior change ad).  
The data contain measures of whether the ad shows specific examples of policy 
improvements and, if so, how many specific examples were shown in each ad. For a policy 
measure to qualify as an improvement, it needs to be a clearly identifiable policy (i.e., with a 
specific name) or a policy that applies to a specific geographic location. For instance, a hospital 
with a specific name (e.g., Hospital Maria do Carmo) qualifies as a specific example of an 
improvement. On the other hand, an ad that shows that a government built 4 new hospitals is 
generic and does not apply as a specific improvement. Relatedly, an ad that shows a public policy 
being delivered in a specific geographic location (a new bridge at neighborhood X) qualifies as a 
specific example of improvement. If, however, an ad does not specify a name or a geographical 
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location that allows a policy to be clearly identified, it does not count as a specific example of an 
improvement. 
The dataset has a measure of the time horizon of each ad, meaning whether the time tense 
used in the ad was in the past, mix of past and present, present, mix of present and future, or future. 
To assess information about the advertised money spent with policies, the data contain a variable 
assessing whether each ad advertised the amount spent with policies. Another important piece of 
information regards whether government ads show supporting sources of evidence to buttress 
claims made in the ads or not and, if so, which supporting source of evidence was offered. To that 
end, I measured the supporting sources of evidence in each ad (i.e., none, personal testimony from 
individual(s), news’ headlines, statistical information, and other). Concerning statistical 
information, the coding assumes a broad interpretation of what qualifies or not as statistical 
information. Any numerical information conveying quantity of some policy output qualifies as 
statistical information, ranging, for instance, from the number of ambulances purchased by a city 
hall government to the amount spent with a new bridge.  
Moreover, the data also contain information on whether each ad provides information about 
a policy with a specific name mentioned in words or pictures. This information is very important 
because in several countries (and especially in Brazil) governments give specific titles to their 
initiatives, which can be used by incumbent office holders for advertising and reputation building 
reasons with electoral goals in mind. The data also collects information about audio-visual 
techniques used in the ads, particularly for TV ads (i.e., who speaks to the audience in the ad, 
whether the ad features a celebrity). Also, the data contain information about whether an ad 
sponsors or endorses third-party initiatives. Lastly, the data contains information about which 
social group is targeted in the ad, in words or pictures (e.g., the elderly, workers, teachers, etc.) 
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and the ad themes or issues of each ad. Each ad can cover more than one social group and more 
than one issue.  
As a result, the final datasets provide a comprehensive account of the information conveyed 
in government ads and provides an initial basis of comparison across different government and 
countries. 
4.4 Results 
Below, I present descriptive statistics of the results for each variable coded in the datasets. 
I present each variables’ frequencies and percentages. 
The most important variable is the ad’s goal or purpose. As already stated, government ads 
can assume one of three categories. Government ads can publicize or promote a policy, claim 
credit for past, present, or future policy measures and accomplishments, or can inform educate, 
guide, or alert citizens to adopt or change behavior. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of ad’s 
goals. 
 
Table 2 Ad’s Goal 
  
MG state 
government MG city halls 
Goals Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
To claim credit for past, present, or future policy 
measures and accomplishments 130 59.91 155 72.09 
To publicize or promote a policy 49 22.58 34 15.81 
To inform, educate, guide, or alert the viewer to 
adopt or change behavior 38 17.51 26 12.09 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
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The results clearly show that government advertising is mostly used for credit claiming 
purposes by the governments in the samples. Approximately 60% of the ads aired by the Minas 
Gerais’ state government aim at claiming credit for policy measures and accomplishments. Credit 
claiming emphasis is still more pronounced in the state’s city halls: 72% of the ads aired by 
municipal governments in the sample claim credit for activities and accomplishments promoted 
by the governments. The numbers reinforce the view that governments use advertising to advance 
political goals of incumbent politicians. 
Government advertising can also vary in terms of the number of improvements they 
display. The information about the number of improvements is relevant because it allows the 
advertising to convey information about the “amount of work” being done by incumbent 
governments, which can be used by incumbent office holders for electoral purposes. Not only can 
governments claim credit about activities and improvements, but they can also specify which 
policies have deserved the incumbent government’s attention. This information also allows 
governments to be accountable to the citizenry (if an electoral official chooses so) by specifying 
exactly the policies that the government has promoted on the citizens’ behalf. The next table shows 
whether or not each ad contained specific examples of improvements. 
 
Table 3 Ad Shows Specific Examples of Improvements 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
No 188 86.64 133 61.86 
Yes 29 13.36 82 38.14 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
According to table 3, most ads do not present specific examples of improvements. Only 13 
percent of the Minas Gerais’ government ads specify examples of improvements. Among the 
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state’s city halls, 38% of the ads specify some example of improvement. These numbers suggest 
that governments want to create ads that have a broader appeal to the citizenry. It also suggests 
that elected officials may be wary of accountability. Specific examples of improvements can be 
used effectively for reputation building purposes, but it can also make citizens more demanding, 
especially if there is a discrepancy between the message the advertising conveys, and the policy 
citizens see and experience on their daily lives. For instance, it is not uncommon in Brazil to find 
newly inaugurated buildings being in poor state of conservation vary rapidly, or new buildings 
such as schools and hospitals closed because of lack of funds or proper equipment. Being specific 
about some policies can bring an inconvenient “magnifying glass” over some policies, something 
some incumbent politicians would be worried about and willing to ignore. 
Table 4 quantifies the number of improvements displayed in those ads that promote at least 
one specific improvement. Most ads are selective in terms of the improvements they show to 
constituents. One improvement is the mode among ads that show some improvement. However, 
there are ads that show much more than one improvement, particularly in ads from municipal 
governments. 
 
Table 4 Quantity of Specific Improvements Shown 
  
MG state 
government MG city halls 
N of improvements Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
0 188 86.64 133 61.86 
1 16 7.37 43 20.00 
2 6 2.76 11 5.12 
3 2 0.92 4 1.86 
4 5 2.30 24 11.16 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
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Another important piece of information that government advertising conveys is the time 
horizon, that is, at which point in time the message conveyed in the ad refers to. The choice of a 
time point to convey a message is not inconsequential. Rather, it can have important political 
implications. A focus on the past may suggest that the incumbent has a list of services done to 
show. It may also indicate an intent to induce retrospective evaluations of performance on voters. 
A focus on the present may suggest that the incumbent wants citizens to know about policies that 
are being implemented immediately, with more direct consequences and impact to voters. Next, a 
focus on the future may indicate a willingness to induce voters to promote prospective evaluations 
of performance.  
 
Table 5 Ad's Time Horizon 
  
MG state 
government MG city halls 
Time horizon Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Past 0 0 0 0 
Past and present 103 47.47 76 35.35 
Present 86 39.63 75 34.88 
Present and future 22 10.14 50 23.26 
Future 2 0.92 1 0.47 
No class. 4 1.84 13 6.05 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
According to the information available on Table 5, the preference for the past and the 
present time periods predominate. Approximately 87% of the ads from the Minas Gerais’s state 
government focus on the past and the present, whereas only 11% of the ads convey messages in 
the future, or a combination of present and future. The numbers for the city halls’ ads are more 
balanced. Almost 35% of the ads convey messages in the past and present, while 35% of the ads 
convey messages with a mix of past and present references. One important difference between ads 
from the state government and the city halls’ ads involve the use of the future tense. Almost 24% 
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of the ads from city halls present sentences in the future, more than double the number of sentences 
in the future in the state’s government. Overall, the results point to a retrospective focus on policy 
evaluation instead of a prospective focus. They may also suggest a tendency for local governments 
to promise more policies than higher-level governments. 
Governments cannot only advertise about policy implementation per se, but also about the 
amount spent with each policy measure. It is important, from a positive and normative perspective, 
to evaluate whether governments publicize the amount spent with the policies they promote. Table 
6 shows how many ads display information about money spent in different policies, services, or 
public works. The results are the same for both the Minas Gerais’s state government and the state’s 
city halls. Approximately 90% of the ads do not convey any information about the money spent in 
services or public works. Such results can be interpreted in different ways. Either the amount spent 
is deemed as not essential to the public, or governments do not want to inform the public much 
about how much is spent in public policies. The most severe interpretation may suggest a lack of 
accountability to citizens regarding how much taxpayers’ money is spent on their behalf. 
 
Table 6 Ad Shows Money Spent in Services or Public Works 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
No 197 90.78 193 89.77 
Yes 20 9.22 22 10.23 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
A different type of information that can make advertising more or less persuasive relates 
to whether advertising conveys some amount of evidence that goes beyond the message of the 
“narrator” of the ad, additional information that makes the overall message’s content more 
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credible. To that end, I codified each ad to verify which ones present at least one source to buttress 
statements made in the ad. Table 7 displays the results. 
 
Table 7 Ad Shows Corroborating Sources to Buttress Statements Made in the Ad 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Yes 114 52.53 136 63.26 
No 103 47.47 79 36.74 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
As the table shows, a majority of the ads from Minas Gerais’ state government present at 
least one corroborating source. The number is more expressive for the state’s city halls: 63% of 
the ads present some degree corroborating source of evidence. What are those sources? Table 8 
shows three different types of corroborating sources usually found in government advertising: 
personal testimony (of an individual or actor), display of the media’s coverage of the policy or 
improvement achieved, and statistical information (i.e., any numerical information denoting 
quantity of some policy output), and other sources (e.g., display of results from a public opinion 
poll). By far the most used corroborating source of evidence found in government ads was 
statistical information. Personal testimony and media coverage amount to a minority of the 
sources. This information is important for accountability: it makes clear to citizens how much of 
a policy output is being delivered by governments. It also helps make advertising more credible. 
For example, it is more convincing to say that healthcare is improving because “5 new hospitals 
are being built” rather than simply stating that “new hospitals are being built”.  
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Table 8 Type of Corroborating Source 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Statistical information 103 47.47 116 53.95 
Personal testimony 12 5.53 19 8.84 
Media coverage 1 1 3 1.40 
Other 9 4.15 15 6.98 
Total frequency for MG state government and MG city halls do not amount to 114 and 136, 
respectively, because ads can display more than one corroborating source. 
 
The number of ads that display at least one policy with a specific name or title is a variable 
with relevant political significance. Policies with titles can be used by ambitious politicians willing 
to “leave their mark” during their tenure in office, which can help them build a reputation for 
industriousness and public commitment. Titles can arguably be used to facilitate credit claiming. 
It may be far easier for a politician to credibly claim credit for an identifiable policy rather than 
claiming credit for an unidentifiable one8. Policies with specific titles have been very prominent 
in Brazil, particularly at the federal level (e.g., Bolsa Família, Minha Casa Minha Vida, Programa 
Luz Para Todos, Prouni, PAC, Bolsa Atleta, etc.). In the state of Minas Gerais there are programs 
with specific names such as Minas Ativa (a program to simply the entry of firms into the formal 
sector of the economy), and Programa Fique Vivo (a social program targeting young people living 
in violent neighborhoods). In Belo Horizonte, MG’s capital, there was a program named Vila Viva 
(a program aiming the urbanization of poor neighborhoods). Nonetheless, even though there are 
signs that such practice of attaching titles to policies can be verified at lower levels of governance, 
such signs have mostly been only anecdotal. Table 9 presents a first view of how common such 
denominations are at lower levels of government in government ads. 
 
 
8 Although it can be argued that politicians can claim credit for the state of the economy, which is not an identifiable policy.  
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Table 9 Ad Mentions or Shows Images of a Public Policy with a Specific Title 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
No 143 65.9 132 61.40 
Yes 74 34.10 83 38.60 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
The results show that a minority, but sizable number of policies do contain at least one 
policy with a title. More than a third of the ads from both the state government and the city halls 
contain at least one policy with a title. These results strongly suggest that incumbents make a 
serious attempt at building a personal reputation. These types of policies also facilitate credit 
claiming considerably. 
Government ads can be used not only to advertise initiatives from governments, but also 
initiatives that result from partnerships between the government and other entities, or initiatives 
that are not promoted by a government, such as the media or NGOs. Table 10 informs us about 
how prevalent these types of ads are. The results are clear: almost no ads from the state and local 
Minas Gerais’s governments embrace third-party initiatives in the ads. These results do not mean, 
however, that governments necessarily do not support third-party initiatives. These types of 
initiatives are more usually supported in other types of ads, such as government ads co-sponsored 
with other government or co-sponsored with state-owned enterprises. Both types of ads are out of 
the samples analyzed here. 
 
 
 
Table 10 Ad Supports a Third-Party Initiative with a Specific Title 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
No 209 96.31 205 95.35 
Yes 8 3.69 10 4.65 
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Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
The next two tables present information about audio-visual aspects of the ads. One is the 
conveyor of the message in an ad (a supporting actor or a voiceover). According to Table 11, most 
of the ads that contain someone who speaks with the audience make use of voiceovers. Only one 
ad in the Minas Gerais’s state government and one ad in the state’s city halls make use of 
supporting actors. 
 
Table 11 [For video ads only] Who Speaks to the Audience in the Ad 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
No TV ad 186 85.71 170 79.07 
Yes, voiceover/announcer 17 7.83 27 12.56 
Nobody 13 5.99 17 7.91 
Yes, supporting actor 1 0.46 1 0.47 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
One common resource of ads to attract people’s attention is the use of celebrities in ads. 
Does government advertising make use of them? According to the data from Minas Gerais, mostly 
not. Table 12 shows that only approximately 5% of the ads show a celebrity.  
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Table 12 Ad Shows a Celebrity 
  MG state government MG city halls 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
No 207 95.39 203 94.42 
Yes 10 4.61 12 5.58 
Total 217 100% 215 100% 
 
Government ads (as well as commercial and political ads) may not desire to communicate 
with all citizens. Rather, they may want to convey information to specific subgroups of the 
population. For instance, the recipients of a conditional cash transfer program. To verify which 
groups are targeted in government ads, and the frequency of such targeting, Table 13 shows the 
results of social groups targeted by the ads.  
The results show that government ads are used to convey many messages to 
undifferentiated individuals. References to “citizens” or groups”, by words or pictures, total 38.7% 
in the state’s government’s ads and 44% of the state’s city halls’ ads. Next, the group that is 
targeted by more than 30% of ads is women. More than 35% of Minas Gerais’s state government 
ads and more than 38% of the state’s city halls’ ads portray women in words or images. Children 
also figure prominently in ads (26% and 35%, in each type of government, respectively). 
Adolescents and children combined comprise more than 40% of ads in both types of governments. 
This result can be explained by the fact that many social welfare government ads address education 
and childcare, which understandably portray adolescents and children more often than other types 
of ads. Mentions or depictions of parents or relatives are also not uncommon: more than 10% in 
both types of governments. Specific categories of workers are displayed in government ads, such 
as police officers, teachers, and healthcare workers. Businesspeople and farmers receive little 
attention in government ads. Overall, the percentages are very similar between the state 
government’s ads and the city halls’ ads. 
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Table 13 Ad's Targeted Groups 
  
MG state 
government MG city halls 
Groups Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Citizens / people 84 38.71 95 44.19 
Women 77 35.48 83 38.60 
Children 57 26.27 76 35.35 
Adolescents 37 17.50 37 17.21 
Parents / relatives 36 16.59 24 11.16 
Workers 24 11.06 31 14.42 
Elderly 22 10.14 25 11.63 
Physicians / pharmaceutical / healthcare workers 20 9.22 19 8.84 
Teachers 16 7.37 11 5.12 
Police officers 11 5.07 6 2.79 
Celebrities 9 4.15 10 4.65 
Farmers 8 3.69 1 0.47 
Handicapped 5 2.30 5 2.33 
Public servants 2 0.92 1 0.47 
Businesspeople 2 0.92 3 1.40 
Other 8 3.39 6 2.79 
None 49 22.58 46 21.40 
Total does not amount to 100% because ads can cover more than one group. 
 
Finally, government ads also address different issues. The analysis of the issues in 
government advertising is paramount, for it indicates which policy areas have deserved more 
attention from governments. The coverage of issues in the ads may indicate which issues specific 
elected officials prioritize more during their tenures in office. It may also provide indication of 
which issues are more conducive to credit claiming appeals. Each issue on Table 14 subsumes a 
collection of sub-issues related to each macro-issue (see the Content Analysis Questionnaire in the 
Appendix). The issues covered in the content analysis are: the economy (both in generic and in 
specific terms), social issues (e.g., affirmative action, human rights, gender), law and order (e.g., 
policy, firefighters, narcotics), social welfare issues (e.g., education, healthcare), infrastructure 
(e.g., public transportation, public sanitation, housing), and government (taxes, budgetary matters, 
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government spending, and public administration broadly defined). Lastly, a final category 
encompasses issues that could not be adequately aggregated into the other macro-categories, 
“Other” (i.e., local issues, environment, culture, tourism, event/holiday/anniversary/tribute).  
 
Table 14 Issues Covered in the Ads 
  
MG state 
government MG city halls 
Issue Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Social welfare 129 59.45 132 61.40 
Other 124 57.14 89 41.40 
Economy 66 30.41 32 14.88 
Law and Order 48 22.12 14 6.51 
Government 46 21.20 46 21.40 
Infrastructure 45 20.74 110 51.16 
Social issues 6 2.76 0 0.00 
Total does not amount to 100% because ads can cover more than one group. 
 
The results of Table 14 show that social welfare is clearly the most covered issue in the 
government ads from the state government of Minas Gerais and the state’s city halls’ governments. 
The issue of the economy deserved a considerable amount of attention from the state government, 
that is, 30% compared to only 14.9 % from city halls. An important difference between both types 
of governments relates to the emphasis on infrastructure. Whereas 20% of ads from the Minas 
Gerais’s government cover infrastructure, more than 50% of the ads from city halls address the 
issue. The state government covers law and order issues much more than city hall governments 
(22% versus 6.5%), which can be explained by the fact that in Brazil the police is subordinated to 
the state governments primarily. Some municipalities have “civil guards”, which can devote 
limited efforts to matters of public security. Social issues are almost non-existent in government 
ads from Minas Gerais’s state government and are null in the state’s city halls’ ads. Government-
related issues are covered in the same proportions by both types of governments. Finally, a 
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relatively large number of ads cover other issues than the main macro-issues on the table. The state 
government uses to devote space in its ads to environmental issues, culture, and tourism (11%, 
17%, and 15.6%, respectively), whereas the state’s local governments cover the same issues at 
8.8%, 18.1%, and 6.5% respectively. Events, holidays, anniversaries, and tributes were present in 
8.7 percent of space in the MG ads, whereas the same topics were present in 10.23 percent of the 
City Hall ads.  All in all, the result show that social welfare issues are very important to 
governments and frequently figure in government ads. Data from Datafolha Institute from 2010 
shows that healthcare and education are the most important problems in the state for a sizable 
portion of the state’s population (36.5% and 11.5%, respectively). In city halls’ ads, the issue of 
infrastructure is present in a majority of ads. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a classification scheme of government advertising that is 
different from the other classification schemes in the political communication and the political 
science literatures. It utilizes as the main criteria the goal or purpose of the message in the ad, 
which can be classified into information provision, credit claiming, and behavior change ads. I 
also proposed additional categorization of the government ads based on additional features of the 
ads, such as the display of specific examples or improvements in the ads, the ads’ time horizon, 
among others. 
To verify the appropriateness of the classification scheme, I proceeded to a content analysis 
of the ads from the state government of Minas Gerais and Minas Gerais’ city halls. The descriptive 
analysis of the ads’ content shows that indeed credit claiming is the most prevalent type of ad 
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issued by both types of governments: 59.9% of the ads issued by the Minas Gerais’ s state 
government are credit claiming ads. Among the state’s city halls, credit claiming ads are even more 
pronounced, 72%. This confirms my theoretical expectations that local governments use 
advertising for reputation building purposes and electoral purposes, to show “job being done” in 
favor of the citizenry. However, it has also been shown that governments use advertising for public 
service provision purposes. Adding to that picture, the analysis also showed that messages in 
government ads are mainly retrospective, with a focus on present and past policy declarations. 
Statements in the future tense comprise a minority of the ads in both types of governments.  
A majority of ads in both types of government do not show specific types of improvements, 
that is, they state imprecise policy declarations and do not specify policies by name or geographic 
location. The implication is that many ads aim at conveying messages of broader public appeal, 
but at the same time make accountability more difficult. At the same time, a majority of ads in 
both types of government show corroborating sources of evidence to buttress claims made in the 
ads, and these sources of evidence are mostly statistical information broadly defined. Furthermore, 
a sizeable minority of ads presents policies with specific names or titles in them, which reinforces 
the argument that some ads are used to associate policies with a specific administration for 
electoral purposes. Regarding the issues covered in the ads, social welfare figures as the most 
prominent issue. It appears in 59% of Minas Gerais’s state government ads and in 61% of the ads 
from city hall governments.  
Overall, the findings corroborate theoretical accounts of government ads as vehicles to the 
construction of reputation building with electoral purposes. They provide a first account in the 
literature of how governments craft government advertising messages and with which purpose. 
The political and normative implications are relevant. Elected officials in Brazil have the means 
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of promoting themselves over the course of their tenures and have at their disposal different 
rhetorical alternatives to craft self-promotion. The most explicit way of self-promoting is through 
credit-claiming. However, as it was mentioned before, information and behavior change 
advertising can also be used for self-promotion purposes. The main difference is in how explicit 
and direct self-promotion claims are made. In credit claiming ads self-promotion is evident, direct, 
explicit, whereas in the other two types of ads self-promotion is less evident, indirect, and implicit. 
Also, the analysis of the content of political ads provides an ambiguous account of the use of such 
ads to provide accountability before voters. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that government 
advertising messages provide some degree of accountability. Even self-promotion ads provide 
information of policies being delivered. It can be argued that citizens have the right to know what 
the government does on their behalf. To that end, government advertising provides some degree 
of accountability. On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that governments can use 
government advertising to be accountable on their own terms by choosing when, what, and how 
to make themselves accountable.  
This chapter sets the stage for the coming empirical analyses at the individual and 
aggregate levels. Concerning the former, we still have to know the degree to which government 
advertising can be used successfully to change individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. So far there is 
no account in the literature as to whether government advertising can affect citizens’ attitudes (with 
the exception of Romero, Magaloni, and Díaz-Cayeros, 2015) and how. In the next chapter, I 
empirically and experimentally analyze government advertising’s potential to change people’s 
minds. 
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5.0 The Effects of Government Advertising at the Individual Level: Results from an 
Experiment in Brazil 
5.1 Introduction 
In the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, attention was paid to the content of 
government advertising in the state of Minas Gerais and its municipalities, with the development 
of a typology that classifies political ads according to their stated goal or purpose. The results of 
this analysis (and from the analyses of the two empirical chapters that follow) cannot inform us 
about the impact of government advertising at the individual level, though. Far from being only 
important at the aggregate local level, advertising may also drive important attitude and behavioral 
change, even if short-lived.  
In this chapter, I proceed to an analysis of the impact of government advertising on the 
political attitudes and behaviors of 1,800 Brazilian citizens. A between-subjects factorial online 
experiment was carried out to test hypotheses about the impact of government advertising vis-à-
vis party advertising on responsibility attribution, intention to vote for reelection, ad’s 
effectiveness, and performance in office. Empirical studies of political advertising face great 
challenges in establishing causal effects. The most serious one is the endogeneity of political 
advertising to political and social factors. Even with panel data is hard to rule out the influence of 
time-varying unobserved confounding factors. The experimental design allows us to infer causal 
relationships with more confidence. 
The chapter also considers the role that the information environment may have at shaping 
how citizens receive and process government advertising. To that end, I consider the impact that 
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an independent source of information about the external reality may (or may not) have on the way 
citizens react to and process government advertising. Given the importance of the issue of the 
economy to ordinary citizens and its relevance in the political science scholarship, I verify how 
news about unemployment interacts with the type of ad individuals watch and how this interaction 
affects their behavior. Another reason to use an independent source of information as a second 
treatment in the study is that such procedure allows us to experimentally simulate situations in 
which the message of government advertising airs free (or almost free) from competing influences 
(i.e., no independent news source to contest the claims in the government ads), or situations in 
which the message of government advertising faces challenges from the information environment. 
The former scenario is typical of polities where the access to independent sources of information 
is more limited, whereas the latter is more typical of polities where the message of government 
advertising faces more competition from the media. The experiment also allows us to verify which 
type of advertising (government or party) seems more effective.  
The analyses show that government advertising is capable of affecting responsibility 
attributions. Individuals who watch government ads attribute more responsibility for the state of 
unemployment to the City Hall, whereas those who watch the party ad attribute more responsibility 
to the mayor. Moreover, the experiment found that government advertising is as effective as 
political advertising in influencing citizens’ opinions on the four dependent variables measured in 
the study to assess the advertising’s level of influence. That is, both the government and the party 
ads are effective, with similar levels of impact. Moreover, the study did find important impacts on 
the dependent variable when watchers from government ads are compared to those who were in 
the control condition.  
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The chapter is organized in the following way. First, based on the theory laid out in the 
theoretical chapter (Section 3.4 in the theoretical chapter), I present the experiment’s hypotheses. 
Further, I describe the experimental design, participants, and measures and proceed to the analysis 
of the results. Finally, I conclude. 
5.1.1 Hypotheses 
In this chapter, I will analyze the impact of government and party advertising (plus control 
group advertising) on four dependent variables: attribution of responsibility for employment to the 
mayor and to City Hall, support for the Mayor’s reelection, ad effectiveness, and Mayor’s 
approval. 
Based on the theory, I formulate the following hypotheses about the impact of government 
advertising on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors:  
 
H5.1. Responsibility attribution hypothesis: individuals exposed to political advertising will 
attribute more responsibility to the Mayor for the situation of employment, whereas individuals 
exposed to government advertising will attribute less responsibility to the Mayor and more 
responsibility to the City Hall. 
 
H5.2. Reelection hypothesis: individuals exposed to government advertising will present higher 
electoral support to the mayor’s reelection than those who did not watch the government ad 
(control group or party ad). 
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H5.3. Ad effectiveness hypothesis: individuals exposed to government advertising will rate the ad 
as more effective than those who watched other ads (control group or party ad). 
 
H5.4. Mayor’s approval hypothesis: individuals exposed to government advertising will approve 
the mayor’s performance more highly than those who watched other ads (control group or party 
ad).  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
The 1,800 participants were drawn from a pool of respondents from the Brazilian panel 
firm Opinion Box. The study took place between July 19th and August 1st of 2019. Individuals 
received an invitation to take part in the study in exchange for points that could be exchanged for 
prizes. The sample size was defined based on the results of power analysis (see Appendix C.5, 
Figure 4). The study’s sample size is over-powered (i.e., it has a larger sample size than what was 
estimated in the power analysis). Respondents do not constitute a random sample of the Brazilian 
population. The main difference concerns the education level. The experiment’s sample is more 
literate than the composition of the Brazilian electorate (see Appendix C.5, Table 4 and Table 5).  
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5.2.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
The study follows a 3x3 between-subjects factorial design. Participants received one of 
three ads (control ad, government advertising ad, or party ad), and one of three news stories 
(control story, news story about unemployment increase, or news story about unemployment 
decrease). It consists of nine experimental conditions structured as different combinations of these 
experimental factors. 
  
Treatment 1: advertising 
  
Soccer 
championship’s 
ad 
City Hall’s ad 
 
Party ad 
 
Treatment 2: 
news on 
unemployment 
News: soccer 
championship 
 
Control news 
x 
Control ad 
Control news 
x 
City Hall’s ad 
Control news 
x 
Party ad 
News: 
unemployment 
increase 
News: 
unemployment 
increase 
x 
Control ad 
News: 
unemployment 
increase 
x 
City Hall’s ad 
News: 
unemployment 
increase 
x 
Party ad 
News: 
unemployment 
decrease 
News: 
unemployment 
decrease 
x 
Control ad 
News: 
unemployment 
decrease 
x 
City Hall’s ad 
News: 
unemployment 
decrease 
x 
Party ad 
 
Figure 2 Experimental Conditions 
 
After being briefed about the study and agreeing to participate, participants were asked to 
answer a pre-treatment questionnaire. They were asked about questions on sociodemographic 
  89 
variables, media habits, and party preference. Because the study included content with audio, the 
pre-treatment questionnaire contained one question asking participants to state which sound they 
heard after pressing a button. Individuals who did not answer correctly were excluded from the 
study. Also, the pre-treatment questionnaire contained a trap question asking participants to answer 
the option instructed in the command line. Individuals who did not follow the instruction and 
answered incorrectly were also excluded from the study. 
After answering the pre-treatment questions, participants read about the characteristics of 
a fictitious city called “Cruzeiro Novo” and a concise description of the city’s mayor. The city and 
mayor of the experiment are fictitious to reduce negative political reactions from respondents to 
the political climate in Brazil at the time the experiment took place, an election year close to the 
campaign period with a very unpopular incumbent president. Even though such design reduces 
somehow the external validity of the study, it increases the level of control over the instruments, 
or the study’s internal validity. 
 
 
Imagine a city called Cruzeiro Novo, located in the middle of the state and one of the 
most populous municipalities of its region. Currently, Cruzeiro Novo has a population of 
approximately 430,000 people. The weather is mild, with an average temperature of 25ºC during 
most part of the year. Concerning the city’s economy, the agricultural, industrial, and 
commercial sectors constitute most of its economic output. 
The current mayor of Cruzeiro Novo is Marcelo Costa, is 55 years old and is married. 
Graduated in Law, Marcelo Costa is a lawyer by profession. He is currently beginning his third 
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year in his first term as mayor. His priorities are to improve education and healthcare, to create 
jobs and to maintain the city’s budget in order. 
 
 
Figure 3 Description of the City of Cruzeiro Novo and Its Mayor 
 
After reading the description of the city and its mayor, participants were directed to watch 
one of three ads (a soccer championship’s ad, a City Hall’s ad, or a party ad) of 30 seconds each. 
The video treatments used actual footage from Brazilian government ads that were re-assembled, 
and the audio and texts were crafted in order to maximize realism by a video editor (see Appendix 
C.2 for the text of each ad). After watching one of the three ads, participants were instructed to 
read one of three news stories. Participants in the control condition read a story about a soccer 
championship starting in the city of Cruzeiro Novo, whereas other participants read a news story 
about the increase of unemployment in the city or about the decrease of unemployment. Once 
participants read one of the three news stories, participants were instructed to answer a post-
treatment questionnaire, which contained two manipulation checks and measures of the four 
dependent variables of the study. Finally, participants were debriefed about the purposes of the 
study. Each section took between 10 – 15 minutes. 
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5.3 Measures 
5.3.1 Treatments and Independent Variables  
The first factor of the study was the video ad. Participants watched one of three ads. One 
of the ads (the control condition) portrays the announcement of a local soccer championship in the 
city of Cruzeiro Novo. It was designed to be unrelated to political and economic issues. The other 
two ads are a government ad (City Hall ad) and a party ad. The government ad’s message states 
that the City Hall is creating more jobs. It also says that people’s overall well-being is better. The 
second video ad, the party ad, contains the same message of the government ad, but instead of 
having the City Hall as the ad’s sponsor it has a (fictitious) political party as sponsor. Moreover, 
the party ad also portrays the mayor’s name, which does not appear in the government ad. 
 
 
Ad spot: Prefeitura de Cruzeiro Novo 
 
The City Hall is working to create more Jobs. And it has worked. Cruzeiro Novo has 
brought more than 100 new businesses and is the regional powerhouse in job creation. In the 
last year, more than 10 thousand new job positions were created. The population’s mean income 
increased as well as the consumption potential. More jobs, a worthier life. City Hall of Cruzeiro 
Novo. 
 
Ad spot: PBR 
  92 
 
PBR is working to create more Jobs. And it has worked. Thanks to Mayor Marcelo 
Costa, Cruzeiro Novo has brought more than 100 new businesses and is the regional 
powerhouse in job creation. In the last year, more than 10 thousand new job positions were 
created. The population’s mean income increased as well as the consumption potential. More 
jobs, a worthier life. PBR. 
 
Ad spot: Cruzeiro Novo’s Soccer Championship 
 
For the tenth consecutive year, the ball will roll in the city’s soccer fields, keeping alive 
the historic relationship between Cruzeiro’s people and soccer. Breathtaking matches! A great 
soccer’s celebration. Congratulations to all athletes and let the games begins! Cruzeiro Novo’s 
Chamber of Commerce. 
 
 
Figure 4 Video Ad Condition 
 
The second factor of the study was the news story. Participants read one of three news 
stories. One of the stories (the control condition) relates to the occurrence of a municipal soccer 
championship in the city. It was designed to be orthogonal to the issues of politics and economics 
in general, including employment. 
 
 
Municipal Championship starts with many scores 
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The first round of Cruzeiro Novo’s Soccer Championship started last weekend. In total, 
20 teams take part in the competition. The first round’s games took place at the Antônio Mônaco 
Sport Center, the Jardim das Rosas’s Stadium and at the “Cruzeirão”. 
The first round was marked by many scores. The Atlético Alvorada beat Cohab by 4 to 
1 with scores from Diguinho and André Macedo. At the Jardim das Rosas’s Stadium, 
SET/Lagoa defeated Alvorada by 3 to 0. Of those three, two were penalty kick scores by Roberto 
Alves. Closing the round, Cruzeirense prevailed over São Lucas by 3 to 2 with three scores from 
Newton Jordão. 
 
Figure 5 Control News Condition 
The other two stories relate to the issue of employment in the city of Cruzeiro Novo. 
Participants who did not read a story about soccer championship read one of two news stories 
about unemployment: one stating that unemployment increased in the city and another stating that 
unemployment decreased. The vignette follows the organization of several stories about 
employment reported by local news in Brazilian municipalities. To ensure maximum experimental 
control, the news on unemployment increase and decrease follow the same structure. The only 
changes are on the words that denote increase or decrease, as well as the unemployment rate (6% 
in the news about unemployment decrease and 12% in the news about unemployment increase). 
 
 
Unemployment in Cruzeiro Novo [increased/decreased] in the last semester, inquiry 
shows 
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Data released yesterday by the Commercial, Manufacturing, and Services Association 
of Cruzeiro Novo (ACISCN) concerning the last semester shows that the unemployment level 
in the city [increased/decreased] and now it is [6%/12%]. In the state’s regional ranking, the 
city is among those that [created/lost] jobs the most. 
The inquiry also shows that, overall, the number of hirings was [higher/lower] than the 
firings in the last semester. The year’s first six months registered [an improvement/a 
worsening] of the number of formal jobs during the last three years, with 13428 formal job 
positions [created/closed]. This number represents [a gain/a loss] of 34% compared to the last 
surveyed year. Expanding, the industry was responsible for most of the [hirings/firings] in the 
city, with 5380 [more/fewer] positions, followed by the agricultural sector with the 
[creation/termination] of 4297 positions. The sector of commerce, services, and construction 
also [increased/decreased] hirings and registered the [creation/termination] of 3900 
positions. 
Therefore, the data also shows that the economy is showing signs of [an improvement/a 
worsening] in the city. To Márcia Lisboa Teixeira, president of Câmara de Dirigentes Lojistas 
(CDL) de Cruzeiro Novo, there are several factors that contribute to the increase in 
[hirings/firings]. The [development/retreat] of the primary sector and the connection with the 
service sector is one of them. “[With/Without] job and income, people [will/will not] buy. We 
have a strong primary sector going through a strong [expansion/retraction], which is moving 
[a lot/little] money. This also contributes to [the increase/the decrease] of commerce”, 
observes. 
 
 
Figure 6 Vignette Treatment: Unemployment Increase and Decrease 
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5.3.2 Manipulation Checks and Dependent Variables 
The post-treatment questionnaire measured the participants’ opinions about the mayor, the 
City Hall, and the ad they watched. The participants were asked to answer two manipulation 
checks.  First, they were asked about who was the advertiser of the video they watched (City Hall, 
political party, or the city’s Chamber of Commerce). The second manipulation check variable 
asked participants to answer what the story read by them said about the level of unemployment in 
the city (i.e., whether unemployment increase, whether unemployment decrease, or whether they 
read a news about the municipal soccer championship in the city). The goal of the questions is to 
ensure that participants in the experiment understood the sponsor of the ad and the direction of 
unemployment of the news they read. Next, participants reported how likely they would vote for 
the mayor’s reelection (from 1 – highly likely to 5 – highly unlikely). The variable was recoded 
so that higher values mean higher likelihood of voting for the mayor. The responsibility 
attribution question asked participants to choose, from a list of entities, which they thought it 
would be the most responsible for the situation of employment in Cruzeiro Novo. Only one answer 
option was allowed.  This measure of responsibility attribution possesses one desirable property 
(as in Rudolph and Grant, 2002). It asks participants who is responsible for the situation of 
employment in general rather than asking who deserves credit or blame for specific employment 
conditions. In this way, the measure encourages participants to determine by themselves whether 
the situation of unemployment is good or bad. The ad’s effectiveness is a composite index and 
was measured on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is “Not at all” and 5 is “Very”. Participants were 
asked to rate the ad on six characteristics, that is, how fair, important, truthful, convincing, 
informative, and impartial they thought the ad was. The six items were averaged. Lastly, the 
mayor’s performance was measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Zero means strong disapproval 
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and 100 means strong approval. Fifty means neither approval neither approval nor disapproval. 
Summary information on the independent and the dependent variables can be found on the table 
below. 
Lastly, the pre-treatment questionnaire asked participants standard sociodemographic 
questions (gender, age, state, state’s region, income level, education). It also asked about their 
degree of attention to news, interest in politics, favorite type of media, and trust in the media. 
Further, the questionnaire asked participants about whether they turned out to vote and their party 
preference (for more details, see the Appendix).   
  
Table 15 Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Attribution to City Hall 1800 0.399 0.489 0 1 
Attribution to Mayor 1800 0.258 0.438 0 1 
Reelection 1800 3.156 1.156 1 5 
Ad’s effectiveness 1800 3.485 0.876 1 5 
Mayor’s approval 1800 66.405 24.873 0 100 
Treatment – video ad 1800 2 0.816 1 3 
Treatment – news on unemployment 1800 2 0.816 1 3 
Age group 1800 2.980 1.526 1 6 
Education 1800 6.412 1.759 1 9 
Family income 1800 3.193 1.567 1 7 
Looking for job 1800 0.147 0.353 0 1 
Turnout 1800 0.928 0.258 0 1 
Media – TV 1800 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Attention to the news 1800 4.653 0.703 1 5 
Political interest 1800 3.152 1.075 1 5 
Issue involvement: unemployment 1800 4.441 0.778 1 5 
Trust in the media 1800 3.131 0.789 1 5 
Party preference 1800 0.336 0.472 0 1 
 
  97 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Manipulation Check 
I included manipulation checks to ensure that participants knew the sponsor of the ad and 
the situation of employment (increase, decrease, or no news on unemployment). Tabulation of the 
results of reported ad seen with the video seen by participants provides indication that participants 
correctly retained in memory the sponsorship of the ad they watched. 81% of participants in the 
control group correctly reported having seen the video on soccer championship, 90% correctly 
reported having seen the City Hall ad, and 79% correctly reported having seen the party ad. 
Additionally, I conducted a two-sample difference of means test to verify whether there were 
meaningful differences between those who reported having watched or not the City Hall ad by the 
type of ad they actually watched (two-sample difference of means test: t = 34.10, p <.001). An 
ANOVA analysis with “ad seen” as the dependent variable and the treatment ad (City Hall ad or 
Party ad) as the explanatory factor was also conducted. The results show significant differences in 
the level of “ad seen” across treatment groups (F = 1163.42, p = .000). Participants who watched 
the City Hall ad were much more likely to report having seen the City Hall ad than those who 
watched the Party ad. 
Regarding the second treatment, news story about employment, tabulation of the results of 
news read with the news treatment received by participants shows that 72% of participants 
correctly classified having read the news story on soccer championship, 74.5% correctly reported 
having read the story about unemployment increase, and 83.8% correctly reported having read the 
story about unemployment decrease. Additional difference of means test showed statistically 
significant differences between those who reported having read about unemployment decrease or 
  98 
not by the type of news story they actually read in the experiment. The test shows statistically 
significant difference (two-sample difference of means test: t = -21.15, p <.001). Also, I conducted 
an ANOVA analysis with news read as the dependent variable and the treatment story 
(unemployment decrease versus unemployment increase) as the explanatory factor. The results 
show significant differences in the level of news story read across treatment groups (F = 1163.42, 
p = .000). Participants who actually read the news story about unemployment decrease were much 
more likely to report having read the news about unemployment decrease than those who read the 
news story about unemployment increase. 
5.4.2 Attribution to Mayor and City Hall 
 
 
Figure 7 Difference in Means’ Test (T-Test) for Attribution to Mayor 
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Figure 7 displays three difference in means to determine if there were differences in 
attribution of responsibility to the mayor based on treatment type, consisting of those who watched 
the City Hall, those who those who watched the party ad and those who did not watch the 
government ad (i.e., control condition). The results show that participants who watched the 
government ad attributed significantly less attribution to the mayor than those who watched the 
party ad (t = 4.28, p = 0.000). Those who watched the party ad presented higher levels of attribution 
to the mayor (t = -8.69, p = 0.000). Further, the difference of means of the control group was the 
same as the City Hall treatment (t = 4.28, p = 0.000). 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Difference in Means’ Test (T-Test) for Attribution to City Hall 
 
The pattern is reversed for attributions of responsibility to the City Hall. In this case, 
participants who watched the government ad presented on average a higher attribution of 
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responsibility to the City Hall than participants who watched the party ad (t = -7.17, p = 0.000). 
Participants who watched the party ad attributed a lower level of attribution to the City Hall (t = -
4.48, p = 0.000). There is a difference in means of .19 between those who watched the City Hall 
ad vis-à-vis those who watched the party ad. Further, the mean for the party ad does not differ 
significantly from those who watched the control video (mean of 33 for the former and a mean of 
36 for the latter). 
 
Table 16 Determinants of Attribution of Responsibility for Unemployment to City Hall and the City’s Mayor 
  
  
Attribution to City Hall Attribution to Mayor 
Odds 
ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>|z| 
% change in 
odds Odds ratio Std. Err. P>|z| 
% change in 
odds 
Control ad x Unempl. 
Increased 0.504** 0.109 0.002 -49.6 0.874 0.234 0.614 -12.6 
Control ad x Unempl. 
Decreased 0.916 0.188 0.667 -8.4 1.404 0.349 0.173 40.4 
City Hall ad x Control 
news 1.795** 0.365 0.004 79.5 1.375 0.345 0.203 37.5 
City Hall ad x Unempl. 
Increased 1.204 0.245 0.361 20.4 0.443** 0.137 0.009 -55.7 
City Hall ad x Unempl. 
Decreased 1.643* 0.334 0.015 64.3 1.577 0.389 0.065 57.7 
Party ad x Control news 0.698 0.146 0.085 -30.2 3.130*** 0.737 0.000 213 
Party ad x Unempl. 
Increased 0.663 0.139 0.050 -33.7 1.822* 0.444 0.014 82.2 
Party ad x Unempl. 
Decreased 0.700 0.146 0.088 -30.0 3.870*** 0.908 0.000 287 
Gender 0.958 0.096 0.674 -4.2 1.208 0.139 0.100 20.8 
Education 1.009 0.033 0.781 0.9 0.862*** 0.032 0.000 -13.8 
Family income 0.958 0.035 0.248 -4.2 1.037 0.043 0.390 3.7 
Media – TV 1.219 0.136 0.077 21.9 0.814 0.105 0.112 -18.6 
Attention to the news 1.167* 0.088 0.042 16.7 0.870 0.068 0.078 -13.0 
Trust in the media 1.054 0.068 0.415 5.4 1.072 0.077 0.340 7.2 
N 1800       1800      
Log Likelihood -1171.37    -961.62    
LR chi2(12) 79.27    135.56    
Prob > chi2 0.000    0.000    
McFadden R2 0.033       0.065       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 16 allows us to verify the results of the interaction between the video treatment and 
the news treatment. Results of two balance tests (Appendix C.6, Table 6 and 7) indicate that six 
variables presented statistically significant coefficients in the difference t-test: education, attention 
to news, gender, family income, preference for TV media, and trust in the media. Therefore, I 
include these six variables as controls in Table 16 and the other regression models that follow.  
The results show that the party ad increases the odds of attributing responsibility to the 
mayor when interacted with the news control condition and the unemployment decreased 
condition. Nonetheless, the government ad exerts a significant impact on attribution of 
responsibility to the mayor when interacted with the unemployment increase condition, thereby 
reducing the odds of attribution. The highest change in odds derives from the interaction between 
party ad and news of unemployment decrease. One unit increase in this interaction increases the 
odds of attributing responsibility to the mayor by almost three-fold, holding other variables at their 
means. Also, the odds ratio of the interaction between party ad and unemployment increase is 
positive, indicating that participants were more willing to attribute responsibility to the mayor 
when the employment scenario is negative. 
Regarding the attribution of responsibility to City Hall, the table shows that the City Hall 
ad exerts a statistically significant impact when interacting with the news control condition and 
the news unemployment decrease condition. About the former interaction, the odds of attributing 
responsibility to the City Hall increase by 79.5% whereas the odds of attributing responsibility to 
the mayor increase by 64.3% for the latter interaction.  
A better visualization of the results can be obtained through an analysis of the predictive 
margins (or adjusted predictions) of the previous regression output. Figure 9 presents the predictive 
margins of the attribution of responsibility to City Hall and Mayor according to the type of 
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treatment received, or the interaction between the video treatment and the news treatment. The left 
panel of Figure 9 shows the predictive margins for attribution to City Hall. There is no discernible 
difference between the control condition and the treatment conditions when unemployment 
decreased. The right panel shows the predictive margins for attribution to Mayor. In this panel, it 
is shown that the Party ad considerably increases the probability of attribution to Mayor when 
participants receive both a message of unemployment increase and of unemployment decrease. 
The same pattern can be visualized on the left panel.  
 
Figure 9 Predictive Margins for Attribution to City Hall and Mayor 
 
In sum, the results suggest that the government ad is effective at raising attributions of 
responsibility to the City Hall, but it is not capable of leading to higher responsibility to the mayor. 
When the variable “government ad” interacts with “news of unemployment increase”, the change 
in odds is reduced. Conversely, the party ad increased attribution of responsibility to the mayor in 
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all its interactions. Together, these results point to the government advertising’s limitation of not 
being able to convey the mayor’s name in its content, which establishes a limit to government ad’s 
capacity to link the mayor to the accomplishments in the ad. That said, the interaction between the 
City Hall ad and unemployment increase on Table 16 did affect a lower attribution to the mayor, 
which suggests that the government ad can be successfully used to deflect blame. 
5.4.3 Reelection 
 
 
Figure 10 Difference in Means’ Test (T-Test) for Reelection 
 
Results for the impact of advertising and the news stories on the likelihood of supporting 
the mayor’s reelection can be found on Figure 10. It shows that there is not a statistically significant 
difference in reelection rating between the participants who watched the government ad (t = -4.57, 
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p = 0.000) and those who watched the party ad (t = -4.93, p = 0.000). In comparison with those 
who watched the control video (t = 9.69, p = 0.000), though, it can be seen that both the government 
ad and the party ad were equally effective at raising the support for reelection by approximately 
.55. 
The next figure presents the means of the likelihood of supporting the mayor’s reelection 
by the type of news received. In all news conditions, the mean of City Hall ad is not statistically 
significantly different from the party ad. However, both are effective in comparison to the control. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Means’ Bars with Confidence Intervals for Reelection 
 
In all news conditions the means for the government ad and the party ad are higher than 
the mean for the control video, including the news condition where unemployment is shown to 
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have increased in Cruzeiro Novo. The results show that government advertising is as effective as 
the party ad at increasing the support for reelection. 
Table 17 presents the regression results of the interaction between the video treatment and 
the news treatment, followed by the control variables. The City Hall ad presents increase in the 
odds when interacted with the news control condition and the news of unemployment decrease 
condition. The City Hall ad is not capable of counteracting the effect of negative news on 
unemployment. A one unit increase in the interaction between the government ad and the news on 
unemployment increase lowers the odds of supporting the mayor’s reelection by 31.5%. 
 
Table 17 Impact of Video Ads and News on the Likelihood of Supporting the Mayor's Reelection 
  Odds ratio Std. Err. P>|z| % change in odds 
Control ad x Unempl. increased 0.444*** 0.081 0.000 -55.6 
Control ad x Unempl. decreased 2.665*** 0.495 0.000 166.5 
City Hall ad x Control news 4.242*** 0.779 0.000 324.2 
City Hall ad x Unempl. increased 0.685* 0.126 0.040 -31.5 
City Hall ad x Unempl. decreased 7.105*** 1.331 0.000 610.5 
Party ad x Control news 4.438*** 0.817 0.000 343.8 
Party ad x Unempl. increased 0.832 0.155 0.321 -16.8 
Party ad x Unempl. decreased 5.448*** 1.012 0.000 444.8 
Gender 0.948 0.083 0.547 -5.2 
Education 0.975 0.028 0.379 -2.5 
Family income 1.015 0.032 0.632 1.5 
Media - TV 1.002 0.099 0.986 0.2 
Attention to the news 1.125 0.071 0.063 12.5 
Trust in the media 1.504*** 0.089 0.000 50.4 
N 1800    
Log Likelihood -2486.87    
LR chi2(12) 504.31    
Prob > chi2 0.000    
McFadden R2 0.092       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The party ad leads to an increase in the change in odds when interacted with the news 
control condition and the news of unemployment decrease. For the former, a one unit increase in 
the interaction leads to more than 300% increase in odds of supporting the mayor’s reelection. For 
the latter, a one unit increase in the interaction leads to more than a four-fold increase in the odds 
of supporting the mayor’s reelection. Overall, the government ad presents the highest positive 
change in the odds of supporting reelection, more than six-fold. Nevertheless, it is not capable of 
deterring the impact of negative news on unemployment.   
The next figure presents the predictive margins from the previous regression. Due to the 
large number of combinations obtained in the interaction between the video treatment and the news 
treatment, here I present the predictive margins of the impact of news treatment only for each one 
of the five values of the dependent variable, while holding other variables at their means. 
 
 
Figure 12 Predictive Margins for Reelection 
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According to the figure, the “highly unlikely” and the “highly likely” categories were 
significantly affected by the news on unemployment increase, whereas the reverse holds for the 
“likely” and “highly likely” categories. 
5.4.4 Ad Effectiveness 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Difference in Means’ Test (T-Test) for Ad’s Effectiveness 
 
The experiment also rated the ads concerning their level of effectiveness (see more in the 
Appendix). The dependent variable, ad effectiveness, is a composite measure of how fair, 
important, truthful, convincing, informative, and impartial each ad is according to the experiment’s 
participants. Figure 13 presents the means of ad effectiveness by the type of ad watched by 
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participants. Again, there is no significant difference between the means of ad effectiveness 
between those who watched the City Hall ad (t = -3.00, p =0.000) ad and those who watched the 
party ad (t = -2.21, p = 0.027). That said, both the government ad and the party ad are effective in 
comparison to the control condition (t = 5.24, p = 0.000). 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Means’ Bars with Confidence Intervals for Ad’s Effectiveness 
 
Figure 14 shows the means of ad’s effectiveness across categories of news story. The 
means of ad’s effectiveness are higher for the City Hall ad in two of the three news stories (i.e., 
control condition and news on unemployment decrease), and the means for party ad and 
government are essentially the same for the news of unemployment increase. Corroborating the 
difference in means tests, the results do not show meaningful differences in ad effectiveness 
between those who watched the government ad and those who watched the party ad. In comparison 
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to the control video and the control news conditions, ad effectiveness is higher for those who 
watched the government ad and the party ad. The news treatment affects perceptions of ad 
effectiveness in significant ways. Ad effectiveness is considerably lower for participants who 
received the news about unemployment increase and higher in the other two conditions. 
 
5.4.5 Mayor’s Approval 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Difference in Means’ Test (T-Test) for Mayor’s Approval 
 
The study also verified the impact of advertising on the level of approval for the mayor. As 
Figure 15 shows, the mayor’s approval mean among those who watched the government ad (t = -
3.84, p = 0.000) is the same of those who watched the party ad (t = -4.07, p = 0.000). Still, both 
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the government ad and the party ad are effective at raising the Mayor’s approval in comparison to 
those who watched the control video (t = 8.02, p = 0.000). The mean approval for participants who 
watched the government ad and the party ad is of approximately 70, whereas the approval among 
those who watched the control video is of approximately 60, a difference of 10 points in approval.   
Results from Figure 16 cross the type of ad seen with the type of news story read. It shows 
that the mean approval is higher among those who watched the City Hall ad in two conditions, the 
news control condition and the condition on positive news about unemployment. The mean 
approval is higher for the government ad and the party ad among those who read the news story 
about unemployment decrease, pointing to the importance of the information context for the 
processing of the content of the ads. 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Means’ Bars with Confidence Intervals for Mayor’s Approval 
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The next table reports the results of two Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) for the last two 
dependent variables previously analyzed. The table presents the F statistics for both factors, the 
interaction, and the model. It also presents two measures of effect size: the partial η2 and the 
Cohen’s f statistic. The partial η2 is the ratio of variance associated with an effect, plus that effect 
and its associated error variance9. The suggested norm for partial η2 are 0.01 for small effect, 0.06 
for medium effect, and 0.14 for large effect (Cohen, 1969). The Cohen’s f statistic10 is a type of 
standardized average effect in the population across all levels of the independent variable, or the 
ratio of the population standard deviation. It takes on values between zero (when the population 
means are all equal), and an infinitely large number as standard deviation of means increases 
relative to the average standard deviation within each group. The convention is that values of 0.10, 
0.25, and 0.40 represent small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Ellis, 2010, p.41). 
 
Table 18 Analyses of Variance of Ad's Effectiveness and Mayor's Approval, by Treatment and Their 
Interaction 
 
  Ad's effectiveness Mayor's approval 
  F η2 Cohen's f F η2 Cohen's f 
Video ad 14.35*** 0.015 0.119 37.42*** 0.040 0.186 
News on unempl. 29.95*** 0.032 0.177 142.12*** 0.136 0.387 
Video ad x news on unempl. 3.12** 0.006 0.067 3.47*** 0.007 0.067 
Model 12.63*** 0.053   46.62 0.172  
Adj. R2 0.049   0.1687     
N 1800     1800     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
 
 
9 Partial η2 = SSeffect / SSeffect + SSerror 
10 f = σmeans/σ 
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Regarding the ad’s effectiveness, it presents statistically significant main effects for the 
video treatment, the news treatment, and the interactions. The effect sizes are also small for each 
treatment and their interaction. Lastly, the results of the ANOVA for mayor’s approval show 
statistically significant effects for the treatments and their interaction. Differently from the other 
dependent variable, it presents a moderate-to-large effect for the news treatment (partial η2 = .13.6, 
Cohen’s f = .38). Overall, the results show that the treatment had small effects on the two 
dependent variables analyzed. 
Next, it follows the predictive margins of ad’s effectiveness and approval obtained from 
the ANOVA models from the last table. Figure 17 shows the predictive margins for the ad’s 
effectiveness’s dependent variable. Respecting the effect of the treatment of news on 
unemployment, it can be verified that participants who watched the City Hall ad and the party ad 
rated on average the ad as more effective when treated with the news covering the decrease of 
unemployment in Cruzeiro Novo. Conversely, the news of unemployment considerably depresses 
the rate of effectiveness of the City Hall ad and the party ad. Also, it can be observed that the linear 
prediction for the City Hall ad and the party ad is the same for each category of news treatment 
(i.e., unemployment increase and unemployment decrease). 
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Figure 17 Predictive Margins for Ad’s Effectiveness 
Concerning the predictive margins of approval, Figure 18 presents the level of approval for 
each interaction between the video treatment and the news treatment. It can be seen that the news 
showing unemployment increase considerably depresses the level of Mayor’s approval for all the 
three video treatments. The figure also shows that support for the Mayor is higher when 
participants receive a news about unemployment decrease. The same can be observed for those 
who watched the party ad. Both the government ad and the party ad are effective at increasing the 
Mayor’s approval when the news about unemployment is more sanguine. In all, Figure 17 and 
Figure 18 attest that the City Hall and the party ad are effective at increasing perceptions about 
each ad’s level of effectiveness and the Mayor’s approval. 
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Figure 18 Predictive Margins for Mayor’s Approval 
 
 
Table 19 Impact of Treatment, Interactions, and Additional Variables Ad's Effectiveness and Mayor's 
Approval 
 Variable 
(1) Ad's 
effectiveness 
(2) Mayor's 
approval 
Control ad x Unempl. increased 
-0.022 
(0.082) 
-10.650*** 
(2.228) 
Control ad x Unempl. decreased 
0.144 
(0.082) 
8.674*** 
(2.224) 
City Hall ad x Control news 
0.391*** 
(0.082) 
15.070*** 
(2.224) 
City Hall ad x Unempl. increased 
-0.002 
(0.082) 
-6.085** 
(2.227) 
City Hall ad x Unempl. decreased 
0.499*** 
(0.082) 
19.300*** 
(2.229) 
Party ad x Control news 
0.330*** 
(0.082) 
12.960*** 
(2.222) 
Party ad x Unempl. increased 
-0.017 
(0.082) 
-2.482 
(2.226) 
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Party ad x Unempl. decreased 
0.457*** 
(0.082) 
16.770*** 
(2.223) 
Gender 
0.044  
(0.039) 
0.382  
(1.075) 
Education 
-0.079***  
(0.013) 
-1.245*** 
(0.351) 
Family income 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
1.210** 
(0.393) 
Media - TV 
-0.030 
(0.044) 
1.556 
(1.200) 
Attention to the news 
0.080** 
(0.028) 
1.801* 
(0.776) 
Trust in the media 
0.220*** 
(0.025) 
4.521*** 
(0.690) 
N 1800 1800 
Adj. R2 .121 .204 
F 18.61 33.85 
Prob > F .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
 
 
Table 19 presents the regression results of ad’s effectiveness and the mayor’s approval. 
Regarding Model 1, government advertising is positively associated with ad effectiveness alone 
(i.e., in interaction with the control news condition) and when interacted with the news on 
unemployment decrease. The same occurs with the party ad, that is, it is positively related to the 
dependent variable in its interaction with the news control condition and in its interaction with the 
news about unemployment decrease.  
Third, Model 2 shows the results for mayor’s approval as the dependent variable. The 
mayor’s approval is clearly affected by news on unemployment increase. Holding all variables 
constant, a one unit increase in the interaction between the City Hall ad and the news on 
unemployment increase leads to a decrease of mayor’s approval of 6%. When the news on 
unemployment increase interacts with the control video, the reduction in the mayor’s approval is 
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higher, of 10.6%. Government and party ads are positively and statistically associated with 
mayor’s approval when both interact with the control, news condition or the news on 
unemployment decrease. It is clear from the results that the contextual factor (news about 
unemployment) exerts an important mediating impact between the advertising and the level of 
approval for the mayor.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Can government advertising affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors? If so, under which 
circumstances? In this chapter, I aimed at providing some answers to these questions. The study 
used a between-subjects online survey experiment to verify whether government advertising can 
affect citizens’ attribution of responsibility, support for reelection, perceptions of ad effectiveness, 
and the incumbent’s approval. It was theorized, based on the literatures of attribution theory and 
ad sponsorship, that government advertising should be more effective than party advertising. 
Because individuals would attach less self-interested political motivations to government 
advertising than to party advertising, government advertising would be more persuasive.  
The analyses found interesting results. Attribution of responsibility for City Hall was 
higher among those who watched the government ad. Conversely, the attribution of responsibility 
for mayor was higher among those who watched the party ad. These results show that it is difficult 
to link the mayor’s name to the message of improvements in government advertising.  
The results also indicated that government advertising is equally effective in comparison 
to party ads. The results detected an increase in support for reelection, ad effectiveness, and the 
mayor’s approval when those who watched the government ad were compared with those who did 
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not watched (i.e., in the control condition). Further, advertising had small effects on ad 
effectiveness and the mayor’s approval. 
Moreover, the impact of the second experimental factor, news on unemployment, was 
relevant. The processing of advertising message was mediated by the news stories read by 
participants. Those who watched government advertising and read a news story about 
unemployment increase showed lower likelihood of supporting the mayor’s reelection, rated the 
government (and party) ad as less effective, and awarded less approval to the mayor. It is clear that 
government advertising was not capable of hindering the impact of negative news on 
unemployment. This brings important practical implications. It suggests that government 
advertising is more effective in environments where the message in government advertising can 
be aired with little-to-no countervailing messages, a situation more likely in poorer polities and 
where news media broadcast is less diversified. 
The study contains important limitations. One of the most relevant was the experiment’s 
limited degree of realism. The most consequential limitation of the experimental setup may have 
been the use of a fictitious party ad. As theorized by Feierherd (2019), the strength of party labels 
mediates electoral spillovers across levels of government (positive or negative). Whereas strong 
party brands may convert the performance of incumbents into collective goods for all politicians 
who share that label, candidates and incumbents only circumstantially linked to parties may be 
ignored by voters. Therefore, it is possible that participants ignored the party label of the 
experiment due to the fact that the party in the ad was not a strong (and real) party brand. Had the 
experiment used a real Brazilian party in the ad, the results could have been different.  
Despite these limitations, the findings from the study complement the literatures on 
political advertising, incumbency (dis)advantage and ad sponsorship. Political advertising is not 
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the only type of advertising capable of influencing voters in several developing democracies. 
Government advertising can also have influence on voters, which is not limited to vote intention 
and approval. The findings also complement the studies on incumbency (dis)advantage. They 
show that several incumbents have at their disposal the use of government advertising as a tool 
that they can use during their mandate to promote their actions in office and to build their political 
reputations. If incumbents can use government advertising effectively, they may be able to shape 
their constituents’ information environment in consequential ways, which means that government 
advertising can be a potential important mechanism for incumbency advantage. Lastly, 
government advertising shows that interest group advertising is not the only relevant non-political 
type of advertising with relevant political uses and consequences. Government advertising can also 
be used to promote policies and to defend administrations.  
In the next section, the dissertation studies the determinants of and the effects of 
government advertising spending in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. By carrying out a 
multivariate analysis of the spending with advertising by the state government in its 853 
municipalities, the chapter tests hypotheses about the allocation of government advertising to 
verify the degree to which political considerations play a role in the allocation. The chapter also 
presents multivariate statistical analysis to verify the effects that government advertising in the 
state have on the incumbent’s candidate vote share and on turnout. 
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6.0 The Determinants of Government Advertising Spending and Its Effects: A Subnational 
Analysis in Brazil 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate how government advertising is allocated and its electoral 
effects. To that end, I use rich data obtained from the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais on the 
spending with government advertising per municipality in the state, from 2003 to 2014, 
encompassing three gubernatorial election. The level of detail of the spending is very difficult to 
be obtained and does not exist for other Brazilian states. Further, the data is used to verify the 
impact of government advertising on three electoral dependent variables. I develop theoretical 
arguments based on the idea that incumbent chief executives are concerned with reputation-
building and integrate this insight with the political science literatures on distributive spending and 
the allocation of federal spending by the U.S. government. The analyses find that incumbent 
governors allocate government advertising in a non-particularistic fashion, that is, they distribute 
government advertising to reach the largest number of voters. Second, respecting the effects of 
government advertising, it was found that government advertising does not exert electoral effects. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of the most recent political 
history of the state of Minas Gerais to contextualize the data analyses and the choice of the state 
as a case for study. Second, based on the theory laid out in Section 3.5 of the theoretical chapter, I 
state the hypotheses. Third, I present descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (i.e., spending 
with government ads). Next, the chapter describes the independent variables. Further, the empirical 
results from the multivariate analyses are presented. In the section that deals with the effects of 
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government advertising, I also present descriptive statistics for the key independent variable, 
present the independent and dependent variables, and lay out the empirical strategy followed by 
the results. Finally, I conclude. 
6.2 Minas Gerais: Recent Political History 
The state has a total of 853 municipalities (almost two hundred more than the most 
populous state of the country, São Paulo), spread out through a vast territory marked by drastic 
regional differences. It ranks fourth in area with 586,000 squared kilometers (226,255 square 
miles), comparable in size to Ukraine. 
The state has been portrayed as a microcosm of Brazil itself, reproducing within its limits 
the regional differences that would characterize the country. Many times, mineiros refer to their 
state as a “small Brazil”. It has a rich, industrialized core (as Brazil’s Southeast), an autonomy-
seeking cattle-raising border region (as Brazil’s Southern region), and a vast arid and poor region 
(as Brazil’s Northeast). The diversity of the state’s municipalities has translated into a plural 
political spectrum, with parties on the left and right competing for the positions of the state and 
local governments since the return to democracy in the late 1980s (Da Ros, 2014). 
 
Table 20 Minas Gerais and Brazil, Socioeconomic Comparison (2010) 
  Minas Gerais Rank* Brazil 
Population 19,597,330 2 190,755,799 
Area (km2) 586,521 4 8,511,000 
Human Development Index 0.731 9 0.755 
Gini Index 0.56 0 0.60 
GDP per capita (R$) 27,282 1 31,702 
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Percent poor 10.97 7 15.20 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) - Census 2010, Brazilian Atlas of Human 
Development 
GDP per capita data from 2017 
*Minas Gerais's position among the 27 Brazilian states 
 
 
 
The military regime came to an end in 1985. Minas Gerais led the movement that resulted 
in the military regime and also led the return to democracy in 1985. Tancredo Neves, national 
leader of the opposition and important mineiro politician, was successful at attracting the support 
of traditional oligarchies who were disenchanted with the regime. He was elected by indirect 
voting of an electoral college to president but fell gravely ill and passed away 39 days after his 
election. The end of the regime also led to the emergence of a new economic elite in the state: 
medium sized businessmen, industry leaders, strong unions, and urban professionals limited the 
powers of the traditional oligarchies. 
With the transition to democracy in 1985, the fragmentation of the opposition parties as 
well as the pro-military factions generated a competitive electoral arena where the hold on power 
has been unstable (Borges, 2006). PMDB emerged as the dominant party during the period in the 
country and in Minas Gerais. However, internal divisions of PMDB generated fragmentation and 
a weakening of the party in the early 1990s. Many representatives of its leftist wing left the party 
to join newly formed left parties and the social-democratic PSDB. In a brief period of time, PSDB 
became the main challenger of PMDB. During the 1990s, PSDB and PMDB competed and 
alternated in power. 
In the 2000s the Workers’ Party (PT) won the national presidential election. The period 
was marked by the alliance between the national PT and the local PMDB, as well as by the 
domination of the local politics by Aécio Neves from PSDB, Tancredo Neves’ grandchild. He was 
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elected for his first term as governor with 57.6% of the valid votes in 2002 and was reelected with 
77% of the valid votes in 2006. In 2010, he made one of his cabinet members, Antônio Anastasia, 
his successor. Anastasia obtained 62.7% of the valid votes in the first round of the gubernatorial 
election. Four years later, he decided not to pursue reelection for governor. Instead, Anastasia ran 
and won a Senate seat in 2014. In the same year, the 12 year-period of PSDB dominance in the 
state’s government came to an end. The PT candidate Fernando Pimentel won the gubernatorial 
election with 52.9% of the valid votes in the first round.  
Overall, the state stands out as an example of high political competition (and more 
democratic) than several other Brazilian states (Mera, 2016, p.142). It has been classified as 
marked by coalescent pluralism, that is, low levels of inter-elite conflict and coalescent elite 
behavior (Borges, 2007) and low electoral dominance (Borges, 2011). The state has presented 
high-intensity electoral competition, highly fragmented party system, lack of political bosses or 
dominant political families, low levels of levels of political continuity, low levels of ideological 
polarization, and by its political centrism (Borges, 2007). The state constitutes a useful case for 
comparative analysis. It possesses a large number of municipalities with great degree of variance 
on important political and socio-economic characteristics to test the theory and hypotheses put 
forward in the sections that follow. 
6.3 Allocating Government Advertising Spending: The Role of Particularism, Term Limits, 
Rules, and Hypotheses 
In this chapter, I argue that incumbents can allocate government advertising spending in 
order to benefit constituencies that are more pivotal to the incumbent to advance her reelection or 
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to promote partisan goals, a particularistic approach, or they can allocate government advertising 
according to an universalistic logic according to which the incumbent aims at targeting with ads 
the highest number of people. The incumbent will be particularistic in her allocation of advertising 
if he or she targets advertising to serve specific political ends. Contrariwise, a universal distribution 
of advertising suggests that the incumbent will allocate advertising spending to constituencies in a 
manner that is unrelated to particular political characteristics. 
Incumbents face incentives to be particularistic in their allocation of government 
advertising, that is, to advertise more about the deeds and accomplishments of their governments 
to some citizens over others when pursuing their policy agendas. Electoral concerns over reelection 
and risk-aversion may compel incumbents to target government advertising spending to 
constituencies that benefit the incumbent and her party. The particularistic allocation contrasts 
with a universalistic strategy. According to the former, to maximize the incumbent’s prospects for 
reelection, it may not be optimal to appeal to the median voter. While the incumbent represents an 
at-large constituency, not all voters have an equal influence in elections. Because of that, 
incumbents have incentives to allocate disproportional amounts of advertising to constituencies 
with the most clout in elections. Additionally, investment of advertising in core constituencies may 
represent a safer investment. Risk averse political actors who want to maximize their chances of 
winning elections should allocate more funds to loyal supporters (Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa, 
2006). 
A universal distribution of advertising, on the other hand, implies that the incumbent will 
allocate advertising spending to constituencies that is unrelated to political characteristics. In the 
Brazilian political system, governors are elected under a first-past-the-post plurality system with a 
run-off when the winner does not achieve 50% or more of the valid votes. In this system, 
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theoretically, all votes have an equal weight. In this case, the best strategy for allocating advertising 
may be to advertise to the greatest number of people. Therefore, I state the following hypotheses: 
 
H6.1. Equal weight constituency hypothesis: larger municipalities in number of voters should 
receive more advertising spending, all else equal, than municipalities with smaller number of 
voters 
 
H6.2. Core constituency hypothesis: municipalities that more strongly support the incumbent’s 
party for governor should receive more advertising spending, all else equal, than other 
municipalities. 
 
Government advertising can also be used to further partisan goals and benefit the 
incumbent’s political party. Governors are important political figures in Brazil. According to 
scholars, governors have great power over municipal strongholds of state deputies and hold power 
over municipal mayors whom candidates for federal deputy rely upon to obtain votes (Abrucio, 
1994; Samuels, 2003). Also, governors control sizeable budgets and have extensive powers to hire 
and fire personnel in the state bureaucracy (Samuels, 2000). In sum, governors control access to 
patronage and policy (Borges and Lloyd, 2016). Last but not least, governors have influence in 
party organizations at the national and subnational levels in the country (Borges and Lloyd, 2016, 
p.107). Several important decisions regarding elections and party organization (e.g., party 
primaries for selecting candidates to all relevant national posts except the presidency) are made at 
the state level. Given the weakness of national parties and party labels in Brazil, many candidates 
find that associating with a candidate for governor is advantageous (Samuels 2000). For these 
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reasons, the incumbent governor may also have incentives to use government advertising to 
support the party’s state and federal legislators in their strongholds. Therefore, we can also advance 
the following hypotheses: 
 
H6.3. Municipal partisanship hypothesis: municipalities whose mayors belong to the incumbent 
governor’s party should receive more advertising spending, all else equal, than municipalities 
governed by mayors from other parties.  
 
H6.4. Legislative partisanship hypothesis (1): municipalities that more strongly support the 
incumbent’s party for state deputy should receive more advertising spending, all else equal, than 
other municipalities. 
 
H6.5. Legislative partisanship hypothesis (2): municipalities that more strongly support the 
incumbent’s party for federal deputy should receive more advertising spending, all else equal, than 
other municipalities. 
 
Do term limits influence the allocation of government advertising? I claim that reputation 
building concerns affect the incumbent’s calculations. Investment in government advertising is 
advantageous for politicians’ long-run career prospects. Progressive or regressive ambition – not 
to mention static ambition or running for the same executive office after one term out of office – 
are benefited by the construction of a reputation of accomplishments in executive office. Legacy 
building also constitutes an additional incentive to spend with government advertising and 
reinforces reputation building. As a result, term limits may not restrain politicians from investing 
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in government advertising. On the contrary, reputation building concerns provide incentives for 
chief executive incumbents to spend as much (or more) during their binding term in office. In 
Brazil, governors serve a set time period of four years and have the possibility of reelection to only 
one subsequent four-year term. In political settings where parties are weak, partisanship among 
the electorate is low, and the personal vote is prevalent, a good portion of a politician’s success 
may depend on his or her individual capacities. Building a reputation becomes important. 
In Brazil, there is an additional feature that influences the investment in government 
advertising. Electoral law from 199711 established that spending with government advertising was 
limited to the average of investment made during the last three years before the election. In 2015, 
the law was changed by another law12 and became more restrictive. It defined that public agents 
were prohibited from spending on government advertising, during the first semester of the election 
year, amounts superior to the average of the spending of the first semester of the previous three 
years before the election. In practice, the annual average before the law’s change became 
semestral. Consequently, incumbents cannot spend freely on government advertising in Brazil 
during election years. The legislation has implications for the amount incumbents may spend with 
advertising during each period of their tenure. Concerning the spending with government 
advertising in Minas Gerais, we can expect a gradual increase in government advertising spending 
during the three years prior to the election and a substantial decrease in the election year of the 
incumbent’s first term in office. If reelection is achieved, spending should remain stable over time. 
Based on these considerations, I advance two additional hypotheses: 
 
 
11 Lei Federal nº 9.504/97  
12 Lei Federal nº 13.165/15 
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H6. Term limitation hypothesis: the incumbents will spend as much (or more) with government 
advertising during their second term in office.  
 
H7. Years in office hypothesis: the incumbents will spend less with advertising as their tenure in 
office progresses. 
 
Finally, concerning the analysis of the effects of government advertising, I generate the 
hypotheses that it should be positively related to the incumbent governor’s performance in the 
election. Government advertising conveys accomplishments during his tenure that can be 
displayed to voters before the campaign period starts, which is an advantage that the incumbent 
governor has over his challengers. Concerning turnout, my expectation is that government 
advertising spending should be positively related to turnout. If it works, government advertising 
can increase the presence of supporters from the incumbent governor to the polls, leading to an 
overall increase in turnout levels. They can be summarized as follows: 
 
H8. Spending with government advertising hypothesis: the governor will receive more votes in 
municipalities where the state government spent more with government advertising 
 
H9. Personal vote share and government advertising hypothesis: the governor’s “personal” share 
of the vote in a municipality will be higher in municipalities that received more government 
advertising. 
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H10. Turnout and government advertising hypothesis: turnout for governor will be higher in 
municipalities that received more government advertising spending. 
6.4 Dependent Variable: Spending with Government Advertising 
In this chapter, ad spending with government advertising is operationalized as the logged 
amount of spending with government ads per voter, or ln (1 + Spending with government ads per 
voter). I add 1 to spending with government ads when taking logs to avoid dropping observations 
with 0 spending. The data was provided by the Minas Gerais’ Social Communications Secretariat. 
This amount includes the spending with government ads per municipalities encompassing all 
mediums. 
 
 
Figure 19 Spending with Government Advertising, by Year (2003-2014) 
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As shown in Figure 19, the amount spent with government advertising by the state of Minas 
Gerais grew over the period analyzed. From a small amount of R$ 6.4 million, it grew gradually, 
but not constantly, over the years, and reached almost R$ 60 million in 2014. Overall, the state 
increased the spending with government ads over time. 
 
 
Figure 20 Spending with Government Advertising by Medium 
 
The data also allow us to know how much with government advertising was spent per 
medium. Figure 20 displays the percentage spending with government advertising per medium. 
TV advertising has received most part of the advertising spending each year, followed by the 
pending on newspapers, and radio. Investment in other mediums such as magazine, internet, and 
outdoors are very low. Comparing the evolution of spending over time, it is clear that spending 
per medium has remained constant, except for television. There is a gradual decrease in investment 
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on TV advertising, from more than 60% of the overall spending in 2003 to approximately 40% in 
2014.  
 
 
 
Figure 21 Average Percent of MG Municipalities that Receive Government Advertising, Entire Period (2003-
2014) 
 
How is the amount spent with government advertising in the state distributed across 
municipalities? Figure 21 shows that most municipalities in the state do not receive any funds for 
government advertising. One fifth of the MG municipalities (approximately 175 municipalities) 
receive some amount of government advertising spending from 2003 to 2014. Is there variation in 
the number of municipalities that receive investment with government advertising over time. 
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Figure 22 shows the percentage of MG municipalities that receive some amount of investment in 
government advertising during the period of 2003 to 2014. 
 
 
Figure 22 Percent of MG Municipalities that Received Government Advertising (2003-2014) 
 
Spending with government advertising per municipality was mostly stable over time. There 
was little variation over time in the number of municipalities that received spending with 
government advertising. There was a small increase in the number of municipalities that receive 
investment in government advertising from 2003 (17.3%) to 2011 (23%), hovering around 21% 
after that. There is no discernible variation in the percentage of municipalities that received 
spending on government advertising during electoral periods. In 2006, 18% of municipalities were 
contemplated with government advertising, while in 2010 the percentage went up to just 21.9%. 
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In 2014, the percentage of municipalities stayed constant at 21.8%. These numbers strongly 
suggest that the same municipalities have received government advertising over time.   
Is there variation in the amount invested in government advertising during the terms of the 
incumbent governor? Figure 23 shows the average amount spent with government advertising for 
each term in office over years in office. 
 
 
Figure 23 Average Spending with Government Advertising by Term in Office 
 
The numbers suggest that term limits matter in the allocation of investment in government 
advertising. When the governor is eligible for reelection (i.e., not term limited), advertising 
increases during the first three years of a four-year term and decrease in the fourth year. Once the 
governor is term limited, or becomes a lame duck, spending decreases after the first year and 
becomes stable during the tenure.  
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Finally, it is necessary to know whether the spending with government advertising varies 
over time, especially during election years. Figure 24 suggests it does. It shows the average 
spending with ads per voter from 2003 to 2014. The figure shows that spending increased gradually 
from 2003 to 2005 until it decreases in 2006, which is not surprising. It indicates that the Brazilian 
legislation restricting the amount to be spend with government ads in election years exerts an 
effect. After that, spending increases in 2007 and levels off from 2008 to 2010. This period 
between 2007 and 2010 corresponds to the second term of governor Aécio Neves in office. Once 
the new governor, Antônio Anastasia, was sworn in, the same pattern of spending that occurred 
between 2003 to 2006 occurs between 2011 and 2014. That is, spending increases gradually until 
it declines in the election year (as mandated by the Election law). 
 
 
Figure 24 Average Spending with Government Advertising by Year (2003-2014) 
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6.5 Independent Variables 
The next section describes the independent variables used in the multivariate analyses. 
They were obtained from the Minas Gerais’ state government sources (Transparency Portal and 
Fundação João Pinheiro - FJP) and from electoral data sources (Centro de Política e Economia do 
Setor Público – CEPESP, and the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court – TSE).  
The variables that serve to test the first three hypotheses are the logged number of voters, 
swing constituency, and core constituency. A positive coefficient of the log of number of voters 
would confirm the equal weigh constituency hypothesis, whereas the swing constituency and the 
core constituency would confirm the particularistic hypotheses of allocation of government 
advertising, that is, the swing constituency and the core constituency hypotheses. The municipal 
partisanship hypothesis is tested with the variable that measures whether a municipality’s mayor 
and the governor are co-partisans (i.e., belong to PSDB). The legislative partisanship hypotheses 
are tested with the variables “PSDB’s vote for state deputy” and “PSDB’s vote for federal deputy”. 
The term limitation and hypothesis and the “years in office” hypothesis are tested with the 
variables “term limited” (whether the governor serving a term is a lame duck or not) and “years in 
office” (which year in office, from 1 to 4, the incumbent governor is serving in a given year).  
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Table 21 Variables' Definitions and Sources (2003-2014) 
Variable Definition Source 
(log) Ad spending 
per voter State's spending with ads per municipality 
Minas Gerais' state 
government (Social 
Communication's 
Secretariat) 
(log) Number of 
voters Registered number of voters per municipality TSE 
Swing constituency 
Municipalities were the incumbent governor's 
party obtained between 45% and 55% of the valid 
votes on the 1st round of the last election  CEPESP Data, TSE 
Core constituency 
Municipalities were the incumbent governor's 
party obtained more than 55% of the votes in the 
1st round of the last election CEPESP Data, TSE 
Term limited 
Whether governor is serving his lame duck term in 
office due to term-limit restrictions CEPESP Data, TSE 
Years in office Number of years the governor has been in office CEPESP Data, TSE 
Municipality with 
co-partisan mayor 
Whether municipality is government by a Mayor 
that belongs to the same party of the governor 
(PSDB) CEPESP Data, TSE 
PSDB’s vote for 
state deputy 
The percentage of votes received by the 
incumbent governor’s party for state deputy in a 
municipality CEPESP Data, TSE 
PSDB’s vote for 
federal deputy 
The percentage of votes received by the 
incumbent governor’s party for federal deputy in a 
municipality CEPESP Data, TSE 
Mayor's party 
aligned with the 
federal government 
Whether the mayor's party of a municipality is 
part of the president's cabinet 
CEBRAP, Mauerberg and 
Pereira (2020) 
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Governor's travels 
in the state 
Number of travels the governor made to 
municipalities during his tenure 
Minas Gerais' state 
government 
(Transparency Portal) 
(log) Municipal 
GDP per capita Municipal GDP per capita (R$ real prices) FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Municipal per 
capita income 
formal sector 
Municipal per capita income in the formal sector 
(R$ real prices) FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Homicide rate Homicide rate per 100,000 FJP (IMRS) 
Mortality rate 
(standardized) 
Ratio of the sum of deaths expected by age group 
to the municipality's total population, multiplied 
by 1,000 FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Dependency 
ratio 
Ratio between the population defined as 
economically dependent (14 years or less and 65 
years or more) and the population defined as 
potentially productive (between 15 - 64 years) FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Population Municipal population FJP (IMRS) 
Percent of urban 
population Percent of urban population FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Population 
density 
Ratio of the population to the municipality's total 
area in km2 FJP (IMRS) 
Percent of seniors Percent of the population with 65 years or more FJP (IMRS) 
Percent of 
agriculture's 
coverage 
Ratio of the land area occupied with agriculture to 
the municipality's land area, multiplied by 100 FJP (IMRS) 
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Plurality culture 
Presence of at least two cultural equipments (i.e., 
theater, museum, cinema, cultural center, public 
archive or documentation center), except library FJP (IMRS) 
Governor in office Governor in office TSE 
 
 
The multivariate analyses also include control variables that are deemed to be theoretically 
related to the incidence of government advertising in municipalities and whose omission in the 
models could lead to omitted variable bias. I include a measure of whether the mayor is aligned 
with a party from the federal government coalition. It is possible that association with the federal 
government may influence whether the government invests more or less in these municipalities. 
The models also include a measure of the incumbent governor’s visits to MG municipalities during 
his term. The models also control for relevant socio-economic factors. They include the logged 
measure of municipal GDP per capita (R$) and logged municipal per capita income in the formal 
sector of the economy (R$). Other measures include the homicide rate, mortality rate 
(standardized), logged dependency ratio (which is a measure of economic vulnerability of a 
population), logged population, the percentage of urban population, the percent of senior citizens, 
the percentage of agriculture’s land coverage of a municipality, and the plurality of cultural 
mediums in a municipality. Finally, the models also control for the governor in office during a 
given year (i.e., Aécio Neves or Anastasia). Summary statistical information of the variables can 
be found on the table below. 
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Table 22 Summary Statistics of the Variables 
 
 
The next table provides a summary of the distribution of key variables. It can be verified 
that there is little difference between swing and core municipalities with respect to government 
advertising funds received. The same applies to the incumbent’s party vote share for state deputy 
and federal deputy. However, other variables present more clear differences. The means of GDP 
per capita and per capita income in the formal sector suggest that government advertising funds 
are related to the economic background of a municipality, that is, municipalities that are more 
affluent receive more government advertising funds. 
  139 
Table 23 Mean Values by Whether Municipality Received Ad Spending from the MG Government (2003-
2014) 
  
Received ad 
spending 
Did not receive ad 
spending 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
(log) municipal GDP per capita 9.43 0.56 8.94 0.59 
(log) per capita income formal sector 5.58 0.59 4.89 0.66 
Swing constituency 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 
Base constituency 0.83 0.36 0.85 0.35 
Incumbent’s party vote share for state deputy 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.19 
Incumbent’s party vote share for federal deputy 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.18 
6.6 Multivariate Analyses: Estimation Methods and Results 
In the section that follows, the estimation procedures of the multivariate analysis are laid 
out. The analyses verify the determinants of spending with government advertising. The data 
available comprises information on 853 municipalities over a period of twelve years, resulting in 
a total of 10,236 observations. Given the panel structure of the data, the statistical analyses are 
based on panel data methods. 
The method of choice for the data analysis would be the fixed effects approach. The use of 
fixed effects possesses desirable properties for causal inferential purposes. It allows the researcher 
to control for the impact of stable unobserved unit-level factors over time. Therefore, fixed effects 
allow the estimation of the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable while 
controlling for the potentially biasing effects of unmeasured stable variables. However, the fixed 
effects method, which relies on within estimators, cannot provide separate estimates of stable 
observed and stable unobserved variables. This means that there are problems to estimate variables 
that change very little over time. Little change in the independent variable results in unreliable 
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estimates. Preliminary estimation of fixed effects model on the data showed that there is very little 
variation within municipalities and that all of the outcome variation is between municipalities. The 
analysis showed very high values of Rho (i.e., the amount of variance due to differences across 
panels) and very high negative correlation of the errors ui with the regressors in the fixed effects 
model (i.e., corr(u_i, Xb) approaching -1.000). As a result, the use of fixed effects in the current 
analysis is not warranted. Therefore, I use random effects models in the estimations. The method 
allows between effects and can handle clustering and non-independence. It is less causally rigorous 
than the fixed effects model, though. 
An issue that affects research on political advertising is endogeneity. Resources of 
government advertising (as well as political advertising) are not allocated randomly. Instead, they 
follow political and practical concerns. There are multiple attributes of municipalities (both 
observable and unobservable) that influence the receipt of government advertising. Also, 
government advertising can be endogenous to vote choice for governor. Rather than causing an 
impact on vote choice, the allocation of government advertising can be influenced by the vote 
choice for governor in previous elections. A correlation between unobservables and government 
advertising creates an endogeneity problem in isolating causal effect. In the realm of political 
advertising research, political scientists have long recognized the endogeneity of a candidate’s 
choice variables (Green and Krasno, 1988; Gerber, 1998). The same endogeneity problems in the 
literature also apply to government advertising. As a result, the chosen empirical strategy is to use 
instrumental variable estimation models. The challenge is to find suitable instruments, or Zs, that 
do not cause Y except through an endogenous variable D (the inclusion restriction), and that are 
unrelated to ui and ε (the exclusion restriction). In the analyses that follow, I use the lag of 
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municipal GDP per capita, the lag of municipal per capita income in the formal sector, and the lag 
of plurality culture as instruments.  
The estimates of the determinants of government advertising can be found on Table 24. 
The table reports the result for the random effects model (RE) and the two-stage generalized least 
squares random effects estimator (2SGLS). Considering the possibility of heteroskedasticity of the 
error terms, the models were estimated with robust standard errors which, in the panel context, 
also take into account the potential error term problems produced by unit-level clustering.  
 
Table 24 The Determinants of the Spending with Government Advertising by the MG Government 
(2003-2014) 
  (1) RE (2) RE (2SGLS) 
(log) Number of voters 0.0784** 0.1144*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0312) 
Swing constituency 0.0159 0.0228 
 (0.0185) (0.0174) 
Core constituency 0.0202 0.0307* 
 (0.0194) (0.0183) 
Term limited 0.2385*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0037) 
Years in office -0.0591*** -0.0030** 
 (0.0104) (0.0012) 
Co-partisan mayor -0.0003 -0.0058 
 (0.0064) (0.0068) 
Incumbent’s party vote share for state deputy -0.0309** -0.0233* 
 (0.0134) (0.0127) 
Incumbent’s party vote share for federal deputy 0.0106 0.0023 
 (0.0128) (0.0122) 
Incumbent's party margin of victory for governor 0.0037 -0.0169 
 (0.0152) (0.0147) 
Mayor's party aligned with the federal government -0.0017 -0.0051 
 (0.0046) (0.0047) 
Governor's travels 0.0060*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) 
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(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0225*** 0.0218* 
 (0.0072) (0.0114) 
(log) Municipal per capita income formal sector 0.0074 0.0401*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0119) 
Homicide rate -0.0141 -0.0138 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Mortality rate (standardized) -0.0013 0.0036*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
(log) Dependency ratio 0.0195 0.0271 
 (0.0292) (0.0198) 
(log) Population 0.0581** 0.0313 
 (0.0284) (0.0275) 
Percent of urban population -0.0317 -0.0195 
 (0.0272) (0.0312) 
(log) Population density 0.0111 0.0100 
 (0.0110) (0.0112) 
Percent of seniors -0.3990* 0.6649*** 
 (0.2410) (0.1765) 
Agriculture's coverage 0.0538 0.0029 
 (0.0414) (0.0408) 
Constant -1.3931*** -1.7058*** 
  (0.1356) (0.1513) 
Dummies for governor Yes  
Dummies for year Yes  
F-test  195.39 
F-test (Prob > F)  0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (χ2)  1.955 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.162 
R2 (within) 0.061 0.013 
R2 (between) 0.505 0.520 
R2 (overall) 0.385 0.399 
N 10,236 9,383 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Instruments: the lag of (log) Municipal GDP per capita, the lag of (log) Municipal per capita income 
formal sector, and the lag of plurality culture. 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
The results in both models show support for the equal weight constituency hypothesis. The 
coefficient for the logged the number of voters is positive and statistically significant in the RE 
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and the RE-2GLS models. The coefficients for swing and core constituency, albeit positive, did 
not achieve standard levels of statistical significance. These results suggest that MG governors do 
not adopt parochial considerations when allocation government advertising spending. Instead, they 
opt for allocating government advertising where most voters live. Reaching the largest number of 
voters seems a better strategy than reaching specific subpopulation of voters. Concerning the 
hypotheses on term limitation and years in office, both find support. The coefficient is positive for 
the former and negative for latter. These are signs that term limits do not constrain incumbent 
governors when allocating government advertising. Rather, they suggest that reputation building 
considerations provide incentives for incumbents to keep investing in advertising. The legislation 
establishing restrictions to the amount to be spent in election years seems to exert the hypothesized 
impact on the data. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Neither the municipal 
partisanship hypothesis nor the legislative partisanship hypotheses found support in the analysis. 
For the legislative partisanship hypotheses (1), the coefficient is actually negative and statistically 
significant rather than positive. However, the coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant 
in the instrumental variable model. We can conclude that governors do not use government 
advertising to shore up support for the incumbent party. Instead, governors use government 
advertising to further their own goals. Lastly, it is important to notice that the instruments seem to 
have handled endogeneity concerns satisfactorily. The F-test is statistically significant, which 
indicates that all instruments are jointly significant, and the inclusion restriction is met. Also, the 
Sargan-Hansen test for over identification tells that the estimation is consistent and that the 
instruments are valid (i.e., p-value > 5%), so we accept the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid.  
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6.7 The Effects of Government Advertising Spending in the State of Minas Gerais 
In the section that follows, I analyze the impact of government advertising spending on 
three dependent variables of interest: the governor’s incumbent party’s vote share, the incumbent 
governor’s “personal” vote share (i.e., his vote share according to the weight a municipality has in 
his overall performance), and on municipal level turnout for the gubernatorial election. The goal 
is to assess which political and socio-economic variables do have an impact on the three variables 
and, most importantly, the impact of government advertising on all the three dependent variables. 
Most of the variables are the same as the ones used in the analyses in the previous section. Two 
important additions are the variables “percent of heat-points concentration” and “percent coverage 
of urban infrastructure”, which are used as instruments in the endogeneity models. Both are highly 
correlated with the incidence of government advertising (both positively correlated) and seem 
uncorrelated with other factors in the error term. Because the general election occurs every four 
years in Brazil (and the gubernatorial election in Minas Gerais occurs concurrently with the 
election for president, senator, federal, and state deputy), data is available for all 853 municipalities 
for three time periods, for a total of 2,559 total observations.  
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Table 25 Variables' Definitions and Sources (2006-2010-2014) 
Variable Definition Source 
Governor's 
incumbent party's 
vote share Vote share (%) of the incumbent governor's party CEPESP Data, TSE 
Personal vote share 
(Winning Governor’s Votes Received in 
Municipality/Total Votes Received by the 
Winning Governor) x 100 CEPESP Data, TSE 
Gubernatorial 
election's turnout 
Percent of registered voters who turned out to 
vote in the gubernatorial election TSE 
(log) Ad spending 
per voter State's spending with ads per municipality 
Minas Gerais' state 
government (Social 
Communication's 
Department) 
(log) Municipal 
GDP per capita Municipal GDP per capita (R$ real prices) FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Municipal per 
capita income 
formal sector 
Municipal per capita income in the formal sector 
(R$ real prices) FJP (IMRS) 
Municipality with 
co-partisan mayor 
Whether municipality is government by a Mayor 
that belongs to the same party of the governor 
(PSDB) CEPESP Data, TSE 
Mayor's party 
aligned with the 
federal government 
Whether the mayor's party is part of the 
president's cabinet 
CEBRAP, 
Mauerberg and 
Pereira (2020) 
Margin of victory 
of the incumbent 
party (PSDB) 
Difference between the incumbent party and the 
runner up TSE 
Governor's travels 
in the state 
Number of travels the governor made to 
municipalities during his tenure 
Minas Gerais' state 
government 
(Transparency 
Portal) 
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Municipality's 
ideology score 
Sum of the proportion of votes for (local or 
national) legislative elections in a given year 
multiplied by the ideological score for a given 
party in the closest year when the Brazilian 
Legislative Survey (BLS) was conducted.  The 
index varies from approximately -1 to 
approximately 1, with the values corresponding 
to: -1, extreme left; 0, center; and 1, extreme 
right. 
Power & 
Rodrigues-Silveira 
(2018) 
Municipal Dalton’s 
Political 
Polarization Index 
Ten times the squared root of the sum of the 
products between the proportion of votes of each 
party and its absolute variation from the mean 
local ideological position. It ranges from 0 (no 
polarization) to 10 (extreme polarization) 
Power & 
Rodrigues-Silveira 
(2018) 
(log) Bolsa Família 
transfers per family 
Amount of transfers per family in each 
municipality 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
(MDS) 
(log) Homicide rate Homicide rate per 100,000 FJP (IMRS) 
Mortality rate 
(standardized) 
Ratio of the sum of deaths expected by age group 
to the municipality's total population, multiplied 
by 1,000 FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Dependency 
ratio 
Ratio between the population defined as 
economically dependent (14 years or less and 65 
years or more) and the population defined as 
potentially productive (between 15 - 64 years) FJP (IMRS) 
Municipal Human 
Development Index 
(IDHM) 
The UNDP index of human development 
measured at the municipal level 
Power & 
Rodrigues-Silveira 
(2018) 
(log) Population Municipal population FJP (IMRS) 
Percent of urban 
population Percent of urban population FJP (IMRS) 
(log) Population 
density 
Ratio of the population to the municipality's total 
area in km2 FJP (IMRS) 
Percent of seniors Percent of the population with 65 years or more FJP (IMRS) 
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Percent of heat-
points 
concentration 
Ratio between the number of heat points 
identified in the municipality and the number of 
heat points in the state of MG, multiplied by 100. 
It qualitatively indicates the source of 
agrobusiness pollution related to burnings and 
forest fires. FJP (IMRS) 
Percent coverage of 
urban infrastructure 
Ratio between urban areas with predominance of 
non-vegetation surface (including roads and 
constructions) and the total area of the 
municipality, multiplied by 100. FJP (IMRS) 
Percent of 
agriculture's 
coverage 
Ratio of the land area occupied with agriculture 
to the municipality's land area, multiplied by 100 FJP (IMRS) 
Plurality culture 
Presence of at least two cultural equipments (i.e., 
theater, museum, cinema, cultural center, public 
archive or documentation center), except library FJP (IMRS) 
 
Table 26 Variables’ Summary Statistics 
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6.7.1 Primary Independent Variable: Spending with Government Advertising 
The primary independent variable in the study is the (log) of the spending with government 
advertising per voter. The figures and tables that follow show how government advertising varies 
in its incidence by time and place. 
 
 
Figure 25 Percent of MG Municipalities that Received Government Advertising, by Election Period 
 
Figure 25 displays the percentage of municipalities with government advertising per 
election year. As figures in the previous section demonstrated, the spending with government 
advertising tends to be stable over time. In this case, it can be verified that the spending with 
government advertising is very stable over electoral periods. In 2006, 22% of the municipalities 
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received spending with government advertising. After that, the number of municipalities that 
receive government advertising spending increase to 26% in 2010 and stayed the same in 2014.  
In spatial terms, the spending with government ads do not seem to be spatially correlated, 
as Figure 26 shows.  
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Figure 26 Spatial Distribution of the Spending with Government Ads (2006-2010-2014) 
 
Nonetheless, I present measures of global spatial autocorrelation (Moran I) to evaluate 
whether such conclusion is warranted. According to the results in Table 27, there is no spatial 
autocorrelation in terms of spending with government advertising per voter in the state of Minas 
Gerais for the period under consideration. 
 
Table 27 Moran I Measure of Spatial Autocorrelation 
Variable Moran's I SD (I) z p-value* 
Ad spending per voter 2006 0.002 0.017 0.171 0.864 
Ad spending per voter 2010 0.007 0.017 0.495 0.620 
Ad spending per voter 2014 0.019 0.019 1.058 0.290 
* 2-tail test 
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Concerning the amount per capita spent with government advertising, it has grown over 
time. As Table 28 illustrates, the amount in reais almost doubled from 2006 to 2010. After that, 
the growth was smaller, of approximately 25%. The table also allow us to compare the amount 
spent with government ads with the amount raised13 by the incumbent’s party’s campaign for 
governor. It is clear that the incumbent governors raise (and spend) much more with their 
campaigns than they spend with government ads.  
 
Table 28 Mean Campaign Revenue and Spending with Government Ads (2006-2010-2014) 
Type of spending Mean (R$) Ratio 
Incumbent’s party’s campaign revenue per voter in 2006 1.41 4.43 
Spending with government ads per voter in 2006 0.32 
Incumbent’s party’s campaign revenue per voter in 2010 2.62 4.22 
Spending with government ads per voter in 2010 0.62 
Incumbent’s party’s campaign revenue per voter in 2014 2.84 3.46 
Spending with government ads per voter in 2014 0.82 
Source: author’s calculations based on campaign finance data available from “Prestação de Contas”: 
http://www.tre-mg.jus.br/eleicoes/contas-eleitorais 
 
 
13 Even though the campaign amounts on the table do not configure campaign spending, usually the amount of spending is very close to the amount 
of campaign funds raised by campaigns, which allows us to make simple comparisons. 
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Figure 27 Average Spending with Government Advertising per Capita, by Municipality’s Electorate Size 
 
How does government advertising vary in its incidence by the size of the electorate? Figure 
27 shows the average spending with government advertising by the size of the municipalities’ 
electorate for all three electoral periods. As the figure shows, larger municipalities receive more 
spending with government advertising, especially in municipalities with more than 200,000 voters. 
A smaller portion of government advertising spending goes to municipalities between 50,001 and 
200,000 voters. The amount of government advertising spending in municipalities with 50,000 or 
less voters is marginal, of R$ 1.00 per capita or less. It is clear from the data (and from the previous 
analyses) that government advertising is allocated more in municipalities with more voters. How 
many municipalities can be classified in each category of electorate size? Table 29 shows the 
distribution of municipalities by the size of the electorate and the receipt (or not) of government 
advertising spending.  
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Table 29 Distribution of Municipalities by the Size of the Electorate and Receipt of Government 
Advertising Spending by the Minas Gerais's Government (2014) 
 
  Received Did not receive   
Electorate size N 
% 
Municipalities N 
% 
Municipalities Total 
Up to 5,000 9 2.99 292 97.01 301 
5,001 - 10,000 25 9.29 244 90.71 269 
10,001 - 20,000 76 48.72 80 51.28 156 
20,001 - 50,000 65 85.53 11 14.47 76 
50,001 - 100,000 34 100.00 0 0.00 34 
100,001 - 200,000 9 100.00 0 0.00 9 
More than 200,000 8 100.00 0 0.00 8 
Total 226 26.49 627 73.51 853 
Source: calculated by the author based on TSE and Minas Gerais’s state government data. 
    
First, the data shows that a minority of municipalities received some amount of spending 
with government advertising, approximately 26.5%. From those 26%, all municipalities with more 
than 50,000 voters received spending with government advertising in 2014. After that, 85% of the 
municipalities with 20,001 to 50,000 voters received spending with government advertising. For 
the next category (10,001 to 20,000 voters), the percentage of municipalities that received ad 
spending is reduced to approximately 49%.  
6.7.2 Other Independent Variables and Hypotheses  
This section describes the independent variables used in the multivariate analyses. Again, 
they were obtained from the Minas Gerais’ state government sources (Transparency Portal and 
Fundação João Pinheiro - FJP) and from electoral data sources. Aside the three dependent variables 
already mentioned and the primary independent variable, the multivariate analyses will consider 
the impact of other independent variables of interest. The main ones are the (log) of municipal 
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GDP per capita, the (log) of per capita income in the formal sector, municipality with co-partisan 
mayor, Municipal ideology score, and the Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index.  
My hypotheses are that the coefficients for all variables except the polarization index will 
be positive. That is, the performance of the incumbent governor should suffer in municipalities 
where political polarization is higher. Concerning turnout, I expect all the key variables to have a 
positive coefficient, including the polarization index. For the ideology score, a positive coefficient 
means that the incumbent governor’s performance should be higher in more right-wing 
constituencies. 
 
Table 30 Hypotheses: Independent Variables and Coefficients' Expected Signs 
Independent variables 
DV: 
Governor's 
incumbent 
party's vote 
share 
DV: Personal 
vote share 
DV: 
Gubernatorial 
election's turnout 
Expected sign Expected sign Expected sign 
(log) Ad spending per voter + + + 
(log) municipal GDP per capita + + + 
(log) per capita income formal sector + + + 
Municipality with co-partisan mayor + + + 
Municipal ideology score + + + 
Municipal Dalton’s Political 
Polarization Index - - + 
 
 
Other variables are included as controls in order to attenuate the possibility of omitted 
variable bias. They are also included for being considered important predictors of vote and turnout 
in the empirical literature. The analysis considers the impact that the mayor’s partisanship with the 
federal government may have. Mayors closer to the federal government in the period under study 
(the Workers’s Party – PT) should be less amenable to give their support for the incumbent 
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governor of PSDB (a national opponent of the party in national elections for the presidency), which 
can potentially decrease the vote share of the incumbent governor in these municipalities. The 
analyses include a measure of the incumbent governor’s travels around the state. It is possible that 
the gubernatorial presence during his tenure may increase his visibility before voters and lead to 
an increase in support in the municipalities most visited by the incumbent.  
Besides, the analyses include the impact of important socio-economic variables. It includes 
the log of Bolsa Família’s transfers per family, the (log) of homicide rate, a standardized measure 
of the mortality rate, the (log) of dependency ratio (a measure of social vulnerability), and the 
municipal human development index, a measure of the quality of life in a municipality. Next, it 
includes measures of socio-demographic measures: population (logged), the percent of urban 
population, population density (logged), and the percentage of seniors in a municipality. 
6.7.3 Distribution of the Dependent Variables and Government Advertising 
Spending 
Before I proceed to the multivariate analyses, I briefly examine government advertising 
spending varies with the three dependent variables used in the analyses. Figure 28 presents two-
way plots of government advertising spending and the dependent variables. The upper left and 
lower left quadrants show the plots for the incumbent governor’s party’s vote share and election 
turnout, respectively. There is not a clear pattern (positive or negative) between government 
advertising spending and the aforementioned variables. The fitted value in both graphs is flat. 
There is a different pattern, though, on the graph located in the upper right quadrant. The fitted 
value presents a positive slope. However, there are three outliers that may possibly being 
influencing the relationship between government advertising and personal vote share. Posterior 
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analysis found that the three observations correspond to the municipality of Belo Horizonte, the 
state’s capital and most populous municipality. Thus, in the analyses that follow of the effect of 
government advertising on personal vote share, I will estimate a second random effects model 
without the three outlier observations to ensure that the results are not being driven by outliers. 
 
 
Figure 28 Distributions of Governor’s Incumbent Party’s Vote Share, Personal Vote Share, Gubernatorial 
Election Turnout, and Municipal Ideology Score 
 
6.7.4 Multivariate Analysis: Estimation Methods and Results 
In this section, the analyses examine the effects of government advertising spending on the 
incumbent governor’s vote share, his “personal” vote share, and the municipal level turnout in the 
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gubernatorial election. The data available contain information on 853 municipalities over three 
elections, resulting in a total of 2,559 observations. The statistical analyses are based on panel data 
methods. 
Once again, the preferred method to analyze the data would be fixed effects. However, 
once more the data on the dependent variable present very little variation within municipalities 
whereas most of the variation occurs between municipalities. Preliminary analyses showed very 
high values of Rho and very high negative correlations of the errors ui with the regressors in the 
fixed effects model. For these reasons, models with fixed effects were not estimated. Alternately, 
random effects estimators were used. 
Regarding endogeneity concerns, they are present in the current analyses. The choice to 
handle endogeneity is to apply instrumental variable estimation models. This time, though, the 
endogenous variables and the chosen instruments are different. In the analyses that follow, the 
endogenous variable is the spending with government advertising and the instruments are percent 
of heat-points concentration, the percent coverage of urban infrastructure, and the percent of 
agriculture’s coverage. I envisioned that the instruments would be correlated to the endogenous 
variable and that are they would be unrelated to ui and ε. In all instrumental variable models 
estimated, the Sargan-Hansen test for over identification shows that the estimation is consistent 
and that the instruments are valid (i.e., p-value > 5%). 
The estimates of the effects of government advertising on the incumbent’s party vote share 
for governor can be found on Table 31. The table reports the result for the random effects model 
(RE) and the two-stage generalized least squares random effects estimator (2GLS). To account for 
the possibility of heteroskedasticity of the error terms, the models were estimated with robust 
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standard errors which also account for the potential error term problems produced by unit-level 
clustering. 
Table 31 The Effects of Government Advertising and Other Covariates on the Incumbent's Party Vote Share 
for Governor (2006-2010-2014) 
  (1) RE (2) RE (2GLS) 
(log) Ad spending per voter 0.0095 0.2734 
 (0.0059) (0.2396) 
(log) Number of voters 0.0271 0.1633 
 (0.0244) (0.1728) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0247*** 0.0470*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0118) 
(log) Municipal per capita income formal sector 0.0020 -0.0336 
 (0.0073) (0.0217) 
Co-partisan mayor -0.0009 -0.0006 
 (0.0055) (0.0121) 
Mayor's party aligned with the federal government 0.0038 0.0036 
 (0.0043) (0.0091) 
Governor's travels 0.00022*** -0.0007 
 (0.00004) (0.0011) 
Municipality's ideology score 0.2090*** 0.2592*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0353) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index -0.0152*** -0.0196** 
 (0.0029) (0.0092) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family -0.1145*** -0.3422*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0409) 
(log) Homicide rate -0.0099 -0.0717** 
 (0.0165) (0.0334) 
Mortality rate (standardized) 0.00309* -0.0061* 
 (0.0017) (0.0035) 
(log) Dependency ratio 0.2689*** 0.4033*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0547) 
Municipal Human Development Index 0.1961* -0.5906** 
 (0.1055) (0.2882) 
(log) Population -0.0598*** 0.0355 
 (0.0232) (0.0921) 
Percent of urban population -0.0242 -0.0113 
 (0.0212) (0.0464) 
Percent of seniors -0.6514*** -1.2861*** 
  159 
 (0.1590) (0.4785) 
(log) Population density 0.0205*** 0.0312*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0079) 
Percent coverage of urban infrastructure  0.0820 
  (0.2609) 
Constant 1.5051*** 3.8085*** 
 (0.1038) (0.7912) 
FE for governor Yes  
FE for year Yes  
F-test  3157.15 
F-test (Prob > F)  0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (χ2)  1.319 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.250 
R2 (within) 0.855 0.691 
R2 (between) 0.244 0.068 
R2 (overall) 0.687 0.309 
N 2,559 1,706 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Instruments: Percent of heat-points concentration, lag of percent coverage of urban infrastructure, and percent of 
agriculture’s coverage. 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
According to the RE model, government advertising is not statistically significantly 
associated with the incumbent party’s vote share for governor, even though the coefficient is 
positive. The RE-2GLS model provides the same result. This suggests that government advertising 
does not have the electoral impact that conventional wisdom on the matter would suggest it has. 
Incumbent governments in the state do not seem to enjoy electoral returns from the investment in 
government advertising made during their terms in office. Respecting the other independent 
variable, municipal GDP per capita is positively and statistically significantly related to the 
incumbent party’s vote share for governor, but the result does not hold in the instrumental variable 
model. The coefficient for municipal income per capita in the formal sector is statistically 
insignificant in both models. The coefficient for co-partisan mayor is statistically insignificant, 
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albeit positive, which indicates that co-partisanship with the mayor does not help incumbent 
governors in the state to enjoy higher electoral support in those municipalities. Regarding the 
impact of the municipal ideology score and the municipal polarization index, their impact accords 
to the hypotheses laid out in the previous section. The coefficient for the former is positive and for 
the latter is negative, as hypothesized, and both are statistically significant in the RE and the RE-
2GLS models. In other words, the incumbent governors from PSDB enjoy higher electoral support 
in municipalities that tend ideologically to the right. 
The next table presents the results of the effects of government advertising spending on the 
incumbent’s party’s “personal” vote share. Three models are presented: one random effects model, 
another random effects model without the three outlier observations previously mentioned, and a 
two-stage GLS random effects model. 
 
Table 32 The Effects of Government Advertising and Other Covariates on the Incumbent's Party's Personal 
Vote Share (2006-2010-2014) 
  (1) RE (2) RE (3) RE (2GLS) 
(log) Ad spending per voter 0.0118 0.0006 0.559 
 (0.0142) (0.0070) (0.471) 
(log) Number of voters 0.2037*** 0.1275*** -0.0480 
 (0.0791) (0.0167) (0.337) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita -0.0020 0.0050 0.00535 
 (0.0074) (0.0034) (0.0176) 
(log) Municipal per capita income formal sector 0.0085 0.0013 -0.0256 
 (0.0081) (0.0021) (0.0370) 
Co-partisan mayor -0.0021 0.0003 -0.00353 
 (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0187) 
Mayor's party aligned with the federal government -0.0006 0.0017 -0.00600 
 (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0168) 
Governor's travels 0.0061*** 0.0006 0.0185*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.00402) 
Municipality's ideology score 0.0189** 0.0242*** 0.0171 
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 (0.0084) (0.0068) (0.0517) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index -0.0017* -0.0020** 0.0158 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0190) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family -0.0010 -0.0031 0.0563 
 (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0759) 
(log) Homicide rate 0.0036 -0.0030 -0.0495 
 (0.0069) (0.0052) (0.0617) 
Mortality rate (standardized) 0.0006 0.0006* 0.00170 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.00560) 
(log) Dependency ratio 0.0545** 0.0309*** 0.140 
 (0.0218) (0.0106) (0.159) 
Municipal Human Development Index 0.1385 0.0403 -0.408 
 (0.1096) (0.0642) (0.506) 
(log) Population -0.0343 0.0016 -0.0201 
 (0.0379) (0.0086) (0.171) 
Percent of urban population -0.0361 0.0254** -0.136 
 (0.0608) (0.0114) (0.0886) 
Percent of seniors -0.0564 -0.1475** -0.173 
 (0.0914) (0.0644) (0.747) 
(log) Population density 0.0774* 0.0314*** -0.0188 
 (0.0447) (0.0094) (0.0184) 
Percent coverage of urban infrastructure   5.242** 
   (2.150) 
Constant -1.6641*** -1.1877*** 0.8259 
  (0.4916) (0.1474) (1.6103) 
FE for governor Yes Yes  
FE for year Yes Yes  
F-test   3157.15 
F-test (Prob > F)   0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (χ2)   2.282 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)   0.130 
R2 (within) 0.294 0.015 0.281 
R2 (between) 0.526 0.572 0.840 
R2 (overall) 0.521 0.564 0.799 
N 2,559 2,556 1,706 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Instruments: Percent of heat-points concentration, lag of percent coverage of urban infrastructure, and percent of 
agriculture’s coverage. 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Overall, few independent variables are statistically significantly associated with the 
personal vote share of the incumbent governor. Government advertising spending, once again, is 
not associated with the incumbent governor’s personal vote share in the three estimated models. 
There is no sign that the incumbent governors enjoy electoral support from their investment in 
government advertising. Municipal GDP per capita and municipal income per capita do not appear 
to be associated with the incumbent governor’s personal vote share either. Co-partisanship with 
the mayor does not seem to help the incumbent governor. The coefficient for the variable is not 
statistically significant at any level. The last political variables present varying impacts across the 
three models. Municipal ideology score has an effect in the first and second models, but not in the 
third one. The incumbent governor enjoys more support in right-wing constituencies than in more 
leftist ones. Nevertheless, the results do not hold in the instrumental variable model. Polarization 
index is only statistically significant in the second model and it presents a negative coefficient in 
the instrumental variable model. 
The last table presents the results of the effects of government advertising spending and 
other independent variables on the municipal turnout for the gubernatorial election. The results 
show that government advertising is not statistically significantly associated with turnout. The 
level of wealth of a municipality seem to matter for turnout in the RE model. The coefficients for 
both the municipal GDP per capita and the income per capita in the formal sector are positive and 
statistically significant. These results are congruent with the political science literature on 
mobilization that emphasize the role that resources broadly defined (including wealth and time) 
have at lowering the costs of political participation. It has been shown that voting participation, at 
least in the U.S., is strongly correlated with income (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Co-
partisanship with the mayor does not increase turnout, as well as the polarization index.   
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Table 33 The Effects of Government Advertising and Other Covariates on the Municipal Turnout for the 
Gubernatorial Election (2006-2010-2014) 
  (1) RE (2) RE (2SLS) 
(log) Ad spending per voter 0.0021 0.2497 
 (0.0018) (0.2424) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0121*** 0.0202** 
 (0.0021) (0.0089) 
(log) Municipal per capita income formal sector 0.0099*** -0.0177 
 (0.0025) (0.0222) 
Co-partisan mayor 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.0016) (0.0080) 
Mayor's party aligned with the federal government 0.0016 0.0042 
 (0.0012) (0.0058) 
Governor's travels -0.00006*** -0.0011 
 (0.00001) (0.0012) 
Municipality's ideology score 0.0264*** 0.0241 
 (0.0054) (0.0247) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index 0.0009 0.0107 
 (0.0009) (0.0097) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family -0.0291*** -0.0370 
 (0.0053) (0.0512) 
(log) Homicide rate -0.0058 -0.0139 
 (0.0055) (0.0248) 
Mortality rate (standardized) 0.0007 -0.0010 
 (0.0005) (0.0024) 
(log) Dependency ratio -0.0342*** -0.0584 
 (0.0074) (0.0443) 
Municipal Human Development Index 0.2947*** -0.0210 
 (0.0361) (0.3040) 
(log) Population -0.0231*** -0.1028 
 (0.0016) (0.0784) 
Percent of urban population -0.0065 -0.0295 
 (0.0089) (0.0327) 
Percent of seniors 0.1356*** -0.6758 
 (0.0446) (0.7280) 
(log) Population density 0.0247*** 0.0286*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0068) 
Percent coverage of urban infrastructure  0.0128 
  (0.2373) 
  164 
Constant 0.6702*** 1.6624* 
 (0.0339) (0.7545) 
Dummies for governor Yes  
Dummies for year Yes  
F-test  3069.03 
F-test (Prob > F)  0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (χ2)  0.904 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.341 
R2 (within) 0.217 0.012 
R2 (between) 0.606 0.094 
R2 (overall) 0.559 0.083 
N 2,559 1,706 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Instruments: Percent of heat-points concentration, lag of percent coverage of urban infrastructure, and 
percent of agriculture’s coverage. 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
Municipal ideology score is positive and statistically significant at p<.001 in the RE model. 
It suggests that turnout is higher in municipalities that tend to the right in the political spectrum. 
Concerning the other independent variables, the results corroborate the findings in the literature 
about resources and political participation. Turnout is higher in more prosperous municipalities, 
that is, municipalities with higher Human Development Index. The coefficient for dependency 
ratio is negative, which indicates that higher economic vulnerability is negatively related to 
turnout. Also, turnout is negatively related to population size and positively related to population 
density. 
In summary, the models do not show any sign that government advertising spending 
matters for turnout in both models estimated. Other political variables seem to matter little as well, 
except for the municipal ideology score in the RE model. The results are mainly driven by socio-
economic factors that indicate municipal wealth or lack thereof. 
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6.7.5 Hybrid Models for Incumbent’s Vote Share, Incumbent’s Personal Vote 
Share, and Municipal Turnout 
Given the difficulties found to estimate Fixed Effects models with the current data, this 
study also applies a “compromise” method called hybrid model, also known as “within-between” 
model. This model allows for the analysis of the effects of time-invariant covariates, as well as it 
allows for the analysis of possible correlations between the independent variable X and Ui (i.e., 
unit-level unobserved heterogeneity). The covariation between X and Ui can be incorporated to 
the model indirectly by inclusion of the mean of X as an additional independent variable. Through 
this process, the effects of “regular” X can be estimated, controlling for possible confounding 
problems, exactly what Fixed Effects models do. The subtraction of X from mean-X provides the 
within-unit change on the dependent variable. The mean of X provides the effect of a between-
unit change on the dependent variable. 
 
Table 34 Hybrid Models: The Effects of Government Advertising and Other Covariates on the Incumbent's 
Party Vote Share for Governor, the Incumbent's Party's Personal Vote Share, and Municipal Turnout for the 
Gubernatorial Election (2006-2010-2014) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
(log) Ad spending -0.0066 -0.0090 -0.0005 
per voter (within) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0017) 
(log) Ad spending 0.0068 0.0573** -0.0032 
per voter (mean) (0.0092) (0.0239) (0.0031) 
(log) Number of voters -0.0057 0.0289*** -0.3006*** 
(within) (0.0405) (0.0098) (0.0134) 
(log) Number of voters -0.0865** 0.3421*** -0.0963*** 
(mean) (0.0430) (0.0826) (0.0171) 
(log) Municipal GDP 0.0211** 0.0008 0.0074*** 
per capita (within) (0.0089) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
(log) Municipal GDP -0.0061 -0.0043 0.0037 
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per capita (mean) (0.0091) (0.0144) (0.0043) 
(log) Municipal per capita -0.0213** -0.0023 0.0034 
income formal sector (within) (0.0084) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
(log) Municipal per capita 0.0179 0.0085 0.0070 
income formal sector (mean) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0044) 
Co-partisan mayor 0.0005 0.0000 0.0009 
(within) (0.0057) (0.0019) (0.0013) 
Co-partisan mayor -0.0169 0.0230* -0.0011 
(mean) (0.0123) (0.0135) (0.0049) 
Mayor's party aligned with 0.0046 0.0012 0.0020** 
the federal government (within) (0.0044) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Mayor's party aligned with -0.0038 0.0250* 0.0024 
the federal government (mean) (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0037) 
Governor's travels 0.0001** 0.0029*** 0.0000** 
(within) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Governor's travels 0.0002** 0.0340*** 0.0000** 
(mean) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) 
Municipality's ideology 0.1380*** 0.0229*** 0.0095** 
score (within) (0.0198) (0.0076) (0.0046) 
Municipality's ideology 0.3302*** -0.0288 0.0274** 
score (mean) (0.0290) (0.0347) (0.0118) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0085** -0.0018** 0.0011 
Polarization Index (within) (0.0034) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0467*** -0.0045 -0.0012 
Polarization Index (mean) (0.0057) (0.0090) (0.0020) 
Constant 
1.9216*** 
(0.2071) 
-1.7155*** 
(0.5378) 
0.6464 
(0.0863) 
Includes controls Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy for governor Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for year Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 13359.85 249407.24 3400.59 
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 (within) 0.863 0.320 0.546 
R2 (between) 0.321 0.947 0.687 
R2 (overall) 0.715 0.945 0.671 
N 2,559 2,559 2,559 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Dep. variable of Model 1: incumbent's party vote share for governor; Dep. variable of 
Model 2: incumbent's party's personal vote share; Dep. variable of Model 3:  
municipal turnout for the gubernatorial election. 
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*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
 According to the results on Table 34, we can conclude that there is no within effect of 
government advertising spending on the incumbent’s party vote share for governor, the 
incumbent’s party’s personal vote share, and municipal turnout for the gubernatorial election. 
There is only a between effect of government advertising spending on the governor’s personal vote 
share. These results confirm the results found in the RE RE-2SLS models. That is, government 
advertising does not exert a causal impact on the three dependent variables analyzed in this chapter.  
6.8 Conclusion 
What factors do explain the allocation of government advertising? Second, what are the 
electoral effects of such spending? In this chapter, I devised a theory of allocation of government 
advertising based on the literature of distributive politics and allocation of federal spending in the 
United States. I argued that governors have incentives to allocate resources according to a 
particularistic logic in order to reach constituencies that are pivotal to their electoral success, or 
they can invest advertising according to a universalistic logic with the goal of reaching the largest 
number of voters. In addition, concerns over reputation building would maintain incumbent 
governors’ incentives to keep spending with government advertising during their last term in 
office. The data analyses carried out in the chapter provided support for the latter logic.  
In sum, the models depict a non-particularistic pattern of allocation of government 
advertising in the state of Minas Gerais. They also depict a non-partisan allocation, meaning that 
the governor does not seem to use government advertising to further partisan goals such as support 
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for candidates running to legislative seats. On the contrary, government advertising is distributed 
more to municipalities with the highest number of voters. Term limitation does not exert the effect 
that the political science literature would suggest, that governors would not have incentives to 
spend more with advertising and with overall spending in particular. Contrarily, the results indicate 
that the spending with government advertising does not decrease when governors are term limited. 
The Brazilian legislation establishing spending restrictions with government ads exerts the 
intended effect. Spending decreases during the years in office, and the result is mostly driven by 
the decline in spending that occurs in the fourth year of governors in their first term in office. In 
general, the results indicate that government advertising is used for political purposes, but not in a 
highly strategic and particularized way. Governors aim at reaching the highest number of voters. 
The plurality rule that governs gubernatorial elections in Brazil certainly wield an impact. 
Regarding the effects of government advertising, the results are clear. Regular panel data 
models and instrumental variable estimation models showed that government advertising does not 
have an impact on the incumbent governor’s electoral performance and on turnout. Other factors, 
such as municipal wealth and the ideological composition of a municipality seem to play a more 
prominent explanatory role. These results go against the conventional wisdom that suggest that 
governments are effective at swaying voters. That is not what the data analyses allow us to 
conclude. The electoral impact of government advertising is very limited at best, and more realistic 
non-existent at the gubernatorial level in the state of Minas Gerais. 
Therefore, what factors would explain the lack of electoral impact of government 
advertising? One possible explanation can be the limited amount spent with government 
advertising. The data shows that the overall sum spent with government advertising 
(approximately R$ 60 million from 2012 onward) is smaller than the amount incumbent candidates 
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spent in their campaigns. In addition, Minas Gerais is not a small state; it is large in size and 
population. It is logical to presume, then, that to meaningfully affect millions of voters, the amount 
spent with government advertising would need to be higher. Furthermore, the state has a larger 
number of municipalities not affect by government advertising at all, especially the smaller ones. 
As the data previously analyzed shows, the bulk of the spending with advertising is directed 
towards the bigger municipalities. Were the spending targeted more to smaller municipalities (as 
public investment is targeted), it is possible that the potential persuasive impact of spending per 
capita would be higher. 
The analysis so far does not answer all the questions with respect to the effects of the 
spending with government advertising. We do not know the role that government advertising plays 
in addition to other important electoral factors, mainly campaign spending. Do both matter 
electorally? If so, do they exert an impact in isolation or in interaction to each other? These 
questions cannot be answered with the MG data. The Brazilian data at the municipal level allow 
us to answer these questions. That is the purpose of the next chapter. 
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7.0 The Electoral Effects of Spending with Government Advertising: An Analysis of 
Elections for Mayor in Brazil 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of government advertising on three dependent 
variables: the incumbent mayor’s vote share, electoral turnout for the mayoral election, and the 
reelection of incumbent mayors. I use data electoral data from Brazilian municipalities for three 
electoral periods (2008, 2012, and 2016). These data allow us to draw inferences with considerable 
and relevant external validity for Brazil. The chapter studies the electoral effects of government 
advertising and campaign spending on mayors. Far from being an irrelevant office, Brazilian 
mayors have administrative autonomy from subnational and national governments and have 
become important in the implementation of many public policies. They are the political officials 
many citizens first look for when looking for help. 
This chapter tests the theory developed in Section 3.6 of the dissertation’s theoretical 
chapter. According to the theory, government advertising constitutes a source of incumbency 
advantage. There are two basic incentives to spend with government advertising: to build a positive 
reputation before an election and to signal effort to the electorate. The goal of government 
advertising is to form views of the incumbent administration in the long run. Campaign spending 
also aims at signaling effort, but in the short run during the campaign period. Government 
advertising and campaign spending generate different types of information to voters. The 
information they provide is conveyed at different points in time and are qualitatively different. 
Depending on the context (i.e., the locality) where voters are, they will process the information 
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from government advertising and campaign spending differently. Socioeconomic conditions and 
the degree of electoral competition vary from constituency to constituency and affect the impact 
each source of information will have. The theory also recognizes that voters have a limited capacity 
to vote make retrospective evaluations of performance. Voters’ focus on recent rather than 
cumulative performance is the most important of such biases (Huber, Hill, and Lenz, 2012). I 
expect that campaign spending will be more potent and effective than government advertising. It 
occurs closer to the time of electoral decision and presents more recent information, whereas 
government advertising generates information that is cumulative and more easily forgotten during 
the election.  
Respecting the effects of the main variables, the models show that government advertising 
exerts a statistically significant impact on incumbent’s vote share, turnout, and reelection for 
mayor. The campaign spending from the incumbent and from challengers have statistically 
significant and substantial impacts on the political dependent variables under study.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, it provides the hypotheses. Second, I provide 
important descriptive information on the key independent variable, government advertising, 
showing how its values change (or not) over time and across localities. Next, the chapter provides 
information on the remaining independent variables and on the dependent variables used in the 
multivariate statistical analyses. Fourth, I conduct statistical analyses that rely on random effects 
models, two-stage generalized least squares random effects models, hybrid models, and an 
additional endogeneity model (i.e., Heckman probit model). Finally, I conclude. 
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7.2 Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical considerations, it is possible to expect that campaign spending will 
be more potent and effective than government advertising. The first occurs closer to the election 
than government advertising and conveys relevant electoral information that government 
advertising, by law, cannot provide. Concerning turnout, we can expect that government 
advertising and campaign spending will have a positive impact. More spending on government 
advertising and more campaign spending help reduce the information costs associated with voting. 
Further, anything that reduces the cost of acquiring political information associated with voting 
should increase the likelihood of voting (Downs, 1957). Concerning the spending by incumbents 
and challengers, I expect to find a decreasing impact of government advertising spending as the 
incumbent’s campaign spending and the challengers’ campaign spending increase. The hypotheses 
to be tested in the empirical section follow below:  
 
Vote share’s hypotheses: 
 
H7.1. Government advertising and vote hypothesis: the incumbent’s vote share will increase with 
higher levels of spending on government advertising. 
 
H7.2. Incumbent spending and vote hypothesis: the incumbent’s vote share will increase with 
higher levels of incumbent’s campaign spending. 
 
H7.3. Challengers’ spending and vote hypothesis: the incumbent’s vote share will decrease with 
higher levels of challengers’ campaign spending.  
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Turnout’s hypotheses: 
 
H7.4. Government advertising and municipal turnout hypothesis: the higher the spending with 
government ads per voter by the incumbent mayor, the higher the municipal level turnout. 
 
H7.5. Campaign spending and municipal turnout hypothesis: the higher the campaign spending 
per voter in the mayoral election, the higher the municipal level turnout. 
 
Reelection’s hypotheses: 
 
H7.6. Government advertising and reelection hypothesis: the probability of reelection will increase 
with higher government advertising spending. 
 
H7.7. Incumbent spending and reelection hypothesis: the probability of reelection will increase 
with higher incumbent’s campaign spending. 
 
H7.8. Challengers’ spending and reelection hypothesis: the probability of reelection will decrease 
with higher challengers’ campaign spending. 
 
H7.9. Interaction between government advertising and incumbent’s spending hypothesis: the 
probability of reelection will increase as a result of the interaction. 
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H7.10. Interaction between government advertising and challengers’ spending hypothesis: the 
probability of reelection will decrease as a result of the interaction. 
7.3 Independent Variable: Spending with Government Advertising 
Spending with government advertising is operationalized as the logged amount of spending 
with government ads per voter, or ln (1 + Spending with government ads per voter). The number 
1 is added to government ads when taking the log to avoid dropping observations with zero 
spending. The data comes from the Brazilian National Treasury. 
 
 
Figure 29 Spending with Government Advertising, by Year (2005-2016)  
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In this preliminary analysis, the spending with government advertising is presented 
according to its variation in time and place. Figure 29 displays the amount spent with government 
ads by year. As the figure shows, there is a gradual increase in spending with government 
advertising over time. From a spending of 302 million reais in 2005, the spending grew to 1 billion 
and one hundred twenty-eight million reais in 2015. Election years (i.e., 2008, 2012, and 2016) 
present lower levels of spending when compared with the three previous years before each 
election. Such decrease is explained to a considerable degree by a provision in the Electoral Law 
that limits the amount of that can be spent with government advertising in election periods. 
 
 
Figure 30 Percent of Brazilian Municipalities that Spent with Government Advertising  
 
What portion of municipalities in the country do spend with government advertising? 
Figure 30 shows the percentages. Only a minority of municipalities, approximately 25% of the 
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more than 5,570 Brazilian municipalities, spend an amount larger than zero with government 
advertising. Three fourth of the municipalities do not spend any amount of resources with 
government advertising for the period under consideration.  
 
Table 35 Municipalities that Spent and Did Not Spend with Government Advertising 
  Government advertising 
 Spent Did not spend 
Year N % N % 
2008 4,170 74.88 1,399 25.12 
2012 4,177 74.99 1,393 25.01 
2016 4,196 75.07 1,374 24.67 
 
Table 35 shows the variation in spending with government advertising over electoral 
periods. As the table shows, there is almost no variation on the number of municipalities that spend 
resources with government advertising.  
 
Table 36 Distribution of Municipalities by the Size of the Electorate and Spending with Government 
Advertising (2016) 
  Spent Did not spend   
Electorate size N % Municipalities N % Municipalities Total 
Up to 5,000 244 15.66 1,314 84.34 1,558 
5,001 - 10,000 248 16.73 1,234 83.27 1,482 
10,001 - 20,000 301 23.59 975 76.41 1,276 
20,001 - 50,000 289 35.95 515 64.05 804 
50,001 - 100,000 143 56.75 109 43.25 252 
100,001 - 200,000 66 66.67 33 33.33 99 
More than 200,000 83 83.84 16 16.16 99 
Total 1,374 24.67 4,196 75.33 5,570 
Source: calculated by the author based on TSE data 
   
 
Information on Table 36 specifies the spending with government advertising according to 
each municipality’s electorate size for 2016. As the table makes it clear, municipalities with larger 
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electorate sizes tend to spend more with government advertising. Eighty-three percent of the 
municipalities with more than 200,000 voters spent some amount with government advertising. 
Also, two thirds of the municipalities with more than electorate sizes between 100,001 and 200,000 
voters spend with government advertising. Next, almost 57 percent of the municipalities with 
electorate size between 50,001 and 100,000 voters spend with government advertising. Figure 31 
that follows shows the mean per capita spending with government advertising per municipalities’ 
electorate size. Municipalities with more than 50,000 voters spend considerably more per capita 
with government advertising than smaller municipalities. 
 
 
Figure 31 Average Spending with Government Ads, by Municipalities’ Electorate Size 
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7.4 Additional Variables 
The next section describes the dependent and the independent variables used in the 
multivariate analyses. The electoral data were obtained from the Centro de Política e Economia 
do Setor Público – CEPESP, and the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court – TSE. The campaign 
spending data was obtained from TSE. 
The dependent variables in the study are the incumbent’s vote share, the electoral turnout 
for the municipal election, and a dichotomous measure of whether the incumbent mayor won 
reelection (1 if won reelection, zero otherwise). The main independent variables are the spending 
with government advertising per voter (logged), and the measures of campaign spending. 
Regarding the latter, the data contain information about the incumbent’s campaign spending per 
voter (logged), the challengers’ campaign spending per voter (logged), and the total mayoral 
campaign spending per voter, logged (i.e., the sum of campaign spending from all contenders for 
mayor in a municipality, per voter). These independent variables are used to test the hypotheses. 
The remaining variables are included for their possible theoretical impact on the three 
dependent variables whose exclusion could lead to possible omitted variable bias. The data include 
electoral measures such as the number of candidates for mayor, which can be used as a measure 
of electoral competition in a municipality. The data also contain information about the mayor and 
governor are co-partisans. Co-partisanship with governor can be important for the mayor’s 
reelection prospects for governors can be valuable electoral allies by helping the mayor to raise 
money for the campaign and also for her possible political endorsement. The data also include 
political measures of the ideological bent of a municipality (municipality’s ideology score), its 
degree of political polarization (municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index), and whether a 
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municipality can hold runoff election in case the winner does not achieve more than 50% plus one 
of the valid votes (runoff election) 
 
Table 37 Variables' Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Incumbent's vote share Incumbent's share of the vote 
CEPESP Data, 
TSE 
Mayoral election's 
turnout 
Percent of registered voters who turned out to 
vote in the mayoral election 
CEPESP Data, 
TSE 
Incumbent won 
reelection Whether incumbent mayor won reelection 
CEPESP Data, 
TSE 
(log) Municipal 
spending with 
government ads per 
voter Municipal spending with government ads National Treasury 
(log) Incumbent’s 
campaign spending per 
voter Incumbent’s spending with campaign per voter TSE 
(log) Challengers’ 
campaign spending per 
voter 
Challengers’ sum of campaign spending per 
voter TSE 
(log) Total mayoral 
campaign spending per 
voter 
Sum of municipal campaign spending for 
mayor from all mayoral candidates TSE 
Number of candidates 
for Mayor 
Total number of candidates running for Mayor 
in a municipality 
CEPESP Data, 
TSE 
Governor and Mayor 
are co-partisans 
Whether the governor and the Mayor belong to 
the same political party TSE 
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Municipality's ideology 
score 
Sum of the proportion of votes for (local or 
national) legislative elections in a given year 
multiplied by the ideological score for a given 
party in the closest year when the Brazilian 
Legislative Survey (BLS) was conducted.  The 
index varies from approximately -1 to 
approximately 1, with the values corresponding 
to: -1, extreme left; 0, center; and 1, extreme 
right. 
Power & 
Rodrigues-
Silveira (2018) 
Municipal Dalton’s 
Political Polarization 
Index 
Ten times the squared root of the sum of the 
products between the proportion of votes of 
each party and its absolute variation from the 
mean local ideological position. It ranges from 
0 (no polarization) to 10 (extreme polarization) 
Power & 
Rodrigues-
Silveira (2018) 
Runoff election 
Whether municipality can hold a runoff if no 
candidate reaches 50% or more of the valid 
votes 
CEPESP Data, 
TSE 
(log) Real municipal 
GDP per capita Real municipal GDP per capita IBGE 
(log) Bolsa Família’s 
transfers per family 
Amount of transfers per family in each 
municipality IPEA 
Municipal Human 
Development Index 
(IDHM) 
The UNDP index of human development 
measured at the municipal level 
Power & 
Rodrigues-
Silveira (2018) 
(log) Population Municipal population SNIS 
Percent of urban 
population Percent of urban population SNIS 
(log) Population density 
Ratio of the population to the municipality's 
total area in km2 IBGE 
AM radio 
Presence of an AM radio station in the 
municipality IBGE 
FM radio 
Presence of a FM radio station in the 
municipality IBGE 
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TV generating station 
Presence of a generating TV station in the 
municipality IBGE 
Internet Presence of internet in the municipality IBGE 
 
Next, the data contain important socio-demographic information, such as the real municipal 
GDP per capita. The data also contain information about the amount of Bolsa Família’s transfer 
per family (logged). It is expected that higher transfers from Bolsa Família should decrease the 
vote share for the incumbent mayor and decrease turnout for the spending from the program would 
make clientelism a less attractive strategy for incumbent mayors (Frey, 2019), especially in smaller 
municipalities. Also, the data include the municipal Human Development Index, which serves a 
measure of the level of socio-economic development of a municipality, the size of municipal 
population (logged), and the percent of urban population of a municipality. Finally, the data have 
information about the mediums of communication available in each municipality, that is, whether 
a municipality has AM radio station, FM radio station, a TV generating station, and Internet access. 
Summary statistics of the variables can be found on the table below. 
 
Table 38 Variables' Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Incumbent's vote share 7,805 0.500 0.164 0.0005 1 
Mayoral election's turnout 16,864 0.867 0.057 0.625 0.989 
Incumbent won reelection 16,695 0.271 0.444 0 1 
(log) Municipal spending with 
government ads per voter 16,640 0.589 1.205 0 6.499 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending 
per voter 7,665 1.580 1.043 -11.009 5.306 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending 
per voter 7,665 1.712 0.810 0 4.933 
(log) Total mayoral campaign 
spending per voter 16,672 2.487 0.812 -5.112 8.122 
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Number of candidates for Mayor 16,695 2.755 1.163 1 15 
Governor and Mayor are co-partisans 16,680 0.189 0.392 0 1 
Aligned to the federal government 16,680 0.636 0.481 0 1 
Municipality's ideology score 16,699 0.135 0.142 -0.504 0.682 
Municipal Dalton’s Political 
Polarization Index 16,699 5.036 0.701 0 7.400 
Runoff election 16,696 0.008 0.089 0 1 
(log) Real municipal GDP per capita 16,694 9.192 0.713 7.538 13.446 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per 
family 16,695 4.507 0.867 -0.819 6.449 
Literacy (%) 16,634 0.818 0.107 0.325 0.987 
Municipal Human Development 
Index (IDHM) 16,683 0.686 0.081 0.386 0.898 
(log) Population 16,700 9.437 1.152 6.693 16.303 
Percent of urban population 16,700 0.632 0.222 0.018 1 
(log) Population density 16,696 3.322 1.320 0.080 9.513 
AM radio 16,964 0.221 0.415 0 1 
FM radio 16,964 0.400 0.490 0 1 
TV generating station 16,964 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Internet 16,964 0.594 0.490 0 1 
 
7.5 Distributions of Key Dependent and Independent Variables 
One of the dependent variables in the study is whether the incumbent mayor runs for 
reelection. Next, Table 39 presents the number of how many mayors pursued reelection for each 
electoral period under analysis. 
 
Table 39 Percentage of Municipalities Where Mayors Ran and Won Reelection 
 Ran for reelection Won reelection^ 
Year N %* N % 
2008 2,943 52.96 2,031 69.01 
2012 2,345 42.10 1,300 55.43 
2016 2,529 45.41 1,208 47.77 
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Note 1: * Percentage of the total number of Brazilian municipalities 
Note 2: ^ Among those who ran for reelection 
 
As the table shows, the proportion of mayors who decided to run for reelection declined 
from 2008 to 2016 (from almost 57% to 45.4% in 2016). There was a clear decline in the reelection 
rate. From 69% of mayors reelected in 2008, the reelection rate dropped to 47.7%. It is possible 
that the severe economic crises that affected the country between 2015 and 2017 affected the 
number of mayors who ran for reelection and, more specifically, the number of mayors who were 
reelected.  
The analyses in the current chapter consider the impact of the spending with government 
advertising in comparison to the impact of campaign spending. The next table shows the mean 
amount spent with government advertising per voter and total campaign spending per voter and 
allow us to know how much the total spending with campaigns at the municipal level differ from 
the spending with government ads. Table 40 displays the mean amount spent by each type of 
spending. As expected, Brazilian municipal campaigns for mayor spend more with advertising 
than the amount with government advertising. However, the difference measured by the ratio of 
campaign spending by the spending with government ads is not so large. In 2008, the ratio was 
2.67 and it increased to 3.12 four years later, whereas the amount spent with government 
advertising was relatively stable under the period 2008-2016. In 2016, there was a considerable 
decline in campaign spending per voter, which led to a decline in the ratio of spending to 2.05.  
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Table 40 Mean Total Campaign Spending and Spending with Government Ads (2008-2012-2016) 
Type of spending Mean (R$) Ratio 
Total campaign spending per voter in 2008 13.92 
2.67 
Spending with government advertising per voter in 2008 5.21 
Total campaign spending per voter in 2012 17.96 
3.12 
Spending with government advertising per voter in 2012 5.75 
Total campaign spending per voter in 2016 11.09 
2.05 
Spending with government advertising per voter in 2016 5.41 
 
The next table shows the mean values of the dependent variables and key independent 
variables (i.e., campaign spending variables and the number of mayoral candidates) by whether a 
municipality spent or not with government advertising. There are no meaningful differences in the 
mean values of the first four variables on the table. There are some differences in the mean values 
of the incumbent’s campaign spending, though. The mean value for the variable is larger for 
municipalities that did not spend with government ads, which may indicate that mayors who spend 
with government advertising may spend less resources with campaign spending. Also worth noting 
is the difference in the mean values of the total number of candidates running for mayor. The mean 
is larger for municipalities that spent with government advertising for the period under 
consideration (3.08 versus 2.64). These values suggest that the spending with government 
advertising is higher in more competitive municipalities. 
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Table 41 Mean Values of Dependent and Independent Variables by Municipality's Spending with 
Government Ads (2008-2016) 
  Spent with ads 
Did not spend with 
ads 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Incumbent's vote share 0.49 0.16 0.50 0.16 
Municipal election turnout 0.85 0.05 0.87 0.05 
Mayor ran for reelection 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.49 
Mayor won reelection 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending per 
voter 1.47 1.11 1.61 1.01 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending per 
voter 1.69 0.77 1.72 0.82 
(log) Total campaign spending per voter 2.45 0.79 2.49 0.81 
Total number of mayoral candidates 3.08 1.47 2.64 1.01 
 
7.6 Multivariate Analyses: Estimation Methods and Results 
In the section that follows, I outline the procedures for the multivariate analyses to be 
conducted. The analyses verify the effects of the spending with government advertising and 
campaign spending variables on three dependent variables: the incumbent mayor’s vote share, the 
electoral turnout for mayor, and the reelection of the incumbent mayor (dichotomous variable). 
The data available comprises information on approximately 5,570 municipalities over three 
election periods (2008-2012-2016). Given the panel structure of the data, the statistical analyses 
are based on panel data methods. 
The method to be used in the current analyses would be the fixed effects model. The 
capacity of fixed effects models to account for the impact of stable unobserved unit-level factors 
over time make allow researchers to draw relevant inferences with panel data. However, fixed 
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effects estimators present problems to estimate the parameters of variables that change little over 
time. As in Chapter 4, that is the problem with the current data from Brazilian municipalities. 
Preliminary estimation of fixed effects models showed little variation within municipalities. The 
analysis showed very high values of Rho and very high negative correlation of the errors ui with 
the regressors in the fixed effects model. Because of such problems, fixed effects will not be used 
in the following analyses. Thus, I use random effects models in the estimations.  
Research on political advertising is often affected by endogeneity biases. The same 
concerns are valid for research with government advertising. Spending with government 
advertising is not allocated randomly across localities. It is possible that there is mutual causation 
between money spent with government advertising and expected votes. Another issue of concern 
is omitted variable bias. There may be many unobserved determinants of both government 
advertising and electoral outcomes that, if not taken into account, can lead to biased estimates. As 
usual, observational data analyses hardly can include all the relevant variables. As a result, the 
correlation between unobservables and government advertising can result in problems for the 
isolation of the causal effect. To handle concerns with endogeneity, the following analysis will 
rely on instrumental variable estimation models. For instrumental variable models to work 
appropriately, it is necessary to find instruments that meet two basic assumptions. First, that the 
excluded instruments are distributed independently of the error term (exclusion restriction), and 
second, that the excluded instruments are sufficiently correlated with the included endogenous 
regressors (inclusion restriction). The excluded instruments should affect the independent variable 
only indirectly. I use measures of the mediums of communication available in a municipality as 
instruments. 
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In the analyses that follow, three dependent variables are studied: the incumbent mayor’s 
vote share, the electoral turnout for the mayoral election, and the probability of reelection (code as 
1 if reelected, zero otherwise). The incumbent mayor’s vote share’s variable is analyzed first. Table 
42 reports the results of the random effects model (RE) and the two-stage generalized least squares 
random effects estimator (2SGLS). To account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity of the error 
terms, the models were estimated with robust standard errors, which also handle potential error 
term problems produced by unit-level clustering. The RE model also includes dummies for state 
and year. 
 
Table 42 The Effects of Government Advertising Spending and Other Covariates on Incumbent's Vote Share 
  Incumbent's vote share 
  (1) RE (2) RE (2SGLS) 
(log) Spending with government ads per voter 0.0034** 0.1065** 
 (0.0013) (0.0424) 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending per voter 0.0293*** 0.0587 
 (0.0019) (0.0408) 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending per voter -0.0887*** -0.1006*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0137) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0555*** -0.0488*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0071) 
Mayor's party aligned with the governor 0.0014 0.0048 
 (0.0035) (0.0053) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0025 -0.0013 
 (0.0118) (0.0191) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index -0.0004 -0.0076 
 (0.0022) (0.0051) 
Runoff election 0.0802*** -0.0147 
 (0.0207) (0.0405) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0155*** -0.0191* 
 (0.0035) (0.0104) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family 0.0032 -0.0119* 
 (0.0034) (0.0066) 
Municipal Human Development Index 0.0971** -0.2413** 
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 (0.0490) (0.0948) 
(log) Population -0.0036* -0.0265* 
 (0.0021) (0.0146) 
Percent of urban population 0.0039 0.0600** 
 (0.0098) (0.0260) 
(log) Population density 0.0080*** 0.0010 
 (0.0019) (0.0042) 
   
Constant 0.560*** 1.2913*** 
 (0.0514) (0.2312) 
Dummies for state Yes   
Dummies for year Yes  
F-test   9.750 
F-test (p-value)  0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (χ2)  1.123 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.570 
R2 (within) 0.401 0.258 
R2 (between) 0.461 0.204 
R2 (overall) 0.445 0.216 
N 7611 7611 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Instruments: AM radio, FM radio, TV generating station, Internet 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
The results in the RE model show that government advertising is positively associated with 
the incumbent’s vote share. It suggests that mayors who invest in government advertising obtain 
an electoral advantage in terms of votes. The incumbent’s campaign spending is also positively 
related to the incumbent’s vote share. The coefficient for challengers’ campaign spending is 
negative and statistically significant, as hypothesized. These results suggest that incumbents 
benefit from higher spending with government advertising and campaign spending, and that 
challengers’ campaign spending decreases incumbents’ vote shares. Concerning the other 
variables, the coefficient for the number of candidates running for mayor is negative and highly 
statistically significant, indicating that higher levels of electoral competition as expressed by the 
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number of candidates decrease incumbents’ vote shares. Runoff election appears as positively 
related to incumbent’s vote share. This means that elections in larger municipalities that can go to 
a second round can benefit incumbents.  
The table also presents the results for the 2SGLS-RE model. According to the Sargan-
Hansen statistic for overidentification, the estimation is consistent, and the instruments are valid. 
Regarding the F-test statistic, its value is 9.75. Usual recommendations suggest that the F-statistic 
should be bigger than 10 in case of a single endogenous regression. In the current analysis, there 
are four instruments. Hence, results from the 2SGLS-RE model should be seen with a grain of salt. 
Analyses of the coefficients show that government advertising spending is equal in substantive 
magnitude as the campaign spending by challengers.  
Overall, the models showed support for the three vote share’s hypotheses. That is, the 
incumbent’s vote share increase with higher spending with government ads and higher 
incumbent’s campaign spending. Conversely, the incumbent’s vote share decreases with higher 
challengers’ campaign spending. 
Table 43 displays the results for the impact of the independent variables on electoral 
turnout for mayor. As before, the first column presents RE results, while the second column 
presents RE-2SGLS results. Differently from the previous analysis, the results from the following 
table do not include measures of incumbent’s and challengers’ campaign spending. Instead, it 
includes a measure of the overall campaign spending per voter.  
The results from column 1 show that higher spending with government advertising 
increases turnout. Higher total campaign spending also appears positively related to turnout. The 
results for both variables show that electoral participation is responsive to campaign mobilization 
efforts from the local political elites via campaign spending or government advertising.  
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Table 43 The Effects of Government Advertising Spending and Other Covariates on Municipal Turnout 
  Municipal turnout 
  (1) RE (2) RE (2SGLS) 
(log) Spending with government ads per voter 0.0007** 0.0864** 
 (0.0003) (0.0367) 
(log) Campaign spending per voter 0.0066*** 0.0130 
 (0.0004) (0.0280) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.00003 0.0001 
 (0.00029) (0.0036) 
Mayor's party aligned with the governor 0.0010* 0.0025 
 (0.0006) (0.0017) 
Municipality's ideology score 0.0021 -0.0021 
 (0.0027) (0.0102) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index -0.0001 -0.0031** 
 (0.0004) (0.0012) 
Runoff election 0.0131*** -0.0129 
 (0.0039) (0.0171) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0099*** -0.0106 
 (0.0008) (0.0090) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family -0.0009 -0.0167* 
 (0.0007) (0.0099) 
Municipal Human Development Index 0.2727*** -0.1411*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0355) 
(log) Population -0.0299*** -0.0514*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0114) 
Percent of urban population -0.0332*** -0.0244 
 (0.0030) (0.0151) 
(log) Population density 0.0103*** 0.0106** 
 (0.0005) (0.0044) 
   
Constant 0.8445*** 1.5345*** 
 (0.0125) (0.1299) 
Dummies for state Yes   
Dummies for year Yes  
F-test   5.96 
F-test (Prob > F)  0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (χ2)  2.972 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.226 
R2 (within) 0.251 0.007 
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R2 (between) 0.559 0.092 
R2 (overall) 0.497 0.066 
N 16,599 16,599 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Instruments: AM radio, FM radio, TV generating station, Internet 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
This time, the mayor’s alliance with the state’s governor shows sign of statistical 
significance, although at the p < .10. The result is not is not confirmed in the 2SGLS. The socio-
demographic controls indicate that turnout tends to be higher in more affluent and less populated 
municipalities.  
Column 2 shows the results for the RE-2SGLS model. Observing the evaluation statistics 
for the model, it can be seen that the F-test is 5.96, which recommends caution in the evaluation 
of the results. That said, the results are consistent with the results on the first column of Table 43. 
As in the RE model, government advertising is positively and statistically significantly related to 
turnout. Higher spending with government advertising engenders higher turnout. However, the 
coefficient for total campaign spending is not statistically significant, even though the coefficient 
is positive. The sign of the coefficients for some variables is different from the signs in model 1. 
For instance, the municipal Human Development Index’s coefficient is negative in the RE-2SGLS 
model, but positive in the RE model.  
All in all, the two models show partial support for the two turnout’s hypothesis. The 
spending with government advertising is related to higher levels of turnout in both models, but the 
coefficient for total campaign spending is positive in the first model and statistically insignificant 
in the second model. 
  192 
7.6.1 Hybrid Models for Incumbent’s Vote Share and Municipal Turnout 
As stated before, the estimation of Fixed Effects model with the current data has shown to 
be problematic due to little variation within municipalities (i.e., high values of Rho and very high 
negative correlation of the errors ui with the regressors). As a result, RE models were estimated. 
However, it is possible to obtain results that Fixed Effects would provide through the use of hybrid 
model or “within-between” effects model. This model consists in decomposing between and within 
variation and to estimate the respective effects in a single model (Schunck, 2013, p.66). Its use 
here aims at evaluating whether the results obtained in the previous RE and RE-2SGLS models on 
vote share and turnout hold.   
Hence, the following model presents the within and between effects of the independent 
variables on incumbent’s vote share. Full results for the models can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Table 44 Hybrid Model: The Effects of Government Advertising Apending and Other Covariates on 
Incumbent's Vote Share 
 
  (1)  
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0006 
per voter (within) (0.0025) 
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0032** 
per voter (mean) (0.0015) 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending 0.0264*** 
per voter (within) (0.0028) 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending 0.0295*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0023) 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending -0.0910*** 
per voter (within) (0.0041) 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending -0.0872*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0029) 
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Number of candidates for mayor -0.0583*** 
(within) (0.0027) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0557*** 
(mean) (0.0030) 
Mayor's party aligned with the 0.0033 
governor (within) (0.0042) 
Mayor's party aligned with the -0.0014 
governor (mean) (0.0063) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0023 
(within) (0.0193) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0067 
(mean) (0.0150) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political 0.0005 
Polarization Index (within) (0.0032) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0006 
Polarization Index (mean) (0.0029) 
Runoff election -0.1495*** 
(within) (0.0437) 
Runoff election 0.1569*** 
(mean) (0.0266) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0020 
(within) (0.0095) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0154 
(mean) (0.0037) 
 0.5605*** 
Constant (0.0595) 
Includes controls Yes 
Dummies for state Yes 
Dummies for year Yes 
χ2 3979.96 
P > χ2 0.000 
R2 (within) 0.406 
R2 (between) 0.472 
R2 (overall) 0.453 
N 7,611 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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According to the table, there is no within effect of government advertising spending on the 
incumbent’s vote share, although the coefficient is positive as expected. There is a between effect 
of government advertising spending on vote share, though. Moreover, the incumbent and 
challenger’s campaign spending variables present within and between coefficients that are highly 
statistically significant and with coefficients in the right direction (i.e., positive for the former and 
negative for the latter). Concerning the remaining variables, it must be noted the statistically 
significant impact of the within effects of the number of candidates for mayor and the “runoff 
election” variable, both with negative coefficients.  
Respecting turnout, Table 45 presents the results of the impact of the within and between 
effects of the independent variables on municipal level turnout. 
 
Table 45 Hybrid Model: The Effects of Government Advertising Spending and Other Covariates on 
Municipal Turnout 
  (1)  
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0002 
per voter (within) (0.0003) 
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0012*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0004) 
(log) Campaign spending 0.0067*** 
per voter (within) (0.0005) 
(log) Campaign spending 0.0063*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0009) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0002 
(within) (0.0003) 
Number of candidates for mayor 0.0005 
(mean) (0.0007) 
Mayor's party aligned with the 0.0013** 
governor (within) (0.0006) 
Mayor's party aligned with the -0.0016 
governor (mean) (0.0019) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0080** 
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(within) (0.0033) 
Municipality's ideology score 0.0227*** 
(mean) (0.0049) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political 0.0002 
Polarization Index (within) (0.0005) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0001 
Polarization Index (mean) (0.0009) 
Runoff election -0.0052 
(within) (0.0046) 
Runoff election 0.0533*** 
(mean) (0.0060) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0057*** 
(within) (0.0013) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0125*** 
(mean) (0.0011) 
 0.9024 
Constant (0.0178) 
Includes controls Yes 
Dummies for state Yes 
Dummies for year Yes 
χ2 13815.26 
P > χ2 0.000 
R2 (within) 0.256 
R2 (between) 0.566 
R2 (overall) 0.504 
N 16,599 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
Based on the results, we find that there is no within effect of government advertising 
spending on municipal turnout, even though there is a between effect. Concerning the campaign 
spending variable, there are both within and between effects that are highly statistically significant 
and with positive coefficients. Thus, the result does not show a “within” mean-deviated effect of 
government advertising on turnout. 
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In sum, the results of Table 44 and 45 disagree with respect to the causal impact of 
government advertising spending on vote share and municipal turnout. However, the results from 
the tables 44 and 45 confirm the causal impact of the incumbent spending, the challenger’s 
spending, and the total campaign spending variables.  
7.6.2 The Effect of Government Advertising on the Probability of Reelection 
The third dependent variable to be analyzed is the probability of reelection. Because this 
variable is dichotomous, I estimate panel random effects probit models. Two models were 
estimated, one without interactions and another with interactions. The models report robust 
standard errors. Table 46 displays the results for both models. 
 
Table 46 Random Effects Probit Models: Probability of Reelection 
  (1) Coef/SE      P>|z| (2) Coef/SE     P>|z| 
(log) Spending with govt ads per voter 0.0364*** 0.010 0.0867** 0.016 
 
(0.0142) 
 
(0.0362) 
 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending per voter 0.3104*** 0.000 0.1907*** 0.000 
 
(0.0229) 
 
(0.0399) 
 
Spending with government ads x Incumbent's 
campaign spending 
  
-0.0307* 0.062 
   
(0.0165) 
 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending per voter -0.6916*** 0.000 -0.8470*** 0.000 
 
(0.0310) 
 
(0.0521) 
 
Spending with govt ads x Challengers' campaign 
spending 
  
-0.0011 0.955 
   
(0.0202) 
 
Incumbent's campaign spending x Challengers' 
campaign spending 
  
0.0867*** 0.000 
   
(0.0212) 
 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0478*** 0.009 -0.0420** 0.021 
 
(0.0183) 
 
(0.0183) 
 
Mayor's party aligned with the governor 0.0298 0.443 0.0252 0.515 
 
(0.0388) 
 
(0.0387) 
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Municipality's ideology score -0.0870 0.515 -0.1051 0.433 
 
(0.1337) 
 
(0.1340) 
 
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index -0.0351 0.147 -0.0363 0.134 
 
(0.0242) 
 
(0.0243) 
 
Runoff election 0.3880** 0.046 0.3720* 0.060 
 
(0.1945) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0534 0.134 0.0471 0.185 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family 0.0117 0.754 0.0090 0.808 
 
(0.0372) 
 
(0.0373) 
 
Municipal Human Development Index 0.1369 0.787 0.1197 0.813 
 
(0.5054) 
 
(0.5057) 
 
(log) Population -0.0910*** 0.000 -0.0918*** 0.000 
 
(0.0218) 
 
(0.0218) 
 
Percent of urban population 0.2128** 0.035 0.2047** 0.043 
 
(0.1007) 
 
(0.1009) 
 
(log) Population density 0.0464** 0.020 0.0464** 0.020 
 
(0.0199) 
 
(0.0200)   
Constant 1.2735**   1.5515** 
 
  (0.5216)   (0.5274)   
Dummies for state Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Dummies for year Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Wald χ2 824.48 
 
835.93 
 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -4409.7 
 
-4395.56 
 
N 7645 
 
7645   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
The results for Model 1 show that government advertising is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with reelection for mayor. The same occurs for incumbent’s campaign 
spending. The coefficient for challengers’ campaign spending is negative and statistically 
significant. Among the remaining political independent variables, the number of candidates for 
mayor is negatively related to the mayors’ reelection, whereas the runoff election is positively 
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related to reelection. These results show that higher competition decreases the chances of 
reelection, while the chance of a runoff election increases the incumbent’s reelection chances. 
Model 2 shows the results with interaction terms. Except for the interaction between the 
spending with government advertising and challengers’ campaign spending, all main variables and 
their interactions are statistically significant. Differently from hypothesized in hypothesis 9 
(Interaction between government advertising and incumbent’s spending hypothesis), the 
coefficient for the interaction between the spending with government advertising and the 
incumbent’s campaign spending turned out to be negative. Among the other political independent 
variables, it can be seen that higher electoral competition decreases reelection chances, while the 
possibility of runoff elections increases reelection chances.  
Overall, the two models show support for the four of the five reelection’s hypotheses. We 
still need to know more about the substantive effects of the main variables. In the figures that 
follow, I report the marginal effects of the main independent variables and their interactions. Figure 
32 shows the marginal effect for the log of spending with government advertising while holding 
other independent variables at their means. The next figure shows the substantive effect of 
government advertising spending on the probability of reelection. 
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Figure 32 Marginal Effects of (Log) Spending with Government Ads per Voter 
 
According to the figure, as spending with government advertising increases, the probability 
of reelection also increases. However, the rate of increase is small and more significant at lower 
levels. At higher levels of spending, the confidence intervals become wider. From zero spending 
to 6, the probability of reelection increases by approximately 7 percent. 
The next figure shows the marginal effects for the challengers’ campaign spending and the 
incumbent’s campaign spending. As expected, higher levels of challengers’ spending decrease the 
probability of reelection substantively. For an intermediate low-to-medium level of challengers’ 
spending (i.e., 2), the probability of reelection is only 50 percent. The graph on the bottom shows 
the marginal effects for incumbent’s campaign spending. According to the graph, holding all other 
variables to their means, for a candidate to achieve 60% of reelection probability, he or she must 
spend a considerable sum of campaign resources, that is, the incumbent must spend comparatively 
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more than the challenger to achieve a 60% chance of reelection. On the whole, both campaign 
spending categories are effective. However, it seems that the challengers’ spending is more 
effective without interactions.  
 
 
Figure 33 Marginal Effects of (Log) Challenger’s Campaign Spending per Voter and (Log) Incumbent’s 
Campaign Spending per Voter 
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Figure 34 Average Marginal Effects of the Interaction Between (Log) Spending with Government Ads and 
the (log) Incumbent’s Campaign Spending, and (Log) Spending with Government and the (Log) Challenger’s 
Campaign Spending 
 
The next two figures show the marginal effects for the interaction between government 
advertising spending and the two campaign spending variables (i.e., incumbent’s and challengers’ 
campaign spending), and also the interaction between incumbent’s campaign spending and the 
challengers’ campaign spending. Figure 34 displays the result of the first two interactions. The 
graph on the top indicates that at higher levels of incumbent’s campaign spending, the spending 
with government advertising becomes ineffective at increasing the probability of reelection. 
Actually, the probability diminishes. The graph on the bottom shows that the effect of the spending 
with government advertising tends to be stable as the level of challengers’ spending increases. 
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There is a gradual decrease, though, at the probability of reelection as the challengers’ campaign 
spending increases. 
Lastly, Figure 35 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between incumbent’s 
campaign spending and challengers’ campaign spending.  
 
 
Figure 35 Average Marginal Effects of the Interaction Between (Log) Incumbent’s Campaign Spending and 
the (Log) Challenger’s Campaign Spending 
 
The marginal effects follow an inverted U-shaped form, indicating that increases in the 
incumbent’s campaign spending are capable of increasing the probability of reelection at lower-
to-intermediate levels of challengers’ spending. However, as the challengers’ spending becomes 
more significant (i.e., 2.5 and higher), the probability of the incumbent’s reelection decreases 
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substantially. Thus, challengers need to spend considerable campaign resources to decrease the 
incumbent’s chances of winning reelection.  
7.7 Robustness Check: Additional Endogeneity Model 
The instrumental models already estimated help us handle endogeneity. However, there is 
a serious concern that must be taken into account, which is selectivity bias. Incumbents who decide 
to run for reelection might not constitute a random sample of mayors. Potentially, the decision to 
run for a further term is endogenous to the prospects of electoral success. 
I use a Heckman model to control for this potential selection bias. This system of two 
equations (selection and outcome) addresses the threat of bias in the estimates generated by 
systematic differences in incumbents who decided to run for reelection versus incumbents who 
decided not to run for reelection. In the selection equation, I assume that the decision to run for 
reelection is the result of the mediums of communication available in the municipality (i.e., the 
same variables that were used as instruments in the RE-2SGLS models), plus the municipality’s 
GDP per capita.  
The results for the Heckman probit model are reported in Table 47. The sample includes 
16,516 elections, in 8,871 of which the incumbent did not stand for reelection. The table show the 
selection equation and the outcome equation. The dependent variable is the reelection of the 
incumbent mayor. The independent variables in the model are the same included in the previous 
regression models. These models do not include interaction terms. 
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Table 47 Heckman Probit Selection Model: Probability of Reelection 
  Heckman model 
  Coef. P>|z| 
(log) Spending with govt ads per voter 0.0307** 0.014 
 (0.0125)  
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending per voter 0.263*** 0.000 
 (0.0296)  
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending per voter -0.591*** 0.000 
 (0.0552)  
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0398** 0.013 
 (0.0160)  
Mayor’s party aligned with the governor 0.0266 0.419 
 (0.0329)  
Municipality’s ideology score -0.0746 0.514 
 (0.114)  
Municipal Dalton’s Political Polarization Index -0.0304 0.139 
 (0.0206)  
Runoff election 0.317* 0.056 
 (0.166)  
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0595* 0.064 
 (0.0321)  
(log) Bolsa Família’s transfers per family 0.0101 0.752 
 (0.0320)  
Municipal Human Development Index 0.105 0.808 
 (0.433)  
(log) Population -0.0781*** 0.000 
 (0.0201)  
Percent of urban population 0.188** 0.033 
 (0.0884)  
(log) Population density 0.0390** 0.026 
 (0.0176)   
Constant 1.5196***  
  (0.4591)   
Selection equation DV: ran for reelection   
FM radio -0.0343 0.105 
 (0.0211)  
TV generating station 0.0829*** 0.009 
 (0.0317)  
Internet -0.0114 0.575 
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 (0.0204)  
(log) Municipal GDP per capita -0.0305** 0.029 
 (0.0140)   
Constant 0.1983 0.120 
  (0.1277)   
Dummies for state Yes  
Dummies for year Yes   
Rho -0.6504  
Wald test of indep. eqns. (Rho = 0): χ2(1) 9.06  
Wald test of indep. eqns. Prob > χ2 0.002  
Wald χ2 143.39  
Log pseudolikelihood -15805.62  
N 16,516  
N (selected) 7,645  
N (non-selected) 8,871   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
The Wald test of independent equations conclusively rejects the null hypothesis with an 
estimated Rho of -0.65 between the two equation errors, indicating that ignoring the selection into 
running for reelection would render the estimates biased and inconsistent. 
Concerning the main results, the table’s results corroborate the results from the panel 
random effects models for incumbent’s reelection. The data show that higher spending with 
government advertising does increase the probability of reelection. In the same way, the coefficient 
for incumbent’s campaign spending is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient for 
challengers’ campaign spending is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the 
probability of reelection decreases as the challengers’ spending increases. The number of 
candidates running for mayor is a meaningful political variable. As in previous models, higher 
number of candidates running decreases the incumbent’s reelection chances. Runoff election is 
positive and statistically significant at p < .10, indicating that the incumbent mayor tends to have 
a higher chance of reelection in municipalities that hold runoff elections. Among the socio-
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economic variables, it is worth noting that the coefficient for municipal GDP per capita is positive 
and statistically significant. In all, the Heckman model confirms the positive impact of government 
advertising on the incumbent’s chances of reelection. 
In general, the Heckman probit model confirmed the main results from the random effects 
models. Spending with government advertising affects the reelection chances of the mayor. 
Further, the incumbent’s campaign spending and the challengers’ campaign spending also matter. 
Both affect the probability of reelection. The first increases the chances of reelection, whereas the 
latter decreases it. As in previous models, the competitive conditions of the municipalities are also 
relevant predictors of a mayor’s reelection chances.  
7.8 Conclusion 
Does government advertising impact electoral outcomes? If so, how does the impact of 
government advertising stand in comparison to campaign spending by incumbents and 
challengers? In this chapter, I used data from more than 5,570 Brazilian municipalities to evaluate 
the impact of government advertising and campaign spending on the incumbent mayor’s vote 
share, the electoral turnout for mayor, and the probability of the mayor’s reelection. This analysis 
is extremely important for it allows us to know the impact of government advertising at an 
important level of government of the Brazilian political system, the local level of mayors. The 
occupants of this office command important budgetary resources and exert an important political 
role by connecting voters to higher level political candidates (i.e., candidates for state and federal 
deputy, governor, and senator).  
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Theoretically, I argued that mayors spend with government advertising with the goals of 
building their reputations before the election and to signal effort to voters before the next election 
starts. Government advertising works by helping voters build a view of the incumbent, and such 
view is formed cumulatively over the course of an incumbent’s term. The information provided 
by government advertising consists in descriptions of accomplishments, problems solved, and 
services provided to the citizenry. Campaign spending, on the other hand, conveys electorally 
relevant information to voters in the short term, during the electoral period. It aims at affecting the 
voters’ view of the candidate not cumulatively, but at a specific point in time, during the campaign 
period. As a result, we can expect government advertising and campaign spending to have different 
effects on voters. Government advertising may complement the incumbent’s campaign spending, 
but it does not replace it. It was expected then that campaign spending should exert a more potent 
impact on electoral outcomes than government advertising. Based on the theory, a set of 
hypotheses were derived.  
The main results mostly confirmed the hypotheses. Government advertising is positively 
related to the incumbent’s vote share, turnout, and reelection for mayor. Concerning the latter 
variables, challengers’ spending has a potent effect, especially at high levels of spending. 
Incumbent’s spending is also relevant, but to ensure reelection, incumbents must spend a 
significantly high amount of resources per capita to “secure” reelection from opponents. Hybrid 
models were estimated to verify whether the results obtained in the RE models hold. The results 
were mixed. There is no “within” effect of government advertising spending on incumbent’s vote 
share and turnout, even though there are “between” effects for both dependent variables. The 
hybrid models confirmed the relevant impact of the incumbent’s and challenger’s campaign 
spending, as well as the impact of the total campaign spending, on the dependent variables. 
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To verify the robustness of the main results for the probability of reelection, a Heckman 
probit model was estimated. It takes into account selectivity bias. The results confirmed that 
government advertising affects the incumbent’s chances of reelection, as well as the two campaign 
spending variables. 
The results of the empirical analyses lead to some relevant implications. First, it is possible 
to say that the spending with government advertising constitutes a source of incumbent advantage. 
That is, the spending with government advertising does not decrease the incumbent’s vote share 
and her chances of reelection. Instead, government advertising increases both. The substantive 
impact of government advertising, however, is smaller in comparison with campaign spending by 
incumbents and challengers. This means that mayors who cannot spend with government 
advertising may not necessarily be at disadvantage when facing opponents in the next election, as 
long as the incumbent is capable of raising enough resources to outspend challengers. As the 
analyses showed, high levels of challengers’ spending significantly decrease the incumbents’ 
chances of reelection even when the incumbent spends considerable amounts on her campaign. 
Another implication is that government advertising deserves to be included in the political calculus 
of incumbents who decide to run for reelection, especially when competition is expected to be 
fierce.   
What factors do explain the limited impact of government advertising on the electoral 
outcomes? One factor is the smaller spending per capita with government advertising in 
comparison to the amount spent with campaigns (as described on Table 41). The second factor, as 
laid out by the theory, is the recency bias involved in retrospective evaluations of incumbents 
(Huber, Hill, and Lenz, 2012). Brazilian voters are certainly not immune to the tendency of 
weighting recent factors more heavily in their judgments of incumbents than more distant ones. 
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The implication is that government advertising, to be effective, must be massive at the eve of the 
electoral period. In Brazil, that is not possible by force of the law. The result is that incumbents 
should expect limited electoral returns from government advertising. There is one caveat, though. 
Recent changes on campaign finance introduced by TSE resulted in the reduction of the amount 
of campaign spending by candidates. Based on this alone, and holding spending with government 
advertising constant, we can expect a higher impact of government advertising in the future, 
although the impact should still be small in comparison to the amount spent in campaigns by 
incumbents and challengers. 
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8.0 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The questions that orient this dissertation are four. First, what is the content of government 
advertising?  Second, how does government advertising affect citizens’ political attitudes and 
behavior? Third, what factors explain governments’ expenditures with advertising? Fourth, does 
government advertising have political impacts on outcomes that matter for incumbent 
governments, more particularly electoral outcomes? Except for a few empirical studies (Romero, 
Magaloni, and Díaz-Cayeros, 2015; Kopp, 2017; Barboza Ribeiro, 2017), the scholarly literature 
has few answers to these questions. Must scholarship on the topic of government advertising is 
essayistic, anecdotal, descriptive in nature, and based only on journalistic accounts. Thus, the 
literature does not offer theoretical and empirically-based evidence to answer these questions. I 
study Brazil as a case and provide empirical results to answer these questions. 
I argue that government advertising is a tool that incumbent officeholders use to influence 
citizens’ perceptions about their performance or competence in office. It conveys governmental 
action and performance information. Government advertising aims at nurturing the incumbent’s 
personal reputation and signaling effort to voters. Additionally, the effect of government advertising 
is not supposed to be instantaneous, but cumulative. Continuous inflows of government advertising 
should build the view among citizens that the government is doing something on their behalf.  
Concerning the reasons to invest in government advertising, I draw from the literature on 
distributive politics and the federal allocation of funds in the United States. I contend that 
incumbents have incentives to pursue a particularistic strategy in the allocation of advertising funds, 
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or they can pursue a universalistic criterion in the allocation of advertising funds, that is, to reach 
the highest number of people. The allocations take into consideration political considerations (i.e., 
term limits and particularistic incentives), as well as characteristics of the local context (especially 
socio-demographic factors). Regarding term limits, I state that differently from what would be 
expected, the need to engage in reputation building makes incumbents more prone to keep investing 
in government advertising when they are term limited, that is, when they are lame ducks. 
The dissertation also provides a classification scheme for government advertising. Based 
on a content analysis of government advertising from the MG state and its municipalities, I state 
that the current classifications of political advertising are not adequate to the classification of 
government advertising. Instead, I say that government advertising can be classified according to 
the goal conveyed by the ad, which can be basically three: information provision (to publicize or 
promote a policy), credit claiming (to claim credit for past, present, or future policies), and 
behavior change (to inform, educate, guide, or alert the viewer to adopt or change a behavior). All 
three can be used by government to claim credit, but they vary according to their “degree of 
explicitness”. Credit claiming ads are explicit in their communicated intent of claiming credit, 
whereas information provision is less explicit and behavior change is the least explicit in credit 
claiming.  
I also explored how government advertising affects individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. 
To that end, I carried out an online survey experiment on Brazilian respondents. Based on insights 
from attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) and ad sponsorship literatures, I contend that government 
advertising differs from political advertising in the degree citizens assess self-interest. Because 
government advertising would be seen as less self-interested than usual political advertising, it 
could be expected that government ads would have more source credibility. Another relevant 
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factor in the capacity of government advertising to affect people’s attitudes and behaviors is the 
interaction of government advertising with the information environment. Such interaction provides 
important clues that help citizens process the information found in the government advertising. 
The more congruent the message in government ads with the environment of a citizen, the higher 
the persuasive capacity of government advertising. 
In the sections that follow, I synthesize the empirical findings with respect to the individual 
research questions and hypotheses. Second, I examine the theoretical and normative implications 
from the study. I also offer some brief policy implications. Finally, I discuss the study’s limitations 
and recommend possible avenues for future research. 
8.2 Empirical Findings 
Chapter 4 analyzed the content of government advertising in the MG state and its municipal 
city halls. The chapter provides descriptive analyses of the ads. The results showed that a majority 
of ads by the MG state government (59.9 percent) were credit claiming ads, whereas the incidence 
of credit claiming ads in the state’s city halls were even more pronounced: 72 percent of the ads 
aired by municipal governments in the state were credit claiming ads. Information provision and 
behavior change came in second and third place in the types of ads aired for both types of 
governments, respectively.  
Chapter 5 promoted the analysis of the impact of government advertising on individuals’ 
attitudes and behaviors. I implemented a between-subjects factorial online survey experiment on 
1,800 Brazilian citizens using as experimental scenario a fictitious municipality to verify the 
impact of government advertising and information on unemployment on four dependent variables. 
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It was found that government advertising can affect responsibility attribution – in this case, who 
is responsible for the issue of employment. However, the experiment did not find statistically 
significant differences of the impact of government advertising versus party advertising on the 
other dependent variables. Government advertising and party advertising were equally effective at 
shaping respondents’ attitudes and behaviors. The impact of the second experimental factor, news 
on unemployment, was very relevant. As a result, it is possible to infer that government advertising 
is more effective when aired in environments where there are little-to-no countervailing messages. 
Evidence from the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais in Chapter 6 shows that, differently from 
what would be expected by the particularistic logic of allocation, governors in the state allocate 
government advertising funds according to a universalistic logic that consists in reaching the 
largest number of people with advertising. Moreover, the spending with government advertising 
increases the visibility of overall spending in the state (i.e., spending with public policies in general 
per municipality. Respecting the effects of the spending with government advertising, the chapter 
finds no electoral effects on turnout for the gubernatorial election, nor electoral effects on the 
incumbent’s “personal” vote share and on the governor’s incumbent party’s vote share.. They also 
show that government advertising is not a panacea for incumbents desirous of using it as a 
reelection strategy. 
The analyses on Chapter 7 verified the effects of government advertising in Brazilian 
municipalities in elections for mayor. I advanced a theory standing for the differential impacts of 
government advertising and campaign spending and argued that, based on the theory, campaign 
spending should have a higher impact than government advertising. Most hypotheses in the 
analyses were confirmed. Overall, it was found that government advertising had a statistically 
significant impact on the incumbent’s vote share, turnout, and reelection for mayor. 
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8.3 Theoretical and Normative Implications 
The findings from this dissertation also have theoretical ramifications for social scientists’ 
understanding of campaigns and the conditions of political competition in Brazil.  
It is clear from the analyses that government advertising does constitute an important 
component of Brazilian incumbent’s electoral advantage. Having the capacity to use it is better 
electorally for the incumbent than not having the capacity to spend with ads. However, the impact 
is limited in comparison to what incumbents can accomplish with campaign spending. As with 
access to community radio stations (Boas and Hidalgo, 2011), government advertising can be a 
valuable office perk that can complement (but not replace) campaign spending. 
Curiously, term limitation is not a barrier for investment in government advertising, as the 
political science scholarship would suggest. The analyses of the allocation of government 
advertising spending in the MG state clearly showed that spending with government advertising 
does not decrease as some would expect. Instead, it is maintained at previous levels or even 
increases, which suggest that incumbents have concerns about reputation building and the 
signaling of effort even when they are term limited. As a result, should students of Brazilian 
politics necessarily see term limited incumbents as weak chief executives? Probably not. 
Another finding that deserves attention is that universal allocation predominated over 
particularistic allocation in the MG context. Does this result suggest that government advertising 
is used as a spending category whose goal is to “be spent” without any further electoral 
consideration in mind? In the dissertation, it is suggested that the impact can be indirect by 
increasing the visibility of overall spending. A possible implication of these results is that the 
particularistic logic necessitates more resources to be effective. Another possibility is that the 
conditions of electoral competition must differ. Unfortunately (for the dissertation’s purposes), the 
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electoral results for governor in the state of Minas Gerais were mostly lopsided – i.e., the 
incumbent governor’s party obtained a very high percentage of the vote in many municipalities.  
Respecting the content of government advertising, it is clear that credit claiming 
advertising prevail over other types of advertising. It is also clear that claiming credit for 
accomplishments is not the only logic involved in government advertising. Provision of 
information and change of behavior also important aspects of government advertising. The results 
show that the electoral logic is not the only one orienting the spending with government 
advertising. Public policy is also a concern. 
Important theoretical implications can also be derived from the individual level analysis of 
the impact of government advertising. The results in the study found that government advertising 
is not more effective than party advertising. Does this mean that government advertising is 
generally ineffective? Or does it mean that variation in context make government advertising more 
effective? In this dissertation, I found that both types of ads are equally effective. Nevertheless, 
more comparisons are needed between government advertising and political advertising. 
Normatively, the study shows that government advertising can be used either to foster or 
to hinder accountability. If government advertising is framed to convey information that is useful 
to voters, that is, that help them assess the incumbent’s work, government advertising can help 
voters in their retrospective evaluations. Conversely, government advertising can be used to hinder 
accountability. Incumbent chief executives can use advertising to promote some public policies 
(i.e., those they favor or those in which they have a better performance) at the expense of others in 
which they have a poorer performance. Another way government advertising can be used to hinder 
accountability is through its impact on media outlets. As studied by Di Tella and Franceschelli 
(2011) and others, government advertising can be used to “buy” favorable media coverage 
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irrespective of the incumbent government’s “real” performance. The consequences for democratic 
accountability are severe in countries where the spending with government advertising is non-
negligible, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.  
In practice, it does not seem possible to separate “responsible” from “irresponsible” 
accountability. More likely, government advertising will never have the potential to be fully 
acccountable to citizens. In other words, it may never be possible to prevent incumbents from 
using government advertising for narrow electoral purposes at the expense of policy ones. Hence, 
it is possible to make sure that government advertising is used less for self-promotion and more to 
advance accountability? Regulation may be required, and it could be quantitative (i.e., the amount 
spent with government ads) and/or qualitative (i.e., based on the type of message). The goal to be 
maximized would be the provision of information that benefits accountability and make self-
promotion less desirable. To that end, one possibility would be the implementation of limits to the 
amount that incumbents can spend with government advertising per capita rather than overall 
spending, as it is currently the case in Brazil. Another possibility would be to regulate the type of 
ad that is aired, favoring more information provision and behavior change advertising in 
contraposition to credit claiming advertising. Both types of measures would necessitate some 
degree of bureaucratic organization and oversight that is currently small or non-existent. In Brazil, 
the national and the electoral courts could be put in charge of overseeing such regulations. 
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8.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Despite covering a lot of empirical ground, the present study presents some important 
limitations worth noting. Some revolve around data. Other limitations emerge from features of the 
research design chosen, as is the case of the experiment.  
The data chosen in this study was local (Brazilian municipalities) and subnational (the state 
of Minas Gerais) instead of national data. The main reason for such choice was that the national 
study of the determinants of government advertising in Brazil has already been carried out 
(Barboza Ribeiro, 2017). The data available was the amount spent with government advertising. 
Even though these data are valuable and worth using, they have some limitations. One of the key 
limitations of these data is that they somehow assume equal exposure of all citiznes, which is 
obviously an unrealistic assumption. A better measure would be the “gross average point” (GRP) 
measure, as it is available for Designated Market Areas (DMAs) in the United States. GRPs are 
scored to reflect the percentage of the media market that is exposed to an ad14. However, a similar 
type of measure is not available for Brazil. Another limitation is the reliance on only one state for 
the analysis of the allocation of spending and the its effects. Even though it has been argued that 
the state of Minas Gerais reflects somehow Brazil, some may argue that comparisons with more 
states are needed. The reliance on one country and one state bring another type of limitation: they 
do not provide enough institutional variation. The electoral rules are the same for the whole country 
and do not vary by municipality and state. The only important institutional variation is the 
occurrence or not of a second round. As a result, the present’s study capacity to engage in an 
institutional analysis of the determiants of government advertising is very limited.  
 
14 “Buying a hundred GRPs for an ad would mean one exposure for each viewer; a thousand GRPs would mean that viewers would see an ad ten 
times” (Iyengar, 2015). 
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Moreover, the dissertation does not study the role that the incumbent’s approval rating – a 
more immediate political concern – may have on his or her decision to spend with government 
advertising. It is possible that the spending with advertising fluctuates more than the data suggest 
in response to more immediate factors such as scandals or changes in unemployment rate. Thus, it 
becomes imperative to study these possibilities. Unfortunately, there was no public opinion data 
available for MG to test the impact of approval rating. Data on scandals and unemployment rate 
were also unavailable. 
Also, the dissertation could not evaluate the relationship between incumbent governments 
and the media that receives (or not) government advertising. As reported in many journalistic 
accounts and in some scholarly work (e.g., Di Tella and Franceschelli, 2011), several governments 
– particularly in Latin America – use government advertising to obtain favorable media coverage 
or to induce celf-censorship. The available data for Brazil did not allow me to study the possible 
use of advertising to “buy” favorable media coverage in Brazilian municipalities or in the MG 
state. 
Last but not least, the experiment had limitations that were very difficult to avoid. The 
fictitious nature of the experimental setup (i.e., artificial polity and political party) constrains our 
capacity to generalize the findings. In addition, the issue content of the experimental data is limited, 
that is, it considers only unemployment. It is almost certain that the choice of other types of issues 
could have led to different results. Nonetheless, the issue chosen is politically relevant and the 
results obtained in the experiment are robust enough to allow us to conclude that government 
advertising can be effective at leading to changes in people’s political attitudes and behaviors. 
The present study advanced our knowledge of government advertising in Brazil. However, 
much remains to be done. This research raises a number of questions that merit future study. More 
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data is required to foster these studies. To begin with, more comparative works needs to be done. 
This, way, we can answer other important research questions. For instance, what is the importance 
of government advertising in countries where reelection is not allowed, as in Mexico? In this case, 
is government advertising used for party building efforts? Or to foster progressive career 
ambitions?  
There needs to be more studies on the policy impacts of government advertising. For 
instance, we do not know if information provision advertising and behavior change advertising 
“work” (i.e., if they inform or change the behavior of citizens). One possibility would be to study 
whether healthcare measures such as preventive measures against dengue fever work. Also, the 
allocation of government advertising funds by national governments deserve more scholarly work. 
We do not know which national bureauracies receive more funds for government advertising than 
others and why, nor do we know the uses of government advertising by different bureaucracies. 
Concerning the content of government advertising, we do not know which type of 
advertising is more effective at changing people’s attitudes and behaviors. Are credit claiming ads 
more “effective” than information ads and behavior change ads. If they are not, what would be the 
reason? Relatedly, more comparative effort is needed to collect and process content data of ads 
from different countries. 
In all, this work constitutes the first comprehensive analysis of government advertising in 
the Brazilian context. It adds to our knowledge of comparative political communication in 
important ways and improves our understanding of the Brazilian politics at the local level. It is 
also the first study to use the experimental method to study the effectiveness of government 
advertising in a comprehensive way. Further, it applies content analysis to study the types of goals 
of government advertising by using a new classification scheme. In combination with the work 
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done here, political scientists will be better able to advance our understanding of government 
advertising in differenty settings and to structure a research agenda on the topic for the foreseeable 
future. 
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Appendix A Theory 
 
Appendix Figure 1 Example: Information Provision Advertising  
 
Translation: 7th Waters’ Forum of Minas Gerais. An open debate surrounded by water 
from all sides. From March 24 to March 28, it takes place in Belo Horizonte the 7th Waters’ Forum 
of Minas Gerais. An event that will gather committees of river basin, environmental technicians, 
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biologists, teachers and society. Among the addressed subjects are the preservation, the reuse and 
reduction of water consumption, climate change and its impact on the watersheds and the Brazilian 
electrical grid. Once again, Minas advances in the search for solutions to water preservation and 
the environment. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2 Example: Credit Claiming Advertising 
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Translation: Speaker: Good day, Mr. João! How are you doing? João: Now I’m doing 
well. Speaker: But what did it happen? João: My heart presented a problem. Speaker: So, did the 
help arrive fast? João: It was fast. I felt bad, my daughter called, and in less than 10 minutes help 
came and I was treated. Now I’m happy. Speaker: That’s great, Mr. João. Do you know this is 
happening because the government of Minas Gerais keeps expanding urgent care service in the 
municipalities? All for healthcare to be closer to people. João: This is very good. Speaker: Yeah! 
Despite the crisis last year, that the whole world felt and Brazil too, Minas kept investing in 
urgency care, in the recovery of regional hospitals, and in the creation of new rooms in the neonatal 
IR and in the distribution of free medicine. We can be proud of that! Because Minas is the first 
state in Brazil to produce vaccine against Meningitis C. Yeah, Mr João. Family gathered is very 
good for the heart. João: That’s it. Speaker: Minas goes well when mineiros go well. Minas’ 
government. 
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Appendix Figure 3 Example: Behavior Change Advertising 
 
Translation: Respect others and the road sign. Never park in forbidden places. The street 
belongs to all.  
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Appendix B Content Analysis 
Appendix B.1 Questionnaire 
var2. In your judgment, is the primary purpose of the ad to promote a policy or government 
actions, to claim credit for accomplishments, or to inform and alert the population to adopt 
or change a behavior? 
1. To publicize or promote a policy, event, or government action 
2. To claim credit for past or future policy measures and accomplishments 
3. To inform, educate, guide, or alert the viewer to adopt or change behavior 
88. DK 
99. N/A 
 
var3. Does the ad mention or picture specific examples of services, works, or improvements 
(e.g., a new bridge, a service being provided, etc.)? 
1. No 2. Yes 88. DK 
 
var4. (If “Yes” to var3). How many examples? 
1. One 2. Two 3. Three 4. More than three 88. DK 99. N/A 
 
var5. What is the time horizon used in the ad? 
1. Past 
2. A mix of past and present 
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3. Present 
4. A mix of present and future 
5. Future 
88. DK 
99. N/A 
 
var6. Does the ad mention the amount of money spent in the provision of a service or 
improvement? 
1. No 2. Yes 88. DK 
 
var7. Does the ad show supporting sources of evidence to bolster various claims? Select all 
that apply. 
1. No  
2. Yes, personal testimony from individual(s)  
3. Yes, news’ headlines  
4. Yes, statistical information  
5. Other  
88. DK 
99. N/A 
 
var8. Is a policy with a specific name mentioned or pictured in the ad? (e.g., Bolsa Família, 
Minha Casa Minha Vida, etc.) 
1. No 2. Yes 88. DK 
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var9. Does the ad sponsor or endorse some third-party initiative? 
1. No 2. Yes 88. DK 
 
var10. [For video ads only] Who speaks to the audience in the ad? 
1. Supporting actor(s) 2. Voiceover/announcer 3. Nobody 88. DK 
 
var11. Does the ad feature a celebrity? 
1. No 2. Yes 88. DK 
 
var12. (Group targeting). Aside from a narrator or central figure (who is or is not shown), 
who else figures prominently in the ad, in image or words? Select all that apply. 
Citizens/People 
Children 
Adolescents 
Elderly 
Workers 
Teachers 
Public servants 
Parents/families 
Handicapped 
Law enforcement 
Women 
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Doctors/medical personnel/pharmacists 
Celebrities 
Businessmen 
Farmers 
Other (please specify) 
None 
88. DK 
 
var13. Ad themes or issues: 
Economic policy 
Minimum wage 
Farming and cattle raising 
Business 
Union 
Employment/jobs 
Poverty 
Trade 
Economy (generic reference) 
 
Social issues 
Abortion 
Homosexuality/LGBT rights 
Moral/Family/Religious values 
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Tobacco 
Affirmative action 
Sexually transmitted diseases 
Race relations/Civil rights 
Human rights 
Women 
Gender 
 
Law and order 
Crime/Violence/Public security 
Police 
Firefighters 
Narcotics/Illegal drugs 
Sexual violence 
Corruption 
Honesty/integrity 
Other (please specify) 
 
Social welfare issues 
Education/Schools 
Childcare 
Other child-related issues 
Physical handicapping 
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Health care (not prescription drugs) 
Prescription drugs 
Social security 
Inequality 
Welfare 
Women’s health 
Leisure 
Social action 
Professional training 
Sports 
Quality of life 
 
Infrastructure 
Transit 
Public transportation 
Infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, airports) 
Public sanitation (e.g., water and sewage) 
Housing 
Urbanism (e.g., street lightning, pathways, trash collection) 
Energy 
Telecommunications 
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Government 
Taxes 
Deficit/surplus/budget/debt 
Government spending 
Government (public administration) 
 
Other 
Local issues 
Environment 
Culture 
Tourism 
Event/Holiday/Anniversary/Tribute 
Other (please specify) 
88. DK 
 
Appendix Table 1 Summary of Intercoder Reliability Results (Minas Gerais's State Government's Ads) 
  Percent agreement Cohen's Kappa 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
Ad's goal 0.851 0.036 0.000 0.763 0.056 0.000 
Specific examples of 
improvements 0.914 0.028 0.000 0.699 0.100 0.000 
Quantity of improvements 0.904 0.030 0.000 0.677 0.097 0.000 
Ad's time horizon 0.776 0.043 0.000 0.649 0.059 0.000 
Ad shows supporting sources of 
evidence  0.829 0.039 0.000 0.657 0.078 0.000 
Ad mentions or shows image of a 
public policy with a specific title 0.840 0.038 0.000 0.577 0.096 0.000 
Ad supports third-party initiatives 0.883 0.033 0.000 0.365 0.147 0.015 
Who communicates with the 
audience on TV 0.307 0.153 0.045 0.293 0.142 0.042 
Ad features a celebrity 0.978 0.015 0.000 0.655 0.228 0.005 
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Ad's issue: Economy 0.840 0.038 0.000 0.548 0.095 0.000 
Ad's issue: Social issues 0.957 0.020 0.000 0.643 0.166 0.000 
Ad's issue: Law and order 0.904 0.030 0.000 0.674 0.098 0.000 
Ad's issue: Social welfare 0.797 0.041 0.000 0.603 0.077 0.000 
Ad's issue: Infrastructure 0.893 0.032 0.000 0.628 0.105 0.000 
Ad's issue: Government 0.840 0.038 0.000 0.410 0.116 0.001 
 
Appendix Table 2 Summary of Intercoder Reliability Results (Minas Gerais's City Halls' Ads) 
  Percent agreement Cohen's Kappa 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
Ad's goal 0.815 0.038 0.000 0.647 0.071 0.000 
Specific examples of improvements 0.835 0.036 0.000 0.636 0.077 0.000 
Quantity of improvements 0.805 0.039 0.000 0.622 0.073 0.000 
Ad's time horizon 0.611 0.048 0.000 0.440 0.060 0.000 
Ad shows supporting sources of 
evidence  0.815 0.038 0.000 0.626 0.077 0.000 
Ad mentions or shows image of a 
public policy with a specific title 0.767 0.041 0.000 0.438 0.087 0.000 
Ad supports third-party initiatives 0.893 0.030 0.000 0.363 0.151 0.018 
Who communicates with the 
audience on TV 0.689 0.045 0.000 0.364 0.057 0.000 
Ad features a celebrity 0.990 0.009 0.000 0.883 0.115 0.000 
Ad's issue: Economy 0.902 0.029 0.000 0.408 0.144 0.005 
Ad's issue: Social issues 0.990 0.009 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Ad's issue: Law and order 0.961 0.019 0.000 0.648 0.162 0.000 
Ad's issue: Social welfare 0.767 0.041 0.000 0.545 0.083 0.000 
Ad's issue: Infrastructure 0.796 0.039 0.000 0.593 0.073 0.000 
Ad's issue: Government 0.912 0.028 0.000 0.704 0.091 0.000 
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Appendix C Experiment 
Appendix C.1 Experiment’s Questionnaire 
PRE-TREATMENT SURVEY QUESTIONS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
 
 
Gender. (1) male (2) female 
 
 
Age. What is your year range? 
 
(1) 18 a 24 year 
(2) 25 a 29 year 
(3) 30 a 39 year 
(4) 40 a 49 year 
(5) 50 a 59 year 
(6) 60 years or more 
 
 
State. In which state do you live? 
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Income. What is the family income of your household? Please, consider the combined income of 
members in the household. 
 
(1) Until 1 minimum wage (until R$ 998,00) 
(2) 1 to 2 minimum wages (R$ 999,00 a R$ 1.996,00) 
(3) 2 to 3 minimum wages (R$ 1.997,00 a R$ 2.994,00) 
(4) 3 to 5 minimum wages (R$ 2.995,00 a R$ 4.990,00) 
(5) 5 to 10 minimum wages (R$ 4.991,00 a R$ 9.980,00) 
(6) 10 to 15 minimum wages (R$ 9.991,00 a R$ 14.970,00) 
(7) More than 15 minimum wages (More than de R$ 14.970,00) 
 
 
Test sound. Which sound did you hear? 
 
(1) Rain 
(2) Siren 
(3) Bark 
(4) Car horn 
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Turnout. Did you vote in the last election? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
 
Education. What is the highest level of schooling you completed? 
 
(1) None  
(2) Primary incomplete  
(3) Primary complete  
(4) Secondary incomplete  
(5) Secondary complete  
(6) Technical school  
(7) University incomplete  
(8) University complete  
(9) Graduate degree (Doctorate, MA, MBA, Specialization) 
 
 
Political awareness – Attention to news (media exposure). About how often do you pay 
attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers, or the Internet? 
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(1) Daily  
(2) A few times a week  
(3) A few times a month  
(4) Rarely  
(5) Never 
 
 
Political awareness – Interest in Politics. How much interest do you have in politics? Would you 
say you are extremely interested, very interested, interested, a little interested, or not at all 
interested?  
 
(1) Extremely interested  
(2) Very interested  
(3) Interested  
(4) A little interested  
(5) Not interested 
 
 
Issue relevance (or involvement). To what degree would you say that the issue of 
UNEMPLOYMENT has personal relevance to you? To you, the issue of unemployment is 
extremely relevant, very relevant, relevant, a little relevant, or not at all relevant 
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(1) Extremely relevant  
(2) Very relevant  
(3) Relevant  
(4) A little relevant  
(5) Not relevant 
 
 
Trap question (paying attention). This is a question to verify your attention to this study. From 
the options below, select the option “Very important” 
 
(1) Extremely important  
(2) Very important 
(3) Important 
(4) A little important 
(5) Not important 
 
 
Favorite media. Which of the following mediums do you use the most to obtain the news? 
 
(1) TV  
(2) Radio  
(3) News’ websites  
(4) Printed newspaper  
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(5) Printed magazine  
(6) Social Media (such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, What’sApp, etc.)  
(7) Other 
 
 
Trust in the media. In general, how much trust do you have in the media (such as TV, radio, 
newspapers, among others) concerning the presentation of news in a fair, thorough, and 
trustworthy manner? Would you say you have an extreme amount of trust, a lot of trust, a moderate 
amount of trust, a little trust, or no trust? 
 
(1) Extreme amount of trust  
(2) A lot of trust  
(3) A moderate amount of trust  
(4) A little amount of trust  
(5) No trust 
 
 
Unemployed. What do you currently do? 
 
(1) I am employed or work by myself  
(2) I am not working but am looking for work  
(3) I am a student  
(4) I do domestic chores  
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(5) I am retired  
(6) I am neither working nor looking for work 
 
 
Party ID 1. Do you currently identify with a political party? 
 
(1) Yes [Continue to Party ID 2]  
(2) No  
(88) DK  
(98) DA 
 
 
Party ID 2. Which political party do you identify with?  
 
(1) MDB  
(2) PSDB  
(3) PT  
(4) PSL  
(5) Democratas  
(6) PP  
(7) PR  
(8) NOVO  
(9) REDE  
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(10) PDT  
(11) PCdoB  
(12) PSOL  
(13) Other 
 
 
POST-TREATMENT SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
MANIPULATION CHECKS: 
 
 
Manipulation check (Ad). Who is the advertiser of the video ad you watched? 
 
(1) The City Hall of Cruzeiro Novo  
(2) A political party (PBR)  
(3) Cruzeiro Novo’s Chamber of Commerce (ACCN) 
 
 
Manipulation check (News story). Based on the news story you read, what did the story say about 
the level of unemployment in the city? 
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(1) That unemployment increased  
(2) That unemployment decreased  
(3) News about the Municipal Soccer Championship in Cruzeiro Novo 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
 
Vote intention for mayor. If the mayor in question were running for reelection, how likely would 
you be to vote for him: highly likely, likely, unsure, unlikely, or highly unlikely? 
 
(1) Highly likely  
(2) Likely  
(3) Unsure  
(4) Unlikely  
(5) Highly unlikely 
 
 
Responsibility attribution. From the following list of entities, who do you think is the most 
responsible for the situation of employment in Cruzeiro Novo? 
 
(1) The business’ people  
(2) The City Hall of Cruzeiro Novo  
(3) The state government  
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(4) The Mayor Marcelo Costa 
(5) Other 
 
 
Ad effectiveness. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is “Not at all” and 5 is “Very”, I thought the ad 
was: (Not at all, A little, Some, A lot, Very) 
 
Fair          Important          Truthful          Convincing          Informative          Impartial 
 
 
Mayor’s performance. On a scale from 0 to 100, how much do you approve of the mayor’s job 
performance? Zero means disapprove strongly, and 100 means approve strongly. Fifty means you 
do not approve or disapprove. You can use any number between zero and 100. 
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Appendix C.2 Video Treatment and News Treatment Conditions in Portuguese 
Ad spot: Prefeitura de Cruzeiro Novo 
 
A Prefeitura está trabalhando para gerar mais empregos. E tem dado certo. Cruzeiro Novo já atraiu 
mais de 100 novas empresas e é destaque regional na geração de empregos. No último ano, mais 
de 10 mil novas vagas foram criadas. A renda média da população aumentou e o potencial de 
consumo também. Mais trabalho, vida mais digna. Prefeitura de Cruzeiro Novo. 
 
 
Ad spot: PBR 
 
O PBR está trabalhando para gerar mais empregos. E tem dado certo. Graças ao Prefeito Marcelo 
Costa, Cruzeiro Novo já atraiu mais de 100 novas empresas e é destaque regional na geração de 
empregos. No último ano, mais de 10 mil novas vagas foram criadas. A renda média da população 
aumentou e o potencial de consumo também. Mais trabalho, vida mais digna. PBR. 
 
 
Ad spot: Campeonato de Futebol de Cruzeiro Novo 
 
Pelo décimo ano consecutivo, a bola irá rolar nos gramados da cidade, mantendo a histórica relação 
entre o Cruzeirense e o futebol. Partidas de tirar o fôlego! Cerca de 20 equipes disputarão o 
primeiro lugar nas colocações. Uma grande festa do futebol. Parabéns a todos os atletas e que 
comece o próximo campeonato! Apoio: Associação Comercial de Cruzeiro Novo  
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Appendix C.3 News Treatment Condition 
Desemprego em Cruzeiro Novo [caiu/aumentou] no último semestre, aponta levantamento 
 
Dados divulgados ontem pela Associação Comercial, Industrial e de Serviços de Cruzeiro 
Novo (ACISCN) relativos ao último semestre mostram que o nível do desemprego no município 
[diminuiu/aumentou] e está em [6%/12%]. No ranking da região do estado, o município foi um 
dos que mais [gerou/perdeu] empregos. 
O levantamento também mostra que, ao todo, o número de contratações foi 
[superior/inferior] ao de demissões no último semestre. Os primeiros seis meses do ano 
registraram uma [melhora/piora] no saldo de empregos criados para o período nos últimos três 
anos, com 13428 vagas de trabalho com carteira assinada [criadas/fechadas]. Este número 
representa [um ganho/uma perda] de 34% em relação ao último período levantado. Em 
[crescimento/queda], a indústria foi responsável pela maioria das [contratações/demissões] no 
município, com 5380 vagas [a mais/a menos], seguida pela agricultura com [a criação/o 
fechamento] de 4297 vagas. O setor de comércio, serviços e construção civil também 
[aumentou/reduziu] as contratações e registrou [a criação/o fechamento] de 3900 vagas. 
Assim, os dados também apontam que a economia vem dando sinais de [melhora/piora] 
no município. Para Márcia Lisboa Teixeira, presidente da Câmara de Dirigentes Lojistas (CDL) 
de Cruzeiro Novo, são vários os fatores que contribuem para o aumento das 
[contratações/demissões]. O [desenvolvimento/recúo] do setor primário e sua ligação com o 
setor de serviços é um deles. “[Com/Sem] emprego e renda, as pessoas [vão/não vão] comprar. 
Temos um setor primário em forte [expansão/retração], no qual gira [muito/pouco] dinheiro. 
Isso também contribui para [o crescimento/a redução] no comércio”, observa.  
  245 
Appendix C.3.1 News Treatment Control Conditions in Portuguese 
[Grupo de controle]. Campeonato Municipal começa com muitos gols 
 
Começou no último final de semana a 1ª rodada do Campeonato Municipal de Futebol de 
Cruzeiro Novo. No total, 20 times participam da competição. Os jogos da 1ª rodada aconteceram 
no Centro Esportivo Antônio Mônaco, no Estádio Jardim das Rosas e no “Cruzeirão”.  
O início da rodada foi marcado por muitos gols. O Atlético Alvorada venceu o Cohab por 
4 a 1 com gols de Diguinho e André Macedo. Já no estádio Jardim das Rosas, o SET/Lagoa 
derrotou o Alvorada por 3 a 0, sendo dois gols de pênalti de Roberto Alves. Fechando a rodada, o 
Cruzeirense venceu o São Lucas por 3 a 2 com três gols de Newton Jordão. 
 
Appendix C.4 Principal Component Factors Analysis of Ad’s Effectiveness 
 
Appendix Table 3 Principal-Component Factor Analysis of Ad's Effectiveness Items 
  Retained factors Variance Proportion Cumulative 
  1 3.582 0.597 0.597 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Items Factor 1 Uniqueness     
Fair 0.833 0.305   
Important 0.784 0.383   
Truthful 0.840 0.293   
Convincing 0.793 0.37   
Informative 0.781 0.388   
Impartial 0.570 0.675   
2() =  Prob  2 =        
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Appendix C.5 Power Analysis 
 
 
Appendix Figure 4 Experiment’s Power Analysis  
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Appendix Table 4 Comparison of the Experimental Sample's Distributions of Region, Gender, and Education 
in Comparison to the Electoral Tribunal Court’s (TSE) Data 
Variable Item 
TSE 
(%) 
Experiment 
(%) 
Region Midwest 7.30 8.22 
 North 7.83 5.00 
 Northeast 26.63 22.22 
 South 14.53 15.39 
 Southeast 43.38 49.17 
Gender Man 47.50 49.78 
  Woman 52.50 50.22 
Education Illiterate (None) 4.40 0.06 
 Primary incomplete 25.80 1.83 
 Primary complete 6.80 3.33 
 Secondary incomplete 16.80 4.94 
 Secondary complete 22.70 30.06 
 College incomplete 4.90 19.39 
  College complete 9.10 20.78 
 
Appendix Table 5 Panel Participants 
  Panel % N 
Age   
18 - 24 24.94 449 
25 - 29 14.11 254 
30 - 39 22.33 402 
40 - 49 20.17 363 
50 - 59 13.44 242 
60+ 5.00 90 
Gender   
Male 49.78 896 
Female 50.22 904 
Education   
None  0.06 1 
Primary incomplete  1.83 33 
Primary complete  3.33 60 
Secondary incomplete  4.94 89 
Secondary complete  30.06 541 
Technical school  7.00 126 
University incomplete  19.39 349 
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University complete  20.78 374 
Graduate degree 12.61 227 
Family income   
Until 1 minimum wage 15.22 274 
1 - 2 minimum wage 24.78 446 
2 - 3 minimum wage 17.89 322 
3 - 5 minimum wage 19.39 349 
5 - 10 minimum wage 15.17 273 
10 - 15 minimum wage 5.33 96 
15+ 2.22 40 
 
Appendix C.6 Balance Tables 
Appendix Table 6 Balance Table for Treatment: Video Ad 
  (1) (2) (3) t-test t-test t-test 
 
Control 
ad City Hall ad Party ad Difference Difference Difference 
Variable Mean/SE Mean/SE Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (2)-(3) 
Age group 2.987 2.985 2.970 0.002 0.017 0.015 
 [0.064] [0.062] [0.061]    
Gender 0.495 0.498 0.513 -0.003 -0.018 -0.015 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]    
Education 6.323 6.417 6.497 -0.093 -0.173* -0.080 
 [0.070] [0.074] [0.072]    
Family income 3.178 3.133 3.270 0.045 -0.092 -0.137 
 [0.060] [0.064] [0.068]    
Looking for job 0.140 0.155 0.145 -0.015 -0.005 0.010 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.014]    
Turnout 0.935 0.917 0.933 0.018 0.002 -0.017 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]    
Media - TV 0.290 0.283 0.285 0.007 0.005 -0.002 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.018]    
Attention to news 4.677 4.608 4.677 0.068* 0.000 -0.068* 
 [0.028] [0.030] [0.028]    
Political interest 3.142 3.115 3.202 0.027 -0.060 -0.087 
 [0.042] [0.044] [0.046]    
Issue involvement: 
unemployment 4.417 4.433 4.473 -0.017 -0.057 -0.040 
 [0.033] [0.032] [0.030]    
Trust on the media 3.117 3.102 3.175 0.015 -0.058 -0.073 
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 [0.031] [0.031] [0.034]    
Party preference 0.330 0.320 0.358 0.010 -0.028 -0.038 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]    
N 600 600 600       
F-test of joint 
significance (F-
stat)    0.523 0.488 0.932 
F-test, number of 
observations       1200 1200 1200 
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. 
The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. 
 
Appendix Table 7 Balance Table for Treatment: News on Unemployment 
  (1) (2) (3) t-test t-test t-test 
 
Control 
news 
Unempl. 
increase 
Unempl. 
decrease Difference Difference Difference 
Variable Mean/SE Mean/SE Mean/SE (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (2)-(3) 
Age group 2.993 2.907 3.042 0.087 -0.048 -0.135 
 [0.062] [0.062] [0.063]    
Gender 0.495 0.437 0.575 0.058** -0.080*** -0.138*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]    
Education 6.475 6.382 6.380 0.093 0.095 0.002 
 [0.070] [0.072] [0.073]    
Family income 3.332 3.125 3.125 0.207** 0.207** 0.000 
 [0.066] [0.061] [0.065]    
Looking for 
job 0.137 0.153 0.150 -0.017 -0.013 0.003 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.015]    
Turnout 0.940 0.922 0.923 0.018 0.017 -0.002 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]    
Media - TV 0.283 0.257 0.318 0.027 -0.035 -0.062** 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]    
Attention to 
news 4.673 4.653 4.635 0.020 0.038 0.018 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.030]    
Political 
interest 3.192 3.153 3.113 0.038 0.078 0.040 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.043]    
Issue 
involvement: 
unemployment 4.398 4.458 4.467 -0.060 -0.068 -0.008 
 [0.033] [0.031] [0.031]    
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Trust on the 
media 3.080 3.168 3.145 -0.088* -0.065 0.023 
 [0.033] [0.031] [0.032]    
Party 
preference 0.343 0.332 0.333 0.012 0.010 -0.002 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]    
N 600 600 600       
F-test of joint 
significance 
(F-stat)    1.477 1.382 0.971 
F-test, number 
of 
observations       1200 1200 1200 
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. 
The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. 
 
Appendix C.7 Regression Results 
Appendix Table 8 Determinants of Attribution to Responsibility for Unemployment to City Hall and the 
City's Mayor (Additional Independent Variables) 
  Attribution to City Hall Attribution to Mayor 
  Odds ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>|z| 
% change 
in odds Odds ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>|z| 
% change 
in odds 
Control ad x 
Unempl. increased 0.516** 0.113 0.002 -48.4 0.854 0.229 0.556 -14.6 
Control ad x 
Unempl. decreased 0.928 0.191 0.716 -7.2 1.409 0.352 0.171 40.9 
City Hall ad x 
Control news 1.835** 0.375 0.003 83.5 1.374 0.346 0.207 37.4 
City Hall ad x 
Unempl. increased 1.194 0.244 0.386 19.4 0.460* 0.143 0.013 -54.0 
City Hall ad x 
Unempl. decreased 1.728** 0.355 0.008 72.8 1.505 0.374 0.099 50.5 
Party ad x Control 
news 0.706 0.148 0.097 -29.4 3.144*** 0.746 0.000 214.4 
Party ad x Unempl. 
increased 0.667 0.141 0.055 -33.3 1.819* 0.445 0.014 81.9 
Party ad x Unempl. 
decreased 0.705 0.148 0.096 -29.5 3.922*** 0.926 0.000 292.2 
Age group 0.901** 0.031 0.003 -9.9 1.136** 0.044 0.001 13.6 
Gender 0.941 0.097 0.557 -5.9 1.252 0.147 0.056 25.2 
Education 1.008 0.033 0.808 0.8 0.860*** 0.032 0.000 -14.0 
Family income 0.972 0.038 0.478 -2.8 1.002 0.045 0.956 0.2 
Looking for job 0.794 0.118 0.120 -20.6 1.039 0.172 0.815 3.9 
Turnout 0.880 0.171 0.513 -12.0 1.251 0.288 0.330 25.1 
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Media - TV 1.290* 0.147 0.025 29.0 0.763* 0.100 0.040 -23.7 
Attention to the 
news 1.190* 0.095 0.031 19.0 .843* 0.070 0.041 -15.7 
Political interest 1.015 0.057 0.794 1.5 0.996 0.063 0.953 -0.4 
Issue involvement: 
unemployment 0.995 0.066 0.943 -0.5 1.020 0.077 0.797 2.0 
Trust in the media 1.042 0.068 0.534 4.2 1.080 0.079 0.298 8.0 
Party preference 1.077 0.119 0.504 7.7 0.993 0.126 0.957 -0.7 
N 1800       1800      
Log Likelihood -1165.04    -954.31    
LR chi2(17) 91.94    150.18    
Prob > chi2 0.000    0.000    
McFadden R2 0.038       0.072       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 
Appendix Table 9 Impact of Video Ads and News on the Likelihood of Supporting the Mayor's Reelection 
(Additional Independent Variables) 
  
Odds 
ratio 
Std. 
Err. P>|z| 
% change in 
odds 
Control ad x Unempl. increased 0.431*** 0.079 0.000 -56.9 
Control ad x Unempl. decreased 2.554*** 0.475 0.000 155.4 
City Hall ad x Control news 4.217*** 0.777 0.000 321.7 
City Hall ad x Unempl. increased 0.675* 0.125 0.035 -32.5 
City Hall ad x Unempl. decreased 6.931*** 1.304 0.000 593.1 
Party ad x Control news 4.202*** 0.775 0.000 320.2 
Party ad x Unempl. increased 0.810 0.151 0.260 -19.0 
Party ad x Unempl. decreased 5.505*** 1.027 0.000 450.5 
Age group 1.020 0.030 0.507 2.0 
Gender 1.038 0.093 0.681 3.8 
Education 0.950 0.027 0.079 -5.0 
Family income 0.981 0.033 0.571 -1.9 
Looking for job 0.897 0.115 0.394 -10.3 
Turnout 1.101 0.188 0.572 10.1 
Media - TV 1.039 0.104 0.703 3.9 
Attention to the news 0.987 0.066 0.850 -1.3 
Political interest 1.296*** 0.064 0.000 29.6 
Issue involvement: unemployment 1.130* 0.066 0.037 13.0 
Trust in the media 1.447*** 0.087 0.000 44.7 
Party preference 1.014 0.096 0.888 1.4 
N 1800      
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Log Likelihood -2465.53    
LR chi2(10) 546.99    
Prob > chi2 0.000    
McFadden R2 0.099       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Appendix Table 10 Impact of Treatment, Interactions, and Additional Variables on Ad's Sponsor's 
Credibility, Ad's Effectiveness, and Mayor's Approval 
 Variable 
(1) Ad's sponsor's 
credibility 
(2) Ad's 
effectiveness 
(3) Mayor's 
approval 
Control ad x Unempl. increased 
-0.034 
(0.082) 
-0.023 
(0.082) 
-10.800*** 
(2.225) 
Control ad x Unempl. decreased 
0.213** 
(0.081) 
0.143 
(0.082) 
8.548*** 
(2.218) 
City Hall ad x Control news 
0.480*** 
(0.081) 
0.396*** 
(0.082) 
15.100*** 
(2.219) 
City Hall ad x Unempl. increased 
0.088 
(0.082) 
0.001 
(0.082) 
-5.822** 
(2.224) 
City Hall ad x Unempl. decreased 
0.556*** 
(0.082) 
0.496*** 
(0.082) 
18.860*** 
(2.228) 
Party ad x Control news 
0.265*** 
(0.081) 
0.320*** 
(0.082) 
12.550*** 
(2.218) 
Party ad x Unempl. increased 
0.032 
(0.081) 
-0.019 
(0.082) 
-2.618 
(2.219) 
Party ad x Unempl. decreased 
0.496*** 
(0.081) 
0.457*** 
(0.082) 
16.870*** 
(2.219) 
Age group 
-0.026 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.592 
(0.369) 
Gender 
0.060 
(0.040) 
0.056  
(0.040) 
1.109  
(1.095) 
Education 
-0.057***  
(0.013) 
-0.085***  
(0.013) 
-1.454*** 
(0.354) 
Family income 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
0.854* 
(0.417) 
Looking for job 
-0.044 
(0.057) 
-0.065 
(0.057) 
0.261 
(1.547) 
Turnout 
0.011 
(0.076) 
0.119 
(0.076) 
4.424* 
(2.065) 
Media - TV 
-0.039 
(0.044) 
-0.015 
(0.044) 
1.559 
(1.211) 
Attention to the news 
0.057 
(0.030) 
0.055 
(0.030) 
0.744 
(0.816) 
Political interest 
0.052* 
(0.021) 
0.036 
(0.021) 
1.627** 
(0.592) 
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Issue involvement: unemployment 
0.058* 
(0.025) 
0.042 
(0.026) 
0.563 
(0.701) 
Trust in the media 
0.193*** 
(0.025) 
0.208*** 
(0.025) 
4.202*** 
(0.694) 
Party preference 
0.052 
(0.043) 
0.055 
(0.043) 
0.713 
(1.170) 
N 1800 1800 1800 
Adj. R2 .117 .125 .210 
F 12.89 13.84 24.92 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix D Hybrid Models (Full Results) – Minas Gerais 
Appendix Table 11 Hybrid Models: The Effects of Government Advertising and Other Covariates on the 
Incumbent's Party Vote Share for Governor, the Incumbent's Party's Personal Vote Share, and Municipal 
Turnout for the Gubernatorial Election (2006-2010-2014) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
(log) Ad spending -0.0066 -0.0090 -0.0005 
per voter (within) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0017) 
(log) Ad spending 0.0068 0.0573** -0.0032 
per voter (mean) (0.0092) (0.0239) (0.0031) 
(log) Number of voters -0.0057 0.0289*** -0.3006*** 
(within) (0.0405) (0.0098) (0.0134) 
(log) Number of voters -0.0865** 0.3421*** -0.0963*** 
(mean) (0.0430) (0.0826) (0.0171) 
(log) Municipal GDP 0.0211** 0.0008 0.0074*** 
per capita (within) (0.0089) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
(log) Municipal GDP -0.0061 -0.0043 0.0037 
per capita (mean) (0.0091) (0.0144) (0.0043) 
(log) Municipal per capita -0.0213** -0.0023 0.0034 
income formal sector (within) (0.0084) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
(log) Municipal per capita 0.0179 0.0085 0.0070 
income formal sector (mean) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0044) 
Co-partisan mayor 0.0005 0.0000 0.0009 
(within) (0.0057) (0.0019) (0.0013) 
Co-partisan mayor -0.0169 0.0230* -0.0011 
(mean) (0.0123) (0.0135) (0.0049) 
Mayor's party aligned with 0.0046 0.0012 0.0020** 
the federal government (within) (0.0044) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Mayor's party aligned with -0.0038 0.0250* 0.0024 
the federal government (mean) (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0037) 
Governor's travels 0.0001** 0.0029*** 0.0000** 
(within) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Governor's travels 0.0002** 0.0340*** 0.0000** 
(mean) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) 
Municipality's ideology 0.1380*** 0.0229*** 0.0095** 
score (within) (0.0198) (0.0076) (0.0046) 
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Municipality's ideology 0.3302*** -0.0288 0.0274** 
score (mean) (0.0290) (0.0347) (0.0118) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0085** -0.0018** 0.0011 
Polarization Index (within) (0.0034) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0467*** -0.0045 -0.0012 
Polarization Index (mean) (0.0057) (0.0090) (0.0020) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s -0.0481** 0.0051 -0.0034 
transfers per family (within) (0.0190) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s -0.1865*** 0.1393** -0.0347** 
transfers per family (mean) (0.0348) (0.0701) (0.0142) 
(log) Homicide rate 0.0194 -0.0027 -0.0018 
(within) (0.0182) (0.0046) (0.0043) 
(log) Homicide rate -0.0471 0.2125*** -0.01597 
(mean) (0.0355) (0.0767) (0.0151) 
Mortality rate (standardized) 0.0010 0.0002 0.0007 
(within) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Mortality rate (standardized) -0.0016 -0.0208*** 0.0031* 
(mean) (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0015) 
(log) Dependency ratio 0.3030*** 0.0446*** 0.0088 
(within) (0.0326) (0.0117) (0.0075) 
(log) Dependency ratio 0.0755 -0.4122*** -0.3590*** 
(mean) (0.0725) (0.1294) (0.0302) 
Municipal Human -0.6761*** -0.0781 0.0386 
Development Index (within) (0.1719) (0.0731) (0.0425) 
Municipal Human 0.2569* -0.0895 0.1251** 
Development Index (mean) (0.1390) (0.1416) (0.0538) 
(log) Population -0.7554* -0.1354 -0.0374 
(within) (0.3939) (0.0883) (0.1195) 
(log) Population 0.0562 -0.2372*** 0.0685*** 
(mean) (0.0400) (0.0695) (0.0162) 
Percent of urban population 0.0664 0.0293* 0.0268 
(within) (0.0570) (0.0158) (0.0182) 
Percent of urban population -0.0741*** -0.0452** -0.0200** 
(mean) (0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0097) 
Percent of seniors -1.0712*** -0.1158* 0.4641*** 
(within) (0.1963) (0.0612) (0.0504) 
Percent of seniors 0.0747 0.3581 0.5353*** 
(mean) (0.2926) (0.3841) (0.1199) 
(log) Population density 0.7336* 0.1503 0.1437 
(within) (0.4229) (0.1016) (0.1285) 
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(log) Population density 0.0168*** 0.0323*** 0.0177*** 
(mean) (0.0216) (0.0106) (0.0014) 
Constant 
1.9216*** 
(0.2071) 
-1.7155*** 
(0.5378) 
0.6464 
(0.0863) 
Dummy for governor Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for year Yes Yes Yes 
χ2 13359.85 249407.24 3400.59 
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 (within) 0.863 0.320 0.546 
R2 (between) 0.321 0.947 0.687 
R2 (overall) 0.715 0.945 0.671 
N 2,559 2,559 2,559 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Dep. variable of Model 1: incumbent's party vote share for governor; Dep. variable of 
Model 2: incumbent's party's personal vote share; Dep. variable of Model 3:  
municipal turnout for the gubernatorial election. 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Appendix E Hybrid Models (Full Results) – Brazilian Municipalities 
Appendix Table 12 Hybrid Model: The Effects of Government Advertising Spending and Other Covariates 
on Incumbent's Vote Share 
  (1)  
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0006 
per voter (within) (0.0025) 
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0032** 
per voter (mean) (0.0015) 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending 0.0264*** 
per voter (within) (0.0028) 
(log) Incumbent’s campaign spending 0.0295*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0023) 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending -0.0910*** 
per voter (within) (0.0041) 
(log) Challengers’ campaign spending -0.0872*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0029) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0583*** 
(within) (0.0027) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0557*** 
(mean) (0.0030) 
Mayor's party aligned with the 0.0033 
governor (within) (0.0042) 
Mayor's party aligned with the -0.0014 
governor (mean) (0.0063) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0023 
(within) (0.0193) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0067 
(mean) (0.0150) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political 0.0005 
Polarization Index (within) (0.0032) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0006 
Polarization Index (mean) (0.0029) 
Runoff election -0.1495*** 
(within) (0.0437) 
Runoff election 0.1569*** 
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(mean) (0.0266) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0020 
(within) (0.0095) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0154 
(mean) (0.0037) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s 0.0129*** 
transfers per Family (within) (0.0076) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s 0.0032* 
transfers per Family (mean) (0.0077) 
Municipal Human -0.1822 
Development Index (within) (0.1129) 
Municipal Human 0.1153** 
Development Index (mean) (0.0553) 
(log) Population -0.1777 
(within) (0.1507) 
(log) Population -0.0068*** 
(mean) (0.0021) 
Percent of urban population -0.0366 
(within) (0.0890) 
Percent of urban population 0.0072 
(mean) (0.0098) 
(log) Population density 0.2371 
(within) (0.1724) 
(log) Population density 0.0065*** 
(mean) (0.0019) 
 0.5605*** 
Constant (0.0595) 
Dummies for state Yes 
Dummies for year Yes 
χ2 3979.96 
P > χ2 0.000 
R2 (within) 0.406 
R2 (between) 0.472 
R2 (overall) 0.453 
N 7,611 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 13 Hybrid Model: The Effects of Government Advertising Spending and Other Covariates 
on Municipal Turnout 
  (1)  
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0002 
per voter (within) (0.0003) 
(log) Spending with government ads 0.0012*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0004) 
(log) Campaign spending 0.0067*** 
per voter (within) (0.0005) 
(log) Campaign spending 0.0063*** 
per voter (mean) (0.0009) 
Number of candidates for mayor -0.0002 
(within) (0.0003) 
Number of candidates for mayor 0.0005 
(mean) (0.0007) 
Mayor's party aligned with the 0.0013** 
governor (within) (0.0006) 
Mayor's party aligned with the -0.0016 
governor (mean) (0.0019) 
Municipality's ideology score -0.0080** 
(within) (0.0033) 
Municipality's ideology score 0.0227*** 
(mean) (0.0049) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political 0.0002 
Polarization Index (within) (0.0005) 
Municipal Dalton’s Political -0.0001 
Polarization Index (mean) (0.0009) 
Runoff election -0.0052 
(within) (0.0046) 
Runoff election 0.0533*** 
(mean) (0.0060) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0057*** 
(within) (0.0013) 
(log) Municipal GDP per capita 0.0125*** 
(mean) (0.0011) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s 0.0031*** 
transfers per Family (within) (0.0011) 
(log) Bolsa Família’s -0.0063*** 
transfers per Family (mean) (0.0011) 
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Municipal Human 0.2777*** 
Development Index (within) (0.0185) 
Municipal Human 0.2001*** 
Development Index (mean) (0.0176) 
(log) Population -0.0246 
(within) (0.0199) 
(log) Population -0.0307*** 
(mean) (0.0007) 
Percent of urban population 0.0077 
(within) (0.0127) 
Percent of urban population -0.0322*** 
(mean) (0.0031) 
(log) Population density 0.0266 
(within) (0.0226) 
(log) Population density 0.0096*** 
(mean) (0.0005) 
 0.9024 
Constant (0.0178) 
Dummies for state Yes 
Dummies for year Yes 
χ2 13815.26 
P > χ2 0.000 
R2 (within) 0.256 
R2 (between) 0.566 
R2 (overall) 0.504 
N 16,599 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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